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NASHVILLE MODEL CITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

"The Congress hereby finds and declares that improving the quality
of urban life is the most critical domestic problem facing the United
States."' There were probably few Americans in 1966 who did not
understand the real import of that sentence. The cities had been decaying for a long time. But suddenly there was an urgency that made the
disintegrating quality of urban life a "critical" problem and virtually
forced Congress to enact the costly and experimental Model Cities
Program in an election year. The problem was that the victims of urban
deterioration-the ghetto residents-had begun to dismantle the inner
cities at a furious pace. The most recent pattern of urban violence had
begun in 1963 in Birmingham, Alabama. Viewed, at first, as a regional
aberration brought on by the South's racial policies, the seasonal riots
spread during succeeding summers to nearly every major city in the
nation. Then in the summer of 1965, a Los Angeles slum called Watts
exploded in the worst domestic urban violence since the 1943 Detroit
riots. 2 The message of Watts was more than the failure of the local,
state, and federal governments to deal adequately with the problems of
the inner cities. It proved beyond doubt that the problem was not regional, but national in scope, and that a speedy solution was critical to
the stability of the country.
It was not as if the federal government had been ignoring the
deteriorating condition of American cities. In fact, much of Washington's time during the past two decades had been spent in devising elaborate methods of pouring federal money into municipal programs. The
traditional method was the patchwork system of grants-in-aid. As a
new problem arose or an old program failed, the federal government
would respond by appending a new grant-in-aid program to the faltering
segment of the old structure. In reality, however, the more than 400
individual categorical grants did not even begin to cover all of the subtle
1. Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, § 101, 42
U.S.C. § 3301 (1970).
2. REPORT OF THE U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 38 (Bantam ed. 1968).
3. Generally, 4 conditions attach to grants-in-aid: that the money be spent only for a specific
purpose; that matching funds be provided according to a specified formula; that the receiving unit
of government establish an administering agency with which the federal government can deal
directly; and that the federal government reserve the right to monitor the use of the grant. Ervin,
Federalism and Federal Grants-In-Aid, 43 N.C.L. REV. 487, 490 (1965). Thus, regardless of
whether the failure of state and local governments to solve their problems results from lack of
revenue or lack of responsibility, the grant-in-aid is designed to fill the breach by providing the
cash and by requiring that it be spent on projects implementing a federally defined purpose
according to federally defined standards.
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local problems that a city might face. And the top-to-bottom lack of
coordination between the agencies administering different grants-in-aid
programs usually rendered impossible a coordinated use of several
grants-in-aid programs to attack the interrelated complex of problems

that constitutes urban blight.4 Local "grantsmen" and national consulting firms tended to concentrate their efforts on developing the personal
contacts and the technical expertise needed to milk the myriad grant-

in-aid programs for maximum federal dollar return. Once the money
arrived, the experts had completed their jobs, but the problems remained.
The next idea off the federal drawing board was the Community
Action Program (CAP). 5 The creation of professional social planners'
and innovative New-Frontiersmen, 7 the CAP envisioned an enthusiastic
coalition of public and private sectors, government, citizens, local institutions-all working together to plan and implement a coordinated and
comprehensive attack on the blight of the city. Three problems quickly
became apparent. The CAP had nothing to do with physical redevelopment so that, ultimately, it represented neither a coordinated nor a
comprehensive approach. Moreover, as finally enacted, the legislation
establishing the CAP had been so watered down that it offered but slim
hope of any real planning effectiveness." Finally, the built-in resistance
of institutons to change and to a new theory of citizen involvement in
urban problem solving-something called "maximum feasible partici4. Part of the difficulty stems from the fact that the problem to be solved by the grant is
defined by the federal government, not by the individual community. Moreover, a city dependent
on federal grants is forced to solve its problems not according to its own sense of priorities, but
according to what happens to be on the grant-in-aid shopping list. This distortion of priorities is
aggravated further by the inadequate funding of certain grants during a given year and by the
inability of a city to meet the matching fund requirement for a needed grant. See note I I infra
and accompanying text.
5. Economic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2737-49 (1970).

6. See P.
7. See D.

MARRIS & M. REIN, DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL REFORM 7-32 (1967).
MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING, COMMUNITY ACTION IN
THE WAR ON POVERTY 61-101 (1969).

8. President Johnson and Congress apparently were more interested in immediate, tangible
results than in long range planning (especially in an election year). Id. at 41-43. Thus, the innovative
local planning contemplated in the Community Action Program was of secondary significance to
the more specific programs already detailed in the Act. Similarly, the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), which administered the Act, tended to grant funds as individual programs were
proposed by the cities, rather than requiring them to develop a comprhensive plan. J. SUNDQUIST

& D.

DAVIS, MAKING FEDERALISM WORK

39 (1969). OEO even took the initiative and proposed

its own programs such as Head Start, Upward Bound, and legal services. Congress subsequently
earmarked funds specifically for these programs, thereby removing money from the general grants
for the CAP's. Hence, instead Sfencouraging the cities to develop innovative programs, OEO and
Congress created what were essentially more federal grants-in-aid.
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pation of the residents"-had combined in many cities to produce ugly
clashes between citizens and local government?
Watts spoke of the failure of these attempts to eradicate urban
blight. Physically, the inner cities continued to deteriorate. The largest
grant-in-aid program for physical redevelopment, urban renewal, had
been available to the cities since 1949. Yet seventeen years later, seven
million substandard homes remained, 0 while only a fraction of the appropriated money had been used." The cities were often too poor to take
advantage of the program, and the shabby treatment of families displaced by urban renewal projects aroused anger and distrust among the
poor. Nor had there been significantly greater success in the area of
social services. Existing institutions had failed, for example, to alleviate
chronic unemployment or to provide adequate health care. 2 Attempts
to alter these institutions and to devise new programs through the
CAP's often created more tension between the poor and the government.
In October 1965, President Johnson commissioned a task force on
urban problems under the leadership of Robert C. Wood, then Chairman of the Political Science Department at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. 3 The recommendations of the task force included a
demonstration cities program, which was adopted by the President in
his message to Congress on January 26, 1966." The program was endorsed heartily by the nation's mayors, who questioned, however, the
adequacy of the proposed funding. 5 Following a lengthy congressional
battle,"8 the legislation was passed and signed into law on November 3,
1966, as Title I of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Develop9. For a discussion of some of the factors leading to these clashes see D. MOYNIHAN, supra
note 7, at 102-66. Tension developed quickly, and, in the spring of 1965, a delegation of mayors
appeared in Washington to persuade the Administration to aid them in dampening the activities
of the local community action agencies that administered the CAP's. It was suggested to OEO
that greater emphasis be placed on the role of the poor in the administration of poverty programs,
rather than in policy-making and planning. Id. at 145. Ultimately, the 1965 amendments to the
Economic Opportunity Act included a proposal by Representative Edith Green to empower local

governments to bring the community action agencies under local government control. 42
U.S.C. § 2790(a) (1970).
10. H.R. REP. No. 1931, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966).
II. The Demonstration Cities Controversy, 46 CONG. DIG. 36, 45 (1967).
12. Hetzel & Pinsky, The Model Cities Program, 22 VAND. L. REV.727 (1969).
13. Id.
14. H.R. Doe. No. 368, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966).
15. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 181-82 (1966) (testimony of Hugh J. Addonizio, Mayor of Newark,
New Jersey).
16. See The Demonstration Cities Controversy, supra note 11.
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ment Act of 1966.17
The thrust of the Act was to provide the necessary funds for a

limited number of cities (ultimately 150)"8 and to plan and implement a
comprehensive attack on urban blight within a selected target-area
neighborhood in each of the cities chosen. Although the Act was vague
about the structure that a Model Cities program should have, the regulations governing the program quickly filled this void." Structurally, a
Model Cities program was divided into two phases: one year of planning
and five so-called action years."' During the planning year, each city was

required to prepare and submit a Problem Analysis and a Comprehensive City Demonstration Plan (CCDP). The Problem Analysis, which

was to be prepared in the first six months of the planning year, was a
detailed compilation and analysis of data on problems in the target area

neighborhood in each of ten categories or component areas (Housing,
Employment, Economic Development, Transportation, Physical Environment, Health, Recreation and Culture, Education, Social Services,
and Crime Reduction).2 1 In addition to this systematic survey of data,
the Problem Analysis was to include a set of five-year goals for each
component category and program strategies for achieving those goals.

The second half of the planning year was to be spent devising a set of
projects for the first action year in each of the ten component areas. The
projects were to utilize not only the existing panoply of federal grantsin-aid, but also state, local, and private resources that might be

available. When resources were inadequate, the city could plan programs to be funded with Model Cities funding. The first action year
projects, which constituted the bulk of the CCDP, were to be planned
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301-13 (1970).
18. The 150 cities selected to participate in Model Cities were chosen in 2 groups of 75
approximately one year apart. Cities selected in the earlier group are commonly referred to as
"first round" Model Cities and the latter group as "second round" Model Cities.
19. There are 2 basic documentary sources that the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) has used in prescribing the administrative structure of the Model Cities
program: CDA Letters and Technical Assistance Bulletins (TABS). For a more detailed description of these regulatory publications see Appendix 11 infra. The basic structure that a Model Cities
program was to take was published in CDA Letters I and 4. To assist cities in developing their
programs, a more informal presentation of the administrative regulations was published in a
lengthy pamphlet. HUD, Improving the Quality of Urban Life (1967).
20. A third phase also might be added to this structure, the preparation of the Planning
Grant Application. During this phase, several basic steps were to be taken by a city, such as
selecting the Model Neighborhood Area, establishing the citizen participation structure, and initiating the basic data gathering process.
21. The precise names and scope of these 10 component areas have varied somewhat over
the history of the Model Cities program. For example, the Physical Environment component has
been renamed Environmental Protection and Development.
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in coordination with the five-year goals by means of a year-by-year set

of objectives. 22 Thus, the CCDP was something of a master plan for the
entire five-year implementation effort, as well as a detailed administra-

tive outline for the first action year projects. As each action year was
completed, a new set of projects for the succeeding action year was to
be submitted for funding. In theory, each of the new projects would

build on the accomplishments and experience gained in the previous
action years, thereby ensuring a comprehensive five-year effort to

achieve the program's goals and objectives.23
From the outset the Model Cities Program was designed to avoid

all of the problems of the federal grant-in-aid system, while it simultaneously utilized the structure and resources that the system made available

to the cities. The Model Cities Program was to be administered locally
by an arm of the city government, not by a semi-autonomous local
public agency, such as a housing authority. The program was to be
planned at the local level to fit local needs and resources, rather than
to conform to federally planned guidelines. 24 Coordination in attacking
interrelated problems was to be emphasized at the local level by comprehensive planning and at the federal level by inter-agency cooperation.

Projects for each action year were to be planned with a specific amount
of Model Cities funds in mind.? The assurance of a predetermined level
of funding was designed to permit the city to allocate resources rationally rather than to plan projects to achieve maximum federal dollar
22. These goals and objectives originally were to be coordinated by a complex interrelation
of program approaches. See HUD, CDA Letter No. 4, HUD Handbook MCGR 3100.4 (July
1968). After the first round Model Cities programs experienced difficulty in using this complex
planning process, the goals and objectives requirements were simplified substantially. HUD, Circular MC 3140.3 (Dec. 1969).
23. The coordination and evaluation plans were to be an integral part of the CCDP that each
city submitted at the end of the planning year. It was anticipated that these mechanisms would
afford the CDA the capacity to monitor its success and failure and use the information as an input
in a continuous replanning process during the five action years.
24. To the extent that a project in a Model Cities program relied on non-Model Cities grantin-aid funds, the guidelines of the other grant-in-aid programs, of course, would have to be followed. The availability of funds to plan for one year, however, tended to focus local efforts more
on the problems to be solved and less on the federal grant-in-aid guidelines that had to be met.
Furthermore, the Model Cities funds that were available to implement projects had virtually no
programmatic restrictions and required no local matching money. Indeed, under certain circumstances, the Model Cities funds could be used by a city as the local matching money for new
categorical grant-in-aid programs in the Model Neighborhood Area. 42 U.S.C. § 3305(d) (1970).
25. The "target amount" of Model Cities funds upon which a city's first action year program
was to be based was computed by HUD from a formula that emphasized the population of the
city and the relative severity of its problems. Hetzel & Pinsky, supra note 12, at 734; see 42
U.S.C. § 3305(c) (1970). In most Model Cities programs the first action year target figure has
been continued as the amount for each subsequent action year's funding.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

return. Finally, each step of the Model Cities Program was to be implemented with "widespread citizen participation," thereby hopefully
avoiding the hostility that had been visited upon other federal urban
programs that seemed to have been imposed unilaterally on those whom
the program had sought to help.
This is the way a Model Cities program was supposed to look. The
narrative that follows is an attempt to discover why in one city, despite
hard work and general good faith on the part of all concerned, the
Model Cities concept went awry. The Model Cities program examined
is that of Nashville, Tennessee. It clearly should be understood that the
failure of this program is neither typical of all Model Cities programs
(indeed it is commonly acknowledged to be one of the worst), nor is it
typical of other federal programs operated by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Tennessee. Furthermore, this study is not intended
as an expos6 of the problems that unfortunately have been encountered
by Nashville Model Cities. Instead, it is designed to examine how one
federal proverty program that appeared to have strong potential for
success ultimately degenerated into an all too common pattern of bureaucratic waste, complexity, and controversy. This study attempts to
examine the Nashville program in all its frustrating detail, in the hope
that the process by which it became mired in ineffectiveness can be
better understood.
II. APPLYING FOR A MODEL CITIES PLANNING GRANT
Nashville-Davidson County is an urban area embracing nearly
500,000 people governed by a metropolitan city-county government. It
is the capital of Tennessee and a cultural and commercial center of the
Mid-South region. Like most American cities in the mid-1960's, Nashville was beset by extensive inner-city urban blight. Specifically, racial
segregation, chaotic land use, and the continual dislocation that attended successive urban renewal projects all conspired to create an ugly
slum known as North Nashville. In the late fall of 1967, Nashville's
proposal for eradicating urban blight in the decaying North Nashville
area was approved by HUD as one of the first round Model Cities
programs. In the spring of 1972, that program is stalled in federal court
litigation. Consistently with the ethos of the Great Society, Model Cities
was envisioned as a grand partnership of federal and local government
and private citizens. The manifest failure of that partnership is the story
of Nashville Model Cities.

NASHVILLE MODEL CITIES

A.

Early Interest

Long before passage of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan
Development Act of 1966, the Mayor of the Metropolitan Government

of Nashville-Davidson County" realized the Model Cities program's
political and financial potential2 and had his staff initiate an investigation of Nashville's possible inclusion in the program. 2The first formal
action by the Mayor was a series of meetings with the Metropolitan
Planning Commission (MPC) staff in early 1966.2 It was determined
at these meetings that the MPC would have the primary responsibility
for developing objective criteria for selecting one part of the city as the
0
target area. After some very basic goal selection had been attempted,"

however, the Mayor and his staff perceived the need to broaden the base
of people involved in the early planning. A Demonstration Cities Workshop for community leaders was held in April for the express purpose
of getting Nashville's proposal to Washington at the time the act passed,
"probably sometime in June."'" Following this meeting, the MPC com26. Mayor Beverly Briley has been a political leader in the Nashville area for many years
and has constructed an efficient organization that has ensured his continued presence. He was
elected in 1963 as the first Mayor of the Metropolitan Government and has held that position ever
since, surviving 2 re-election campaigns. Even before Metro, however, he served for a long period
as County Judge-the chief executive position in the old Davidson County government.
27. It is not known exactly how and when news of the Model Cities program reached
Nashville, but Mayor Briley's active participation in several national municipal organizations
placed him in a particularly good position to obtain advance information from Washington. It has
even been suggested, with perhaps some exaggeration, that he was an advisor to Secretary of HUD,
Robert C. Weaver, in the program's development. Metropolitan Government of Nashville &
Davidson County, Planning Grant Application, Pt. III, at 145 (1967).
28. Nashville was not the only city to get a head start on planning for this new urban
program. Many cities began to organize far in advance of any official word from Washington. See,
e.g., HUD, THE MODEL CITIES PROGRAM-A HISTORY & ANALYSIS OF THE PLANNING PROCESS
IN THREE CITIES

14-15, 39, 65-66 (1969) [hereinafter cited as THREE

CITIES STUDY].

29. The MPC is the governmental planning body for the entire metropolitan area. For a
discussion of the MPC's work in the early Model Cities planning see R. O'Donniley, A Case Study
of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee's Application for a Model Cities
Grant: The Decision-Making Process in Selecting a Model Cities Neighborhood, 55-57, Mar. 1969
(unpublished masters degree thesis presented to Planning Department of the University of Tennessee at Knoxville; available at the University of Tennessee) [hereinafter cited as O'Donniley Thesis].
30. The principle planner from the MPC assigned to Model Cities established the same basic
goals that were ultimately chosen by Congress. It was hoped that the program would affect the
lives of 20% of the present slum residents and retard any future growth of Nashville's ghettos. Id.
at 55-56.
31. Planning Grant Application, supra note 27, pt. III, at 144-45. Although the meeting
accomplished little in the way of substantive planning, 2 interesting points are raised by the official
notice. First, the unbridled optimism evidenced by the self-imposed June deadline was echoed
throughout the program at the beginning of new stages of development. See, e.g., notes 156-59
infra and accompanying text. Secondly, the program apparently was viewed from the start as
falling under the control of the Urban Renewal Coordinator in the Mayor's office, an association
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pleted its development of the criteria to be used in objectively selecting
a target area neighborhood. At the same time, however, the Model
Cities bill had become snarled in legislative delays. Therefore, instead
of drawing up a proposal without the benefit of federal guidelines, the
city settled down to await final congressional action on the Demonstration Cities legislation.
B.

Selection of the Model NeighborhoodArea

The postponement of detailed planning that had followed the April
1966 workshop came to an end in early November of the same year
when the Demonstration Cities Act was passed. Although the precise

requirements for a Model Cities Planning Grant Application had not
yet been developed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 32 the small group of city officials in Nashville with
"grantsmanship" experience immediately swung into action to meet a
May 1, 1967 HUD deadline. The first task facing these grantsmen was
to select the target-area neighborhood that was to be the beneficiary of

this federal largesse. The MPC quickly began developing detailed charts
and tables3 3 comparing data on six possible target-area neighborhoods. 3 This activity by the Planning Commission built initially on the
work that had followed the April 1966 workshop and was finally coordinated with the first guidelines issued by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development. Thus in early 1967 there existed a fairly complete
quantitative analysis of the six sites being considered for the Model
Neighborhood Area (MNA).
that did little to build citizen confidence in the program. See generally notes 173-74 infra and
accompanying text.
32. The earliest HUD information printed was a series of basic questions and answers on
the Model Cities program and a booklet entitled "Improving the Quality of Urban Life." Neither
of these was immediately available in Nashville. Consequently, the Nashville planners relied heavily upon information received at a series of meetings with a Boston consultant, held in December
1966. See HUD, Questions & Answers to Explain the Demonstration Cities Act of 1966 (1967);
HUD Improving the Quality of Urban Life (1966); O'Donniley Thesis, supra note 29, at 61-63.
33. See, e.g., Planning Grant Application, supra note 27, pt. II, at 11-12. The compilation
of statistics on physical characteristics-such as the percentage of deteriorated housing and studies
of sanitary and storm sewers-and on quantifiable social considerations-such as racial composition, average income, and education levels-is the kind of short-range work that the MPC does
best.
34. The 6 areas considered were all centered around the central business district. Area A
was a portion of the East Nashville urban renewal area; B was the northern portion of North
Nashville; C was the southern portion of North Nashville; D was essentially the Edgehill urban
renewal area; E was a large area south and east of Edgehill; and F straddled the interstate route
southeast of the central city. These areas were compared through absolute and ratio analysis by
the MPC.
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The selection of the target-area neighborhood, however, was not
the product of a purely scientific or objectively quantified decisionmaking process. The Mayor was a sufficiently adept politician to realize
that the influx of large sums of money into any one area of the city
would have significant political ramifications throughout the community. Consequently, when a controversy arose in January 1967 over
one block of totally dilapidated housing in North Nashville, 35 the
Mayor seized the occasion to announce the first Greater Nashville
Housing Conference, to be held in February 1967.36 Instead of considering all of Nashville's housing problems, the conference devoted most
of its time to hearing basic reports on housing approaches and to discussing and viewing the problems in North Nashville. Even though little
concrete progress was made on the broad question of inadequate housing, the conference did serve three important political goals: (1) it removed some rather severe pressure from the Mayor and his urban planners; (2) it laid the foundation for increasing private developers' interest
in the North Nashville area; 37 and (3) it focused a great deal of attention on North Nashville as an area in which there were severe urban
problems. Following the conference, and with no apparent knowledge
of or reliance upon the quantitative recommendations by the MPC, the
Mayor moved to formalize what was becoming an increasingly obvious
political choice for the MNA.3 6 On February 13 the Mayor sent letters
to more than 300 community leaders inviting them to meetings February 17 and 18 to exchange ideas and information on the city's progress
in the Model Cities program. 9 Two factors, however, should be noted
about these invitations: first, the mix of participants invited to the two
meetings, other than city personnel, was weighted heavily in favor of
35.

For a discussion of the development of the controversy see Nashville Banner, Feb. 10,

1967, at 1, col. I; id., Feb. 13, 1967, at 1, col. 3.
36. See id., Jan. 17, 1967, at 1, col. 1; O'Donniley Thesis, supra note 29, at 60-61. See also
W. Reinhart, Follow Up Report on the Greater Nashville Conference on Housing & Urban
Development (July 1967).
37. See Nashville Banner, Jan. 13, 1967, at 1, col. 3. The absence of private development in

the North Nashville area was a serious concern of city officials. Interview with Robert A. Horton,
Fiscal Administrative Officer of Metropolitan Government, in Nashville, July 13, 1971. This
concern was reflected in the follow-up study done on the conference in which the city's progress in
housing as of 1967 was compared with the projections made in the Hammer Study (Hammer &
Co. Associates, the Economy of Metropolitan Nashville, Tennessee (1963) [hereinafter cited as the
Hammer Study]) 4 years before. See W. Reinhart, supra note 36, at 9, 28. See generally Planning
Grant Application, supra note 27, pt. III, at 36, 149.
38. See Nashville Banner, Jan. 26, 1967, at 2, col. 3 ("We consider the North Nashville area

ideal for revitalizing immediately in this program") (quoting Mayor Beverly Briley); Planning
Grant Application, supra note 27, pt. III, at 149. See also materials cited note 36 supra.
39. Planning Grant Application, supra note 27, pt. III, at 107-08.
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North Nashville residents;" secondly, on February 14, two days before

the meetings with the citizens, the Mayor called together a newly appointed Task Force for what was to be the actual selection of the Model

Neighborhood Area.4 At the meeting on February 14, the MPC staff
formally recommended the selection of a target area neighborhood that
corresponded to the southern half of the present MNA.42 The Mayor's
staff agreed with the Planning Commission's conclusion that the Model
Neighborhood Area should be in North Nashville, but they disagreed
with the MPC's restriction of the target area to only a part of the North
Nashville community. Considering it more expedient politically to help

all of North Nashville rather than only half, the Mayor's staff stood
firm and succeeded in persuading the Task Force to expand the target

area to include the entire North Nashville community. With the basic
target area selection process completed, no meaningful questions were
left to be decided by the participants at the meetings on February 17
and 18. Instead, these meetings became hollow gestures that the city

could later use to "document" citizen participation in the planning
process.4

3

C.

Planning Grant Application

With North Nashville established as the MNA, the city faced the
immediate task of completing the Planning Grant Application in time
to meet the May 1 HUD deadline." The basic approach taken was to
divide the component areas required by HUD to be covered in the

application among the various Metro agencies with responsibilities in
these areas.4 5 This method of attack assured a prompt compilation of
40. See id., at 109-39 (mailing list of all persons who received invitations).
41. For the general composition of the proposed Task Force see Nashville Banner, Feb. 10,
1967, at 1,col. 1.
42. O'Donniley Thesis, supra note 29, at 83-86; see note 35 supra.
43. The letters of invitation contained no information on what was to be discussed, and both
the agenda (Planning Grant Application, supra note 27, pt. III, at 142) and the statement of one
participant (Transcript, vol. II, at 231-33, North Nashville Citizens Coordinating Committee, Inc.
v. Romney, Civ. No. 6121 (M.D. Tenn., filed Apr. 12, 1971) [hereinafter cited as NNCCC, Inc.
v. Romney] (testimony of Edwin Mitchell) indicate that the meetings were not exactly the "widespread citizen participation" that the city held them out to be. Planning Grant Application, supra
note 27, pt. III, at 105-06.
44. It is unclear on what date Nashville received the HUD guidelines for preparing a Planning Grant Application. The basic soulrce for these guidelines bears a publication date of December
1966, but Nashville apparently did not receive any copies until sometime in late February. See
HUD, Improving the Quality of Urban Life, A Program Guide to Model Neighborhoods in
Demonstration Cities (Dec. 1966).
45. Interview with William Reinhart, in Nashville, Feb. 15, 1972. A high level of agency
participation in planning did not exist in all Model Cities. See, e.g., THREE CITIES STUDY, supra
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information, but it also resulted in a distinct unevenness in quality
among the various components, a problem that remained with the program throughout its development. Thus, for example, the Health Component' 6-prepared jointly by the Metro Health Department and Meharry Medical College-and the Education Component 47-prepared
under the supervision of the Metropolitan Board of Education-were
the products of energetic and candid efforts to describe basic problems
in the MNA and suggest possible approaches to their solutions.
Other components, such as Crime Reduction, 8 similarly were
farmed out to various agencies, but these agencies apparently had little
interest or expertise to bring to bear in the preparation of such an
application and, consequently, contributed little to the overall quality
of the Planning Grant Application.49 Perhaps the greatest weakness in
the application, however, was the incongruity between the emphasis
placed on housing as a priority goal" and the total absence of in-depth
analysis of housing problems or suggestions for their solutions.51 This
inconsistency was compounded by the inclusion of a woefully inadequate statement on relocation.12 An additional deficiency in the early
planning that surfaced in the Planning Grant Application was the almost complete lack of any meaningful citizen participation.13 Although
note 28, at 15. Many cities, however, including Nashville, did utilize existing governmental agencies
as sponsors of operational projects. See HUD, THE MODEL CITIES PROGRAM-A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE PLANNING PROCESS IN ELEVEN CITIES 51 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ELEVEN
CITIES STUDY].

46. Planning Grant Application, supra note 27, pt. III, at 39-49.
47. Id. at 50-74.
48. Id. at 75-76.
49. The Transportation Component was an exception to this planning process. No Metropolitan agency was involved in its planning, and the application was submitted without any section
dealing with transportation. The absence of an interested agency contributed to the total void in
the development of transportation programs at the implementation stage.

50. "Housing, health and education would rate highest on the list of priorities of goals in
making this designated area into a model neighborhood." Planning Grant Application, supra note
27, pt. I, at 2.
51. The application did have some very basic statistical information on the Nashville housing

situation, but this was not evaluated in the document in a manner indicating the scope of the
problem. See id., pt. II, at 11-12, 17; id., pt. III, at 36 (Housing Supply); id.at 37 (Housing

Choice). The inadequacy of this one and one-half page treatment of one of the most extensive
problems in the MNA is compounded by the apparent insensitivity with which it was written. After
briefly sketching the overwhelmingly nonwhite ghetto residential pattern in North Nashville, the
Housing Choice commentary makes the incredible statement that "[wlithin this area there is

almost complete freedom of choice of housing accommodations for all citizens of all income
levels." Id. (emphasis added).

52. Id., pt. III, at 98 (one-half page); see Memorandum from Stephen R. Barker to Donald
Dodge, former desk officer for the Atlanta region, May 26, 1967.
53.

Nashville is not alone in its failure to involve citizens at this early stage. See THREE
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roughly twenty percent of the application was devoted to the documentation of citizen involvement, 31 of the 43 pages merely listed the names
and addresses of the people invited to the information meetings February 17 and 18. 51 It was obvious to even the most casual observer that
the work at all stages was either coordinated or done by the Mayor's
urban staff and the MPC. This absence of community resident involvement has since been rationalized by the lack of time and the relative
insignificance of the planning decisions made in preparing the Planning
Grant Application. Regardless of these rationalizations, the city's conduct planted a seed of suspicion that the citizens were being used rather
than involved in meaningful participation. This suspicion was particularly acute on the part of those leaders from North Nashville whose
names had been included without their knowledge as participants in the
preparation of the application solely because they had been invited to
the February meetings.
Despite its weaknesses, the application was no worse than the average first round city's effort at working with the new concept of coordination intended for the Model Cities program. The information and
method of presentation to be used in the application were prescribed by
HUD to the most minute detail-including the size of the paper and the
numbering of pages.55 It is perhaps something of a compliment to the
city that Nashville was able to follow these detailed instructions as
closely as it did. Of course, the detailed requirements did force the cities
to think about the Model Neighborhood Area's problems in a comprehensive manner. Furthermore, it was in the city's best financial interest
to identify every problem in the MNA that it could-more specifically
identified problems would justify larger federal grants to solve them.
The detailed requirements, however, frequently stifled the desired innovative approach by exalting form over content. In the end, the only
things exceptional about Nashville's Planning Grant Application were
qualities of Nashville itself: the existence of a metropolitan city-county
government and the presence of three predominantly black universities
in the MNA-Fisk, Tennessee State, and Meharry Medical College.56
With the drafting and compilation of the reports completed in late
April 1967, the Mayor's staff rushed their 180-page document to a
supra note 29, at 15, 68-69. The early deadline and uncertain future of the program
militated against organizing any active citizens group for the planning grant.
54. Planning Grant Application, supra note 27, pt. III, at 104-46.
55. HUD, Improving the Quality of Urban Life 34 (rev. issue Dec. 1967).
56. The importance of having these 3 strong black institutions in the MNA cannot be
underestimated. Their existence explains the presence of a strong and educated middle class in the
area, a characteristic not found in many model city areas.
CITIES STUDY,
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specially called City Council meeting on April 27 for the Council's first,
and last, look at the application. In what was to prove a frequent prac-

tice on Model Cities matters, the Council hurriedly authorized the submission at the same meeting at which it was introduced.5 7 As finally
approved, the Planning Grant Application, requesting 270,537 dollars

in federal funds (to be matched with 67,634 dollars of local money),5"
was submitted to HUD in time to meet the May 1 deadline.
D. Aftermath of the Planning Grant Application

Following the Council's approval of the submission, the city planners in essence held all work in abeyance pending a determination by
HUD of whether Nashville would be selected as a first round Model
City. The planning delay was paralleled by a distinct reduction in efforts

by the city to sell the Model Cities concept; this, of course, was to avoid
unduly raising the residents' hopes over a
been funded yet. Some political activity,
Mayor realized that he had just requested
tremendous preference for one area of the

program that had not even
however, continued as the
a program which shlowed a
city, a black ghetto at that.

The Mayor perceived a dual danger that the citizens of the MNA would
react negatively to the Model Cities program if they saw it as being
imposed on them, while the rest of the city might resent the restriction
of the program's benefits to the North Nashville area. To counter these

reactions before they developed, the Mayor and his staff attended a
series of community meetings in the MNA and periodically released
statements to the press. At the meetings, the standard response to

charges of ignoring the MNA citizens 9 was that the city's activity thus
far was technical in nature and only directed at getting Nashville included as a Model City." This characterization of the role played by the

57. Metropolitan Nashville & Davidson County Council, Res. No. 67-209 (introduced and
passed Apr. 27, 1967). The twofold argument that precipitated this hasty approval was typical:
No local funds were involved and a deadline had to be met to avoid loss of federal funds. Interview
with Councilman James Tuck, Model Cities Committee Chairman, in Nashville, Feb. 28, 1972.
58. Planning Grant Application, supra note 27, pt. VIII, at 178. Model Cities planning and
administration was funded subject to a 20% local match. This was in contrast to the 100% federal
funding from Model Cities for project implementation and relocation benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 330405, 3307(b) (1970).
59. "The planning heretofore has not been sensitive and compassionate to the problems we
have." Nashville Tennessean, May 3, 1967, at 29, col. 6. "We need to be involved in the planning
of the plans . . . not just members of an advisory committee on something that's already been
planned." Nashville Banner, May 3, 1967, at 16, col. 4. Statements like these 2 by a North
Nashville businessman, Inman Otey, were voiced frequently in the summer of 1967.
60. Nashville Tennessean, May 3, 1967, at 29, col. 6. Reassuring statements by the Mayor
and his staff concerning their intention to delay planning until the citizens could organize them-
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city in compiling the Planning Grant Application seems to have satisfied

the citizens at the time. Potential hostility from other parts of the city
was averted largely by constant references to the planned expansion of

the program to the rest of the city, as soon as practicable.' In fact, there
was no HUD program at that time that would have allowed such expan-

sion,' 2 and this was generally known to the top officials on the Mayor's
staff.63 Whatever the intent of these statements, they did keep any
animosity toward the program from erupting at this stage of the planning.
III.

INTERSTATE HIGHWAY

40

AND NORTH NASHVILLE

In 1967, just as the Planning Grant Application was being put
together, citizens in North Nashville began to feel the effects of another
federal project. 4 This was the planned construction of Interstate 40
directly through the MNA.
A.

Route Selection Process

In the early 1950's, the City of Nashville hired a consultant to study
possible routes for the interstate highway through the western part of
the city.6" Relying partially on a 1946 study,66 the consultant tentatively
selves were repeated through 1967 and continued even after Nashville was selected for a Model
Cities program. Id., Jan. 25, 1968, at 4, col. I; id., Feb. 10, 1968, at 17, col. 5. They were still
being made 6 months into the planning year. Id., Sept. 18, 1968, at 6, col. 4.
61. See, e.g., id., May 8, 1967, at 3, col. 1; Nashville Banner, Aug. 31, 1967, at 9, col. 1;
Nashville Tennessean, Oct. 18, 1967, at I, col. 3.
62. There now exists a modification in the original Model Cities approach that allows some
cities to expand their MNA to include the entire city.
63. Interview with William Reinhart, in Nashville, Feb. 15, 1972.
64. One national study of highways and their routings through inner cities concluded that
the Nashville 1-40 experience was "the worst example of the effects of a large highway on a viable,
inner-city community." C. Sevilla, Asphalt Through the Model Cities: A Study of Highways and
the Urban Poor 24, Jan. 31, 1971 (unpublished Masters in Laws thesis presented to the Urban
Law Institute of the National Law Center at George Washington University; available at George
Washington University) [hereinafter cited as Sevilla Thesis]. For a condensation of this thesis see
49 J. URBAN L. 297 (1971).
65. H. Ford, Interstate 40 Through North Nashville, Tennessee: A Case Study in Highway
Location Decision-Making 28, Dec. 1970 (unpublished masters degree thesis presented to Planning
Departrent of the University of Tennessee at Knoxville; available at the University of Tennessee
library) [hereinafter cited as Ford Thesis]. For other discussions of the early highway planning see
A. MOWBRAY, ROAD TO RUIN 178-79 (1969); F. Bergerson, K. McNeil, & C. Zuzak, Beyond the
Ballot-Organized Citizen Participation in Metropolitan-Nashville, Dec. 1971 (a published but as
yet unreleased project of the Urban Observatory of Metropolitan Nashville and the Joint Universities Center), [hereinafter cited as Beyond the Ballot]; Sevilla Thesis, supra note 64, at 24-25.
66. In 1946, Nashville hired an outside consultant to conduct an expressway study and its
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recommended a route through a predominantly white area, paralleling
Charlotte Avenue and running, for the most part, just south of what is
now the MNA. 7 During meetings with the MPC in 1955, however, the
consultants modified their proposal and recommended a more northerly
route that closely paralleled Jefferson Street and passed directly through
the major black business district in North Nashville." The factors that
allegedly precipitated this change were the cost of right-of-way acquisition," design requirements, 7 and interference with major institutions
located along the southern route.7' The final blessing for the northern
route was given at a public hearing held on May 15, 1957, which was
72
to become a major source of controversy.
B.

Development of Opposition to the Route

For the next eight years very little progress was made on the Memphis leg of 1-40. In 1964, however, the acquisition phase began, and
tracts in North Nashville that lay in the path of the highway were
systematically purchased by the State. As the total impact of the rightof-way acquisitions became apparent, black leaders of the North Nashville community began to examine the route selection process. In mid1967 these community leaders 73 learned of the discarded southerly
recommendation was for a route that was located between Broadway and Charlotte, 2 of the major
east-west streets in the area. See Ford Thesis, supra note 65, at 28-29.
67. This new route was only slightly north of the 1946 route. There is some indication that
the recommendation of the 1954 route was made after only a general corridor study had been
completed. Later examination of the precise right-of-way, however, revealed some serious difficulties with the route. See Ford Thesis, supra note 65, at 31-32; Beyond the Ballot, supra note 65.
68. A. MOWBRAY, supra note 65, at 178-79.
69. Ford Thesis, supra note 65, at 32-34.
70. In order to have the desired number of interchanges for the downtown area, it was
allegedly necessary to move the highway farther north so there could be the required 3 miles
between interchanges. Beyond the Ballot, supra note 65.
71. The southern route passed very close to a major hospital and a large urban.park. Id. It
should be noted, however, that the present route affected more houses, businesses, apartment
houses, and churches. Also, the 3 black colleges are in close proximity to the present route. Ford
Thesis. supra note 65, at 39; see Sevilla Thesis, supra note 65, at 24-25.
72. The circumstances surrounding this hearing were unusual and led to charges that no
proper hearing had been held. First, the notices for the hearing had the wrong date. Secondly, the
notices were posted only in post offices in white neighborhoods and were not distributed to the
news media. Thirdly, the transcript of the hearing, required by law to be taken, was very incomplete. Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee v. Ellington, 398 F.2d 179, 182-84 (6th Cir. 1967) cert.
denied. 390 U.S. 921 (1968); Ford Thesis, supra note 65, at 40-42.
73. Two of the important figures in the 1-40 struggle, Dr. Edwin Mitchell of Meharry and
Dr. Flournoy Coles of Fisk, also were influential in other stages of the Model Cities program. Dr.
Mitchell has been a key figure throughout the Model Cities program in Nashville and was among
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route and sensed that the selection of the northern route had been
something less than totally objective.74 After several months of disorganized concern, two events in early September 1967 spurred the group

to action: the first was the proposed widening of a street running between Fisk and Meharry to accommodate the anticipated increase in

traffic from completion of the interstate, and the second was an announcement that bids for the actual construction of the highway would
be let on October 1, 1967. 7- For the next morith an informal coalition
of community leaders petitioned all levels of government-local, state,
and federal 7 6-to have the route modified or at least reexamined, but

they were rebuffed at every turn. As the crisis developed, the interested
citizens formed the 1-40 Steering Committee as an advocatory group

and hired a professional urban planner to give them technical assistance.77 Upon the planner's suggestion, the Steering Committee asked
the first citizens of the area involved in the program's development, having learned of it through
his position as chairman of the Metropolitan Human Relations Commission. After participating
in the struggle over 1-40, he was appointed to the Citizens Coordinating Committee as a representative of the Davidson County Independent Political Council. Once on the CCC he was selected
chairman of the Standing Committee on Housing, later was chosen to head the ad hoc committee
seeking clarifications of the CCC's role, and finally in 1969 was elected chairman of the CCC.
Dr. Coles also has played an important role, especially in the early development of the Model Cities
program. In addition to serving as head of the citizen advocacy group fighting 1-40, he later
undertook a major survey of the North Nashville area to study employment problems. This report
ultimately was included in the Problem Analysis.
74. Three factors combined to create this impression: (1) the routing change did not have
the benefit of extensive engineering studies; (2) the consultants apparently were able to come up
with the northerly route in a very short period of time; and (3) there was a substantial difference
in the amount of private property and in the percentage of black-owned property between the 2
rights-of-way. See generally Ford Thesis, supra note 65, at 33-39; Beyond the Ballot, supra note
65.
75. Beyond the Ballot, supra note 65.
76. Ford Thesis, supra note 65, at 47 (Mayor of Nashville); id. at 45 (Governor of Tennessee); id. at 47 (United States Department of Transportation).
77. After examining the Nashville situation, Yale Rabin, the citizens' consultant, recommended a fourth alternative route for 1-40. He suggested placing the highway along the river, which
would have been well away from all populated areas. Id. at 40. This route, however, had several
disadvantages: (1) it would pass directly through a municipal golf course utilized primarily by the
black community in Nashville; (2) it would pass through the Cumberland floodplain and would
present extensive engineering drainage problems; and (3) it would not aid rapid intra-city transportation because of its distance from the downtown area. It is interesting to note that Rabin has had
several other important contacts with North Nashville. In 1968, he was commissioned by the
Middle Tennessee Business Association (MTBA) to do a land-use study of the black communities
in Nashville for the MTBA Project, Operation Northtown. Rabin, Land Use and Urban Analysis
of Afro-American Communities in Metropolitan Nashville, in Middle Tennessee Business Assn.,
Operation Northtown, Jan. 21, 1969. He also was retained by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
to assist in the preparation of suits to enjoin the Edgehill Urban Renewal Area and the Model
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the Secretary of Transportation for a 90-day delay in the letting of bids,
but despite widespread approval of this suggestion,78 the Secretary refused to grant the delay. Having exhausted their limited administrative

remedies, the Steering Committee retained a local black attorney79 for
a court challenge of the 1-40 route.
C. Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee v. Ellington

On October 26, 1967, suit was filed in the District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee, and a temporary restraining order was
requested pending a determination on the merits.80 The restrainihg order

was not granted, but hearings were held immediately, on October 30 and
November 1. The primary issues were the validity of the 1957 corridor
hearing and the legality of the subsequent decision to route the highway

through North Nashville. On the day following the hearings in federal
court, an opinion was rendered which held that the 1957 corridor hearing, although a poor example of administrative procedure, was not
legally inadequate. The decision went on to state that the crippling effect

which the highway would have on the community was not enough to
show the absence of consideration for the economy necessary to warrant

an injunction.8 ' The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the appeal in
December and affirmed the trial court decision.12 The Supreme Court

put an end to the Steering Committee's court battle by refusing to hear
83
the case.

Cities program. See Y. Rabin, Affidavit, Oct. 5, 1970; Transcript, vols. I & 2, NNCCC, Inc. v.
Romney, supra note 43.
78. See Beyond the Ballot, supra note 65.
79. Avon Williams, a prominent attorney and politician in Nashville, is another of the
figures who is present at almost every stage of the Model Cities program. After the 1-40 fight he
was involved in the CCC's struggle to obtain expert assistance, played a substantial part in the
CCC's negotiations with the Mayor concerning the citizens' role, and was the citizens' attorney
in their suit to enjoin the program.
80. See Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee v. Ellington, 387 F.2d 179, 181 (6th Cir. 1967).
81. The $10,000,000 that already had been spent on engineering studies and on acquisition
must have had some effect on the decision as well. Id. at 184; see A. MOWBRAY, supra note 65, at
182.
82. 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967). The trial court was reversed in one aspect of its holding.
Judge Gray had dismissed Mayor Briley as a party defendant because the judge found that the
Mayor had played no role in the decision-making process. The Sixth Circuit accepted this finding,
but stated that the Mayor's position of power and influence justified requiring him to cooperate in
the ultimate disposition of the case. Id. at 186.
83. 390 U.S. 921 (1968).
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D. Residue of the Highway Dispute
The efforts of the 1-40 Steering Committee were not totally wasted.

As a result of the litigation, and negotiations with many government
officials, the citizens gained concessions that somewhat mitigated the
disruptive effects of the highway. Among these were three additional

underpasses, one pedestrian overpass, some design modifications of access ramps, 84 and replanning of two major feeder roads. 5 The most

significant concession discussed was depressing the roadbed of the highway in the vicinity of Fisk, Meharry, and the disrupted black business

district so that an air rights project, or deck, might be constructed over
1,000 feet of the interstate. The space thus created could have been
vertically developed for commercial, recreational, educational, or governmental services purposes." Despite extensive engineering studies87

and support from the federal government,88 the project has never been
instituted, primarily because of disagreements over the extent of the

design model8" and a concern over the additional residential and business dislocation that would result from the deck and the accompanying
84. Ford Thesis, supra note 65, at 62-64. See also Memorandum from Donald Dodge,
former desk officer for the Atlanta region, to Dep't of HUD staff, Feb. 19, 1968.
85. One significant victory for the citizens was the redesigning of the South Street connector,
S19, which is a feeder street for the Interstate. After considerable negotiation with the 1-40 Steering
Committee, the Metropolitan Government agreed to modify the design of the road to reduce the
residential displacement. See Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, July 26, 1968;
Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, July 16, 1968. A similar result was reached
on the design of 28th Avenue North. See Ford Thesis, supra note 65, at 64.
86. See generally Marcou, O'Leary & Associates, Interstate Highway 40 Air Rights Project,
Nashville, Tennessee (1970).
87. See id. It is interesting to note that the original consultants for Interstate 40 recommended some form of air deck in the 1950's. See Beyond the Ballot, supra note 65.
88. See, e.g., Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, May 8, 1968. See also
materials cited note 84 supra; Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Feb. 19. 1968.
Most of the federal support forthedeck camefrom Lowell Bridwell, Federal Highway Administrator. Aside from making the suggestion of a deck, however, Bridwell did not see the highway
planners as the implementers of this program. Instead, he put great stress on using the Model Cities
program to do the coordination. All this was being recommended when the Model Cities program
in Nashville was barely underway. See id.
89. In a preliminary report, Marcou, O'Leary presented 2 alternatives: one was a limited,
one-level deck that would have been used primarily as a park with some business space; the other
was a comprehensive approach utilizing several blocks around the deck itself for housing, business,
recreation, medical, and university development. Marcou, O'Leary & Associates, supra note 86,
at 20-21. The final report, drawing on citizen reaction that preferred the comprehensive approach's
utilization scheme but disliked the displacement, recommended a Revised Development Approach
with minimal additional relocation but with extensive vertical development. Id. at 23-24. None of
these approaches, however, ever received the wholehearted support of all the people involved.
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frontage roads.9 0
Another reason for the failure of an air rights deck to materialize
was that almost every agency involved, although acknowledging the
desirability of a deck, felt no responsibility to coordinate the planning.
The Tennessee Department of Highways and the U.S. Bureau of Public
Roads were only involved with the possible physical construction of the
deck,9 but the Department of Highways at least showed some concern

over the lack of coordination in overall planning." The Federal Highway Administrator, on the other hand, did consider the deck to be

basically his program, did make preliminary structural commitments,

3

and did authorize the necessary feasibility study, 4 but at the same time

made it clear that he felt that responsibility for the deck lay with the
Model Cities program. 5 Theoretically, this approach was sound but as

a practical matter the City Demonstration Agency (CDA) in Nashville
was ill-equipped to handle the extensive study and coordination necessary, and it consequently resisted efforts to assume complete adminis-

trative responsibility. 6
The CDA, despite its reluctance to handle the deck by itself, was
cognizant of the disruption caused by the highway and of the need to

mollify influential groups in the area. One such group was the Middle
Tennessee Business Association (MTBA), which was composed of black
businessmen from the MNA and which had become very concerned over
the damage that was soon to be visited upon the black business com90. One of 4 requirements that the State Highway Department and the Bureau of Public
Roads felt was necessary before the deck development could proceed was "[flirm financial commitments of public resources for the air rights development." Id. at 22. At several meetings concerning
the deck, the public commitment of funds was made contingent upon the creation of frontage roads
in the area. Transcript, vol. 6, at 242, NNCCC, Inc. v. Romney, supra note 43 (testimony of
Marion Fuson). The residents of the area were strongly opposed to this because it would be just
one more reason to dislocate substantial numbers of MNA residents. See id.; id. at 247-51
(testimony of Edwin Mitchell).
91. See generally Marcou, O'Leary & Associates, supra note 86, at 7, 55.
92. See Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Mar. 14, 1968.
93. See Memorandum from Donald Dodge, former desk officer for the Atlanta region, to
Dep't of HUD Staff, Feb. 19, 1968.
94. See Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, May 8, 1968.
95. See Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Feb. 19, 1968. By August 1968
Lowell Bridwell, the highway administrator, had stopped referring to the CDA as the answer to
all the problems and had begun accusing it of delay. See Memorandum from Deane Tucker to
Earl Metzger, Aug. 1968.
96. See Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Mar. 14, 1968; Memorandum
from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Aug. 1968. In Washington HUD also expressed grave
concern over the participation of City Demonstration Agencies in smoothing out the problems
caused by highways in Model Neighborhood Areas. Memorandum from Donald Dodge, former
desk officer for the Atlanta region, to Dep't of HUD staff, Feb. 19, 1968.
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munity.17 In an effort to obtain an assessment of the potential damage,

the CDA met with this organization in March 1968 and agreed to give
the MTBA a grant of just under 10,000 dollars to study the impact of
1-40 on the business community." After some initial delay in getting the
contract approved,99 the CDA and the MTBA, with the financial assistance of the Small Business Administration, contracted for an impact
study costing approximately 30,000 dollars.' The final MTBA report,

entitled "Operation Northtown," although not relied on extensively in
the final planning, was included in the Problem Analysis submission to
HUD.101
The North Nashville area also received one offer of assistance from

the private sector in Nashville. Realizing the economic damage that had
been suffered by the North Nashville business community, leaders of
several Nashville financial institutions united to create a pool of capital

from which black businessmen could borrow to overcome the losses
incurred as a result of the highway. Ultimately one million dollars was
set aside for this purpose, but, although a black group was supposed to
generate the interest in the community, only one sizeable loan was ever
02
made.
The effect that the interstate highway had on the MNA cannot be

underestimated. Despite the concessions received, the highway still disrupted many businesses and residences, still split up many traditional

neighborhoods, still dead-ended many streets, radically altering the
traffic flow, and still remained as a constant source of nuisance to the

area in the form of noise and exhaust emissions. The highway's presence
97. For a discussion of the role of the MTBA in the 1-40 controversy, see Memorandum
from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Mar. 14, 1968; Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl
Metzger, Apr. 1, 1968.
98. Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Mar. 14, 1968; Nashville Tennessean, Mar. 27, 1968, at 11, col. 1.
99. See Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Apr. 1, 1968.
100. See Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, July 26, 1968; Memorandum
from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, July 16, 1968.
101. For a summary of Project Operation Northtown see Appendix I infra.
102. Offers of financial assistance came from both a large insurance company in Nashville
and a collection of local banks. Each of these offers generally referred to $1,000,000 becoming
available for special loans to North Nashville businessmen and each proposed to use the MTBA
as the coordinating body. Despite this financial support, the only significant loan was obtained by
an influential family in North Nashville to develop a large supermarket shopping center. Interestingly, one brother in this family was the president of the MTBA and another was the chairman of
the MTBA's Operation Northtown study. See Nashville Tennessean, Apr. 15, 1969, at 36, col. 5;
Nashville Banner, Mar. 4, 1969, at 1, col. 7; Nashville Tennessean, April 18, at 1, col. 7; id., Apr.
13, 1968, at I, col. 2; Nashville Banner, Mar. 28, 1968, at 16, col. 8; Nashville Tennessean, Mar.
26, 1968, at 1, col. 3.
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served as a permanent reminder of the impact that a federal program
can have on ordinary citizens. The highway also served indirectly as a

threat of future residential displacement in the form of access roads and
commercial development drawn to the area by the newly acquired access
to interstate highway transportation. The entire episode taught the citi-

zens at least two things: (1) that concerted action against a major project
cannot wait until the final implementation stage and still have a reasonable chance for success 03 and (2) that the MNA residents have the
ability to organize and work to provide meaningful citizen participation

in projects affecting their community." 4
IV.

INITIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLANNING PROCESS

A.

Selection As a First Round Model City

In November 1967, more than six months after the submission of
the Planning Grant Application and only two weeks after the court test

of 1-40, the Secretary of HUD came to Nashville to announce formally
the selection of Nashville as one of the first round model cities.'05 For
103. The North Nashville area recently has been the scene of another highway location
dispute. Since 1958, a connection between state Route 12-U.S. Highway 41A-and an 1-40
interchange in North Nashville had been planned. The highway was to run west through Buena
Vista Park and connect with the Clarksville highway in the northwest corner of North Nashville.
Like 1-40, there had been a long delay before implementation, but as that day approached, the
citizens became concerned over the status of the park and the surrounding residential neighborhoods. After a series of meetings and tours of the area, it became fairly clear that relocation of
the highway would be accomplished, moving it north of major residential development in the
MNA. See generally Letter from Bul Edens, Assistant Director for Highway Planning, to Edwin
Mitchell, April 28, 1971; Letter from Edwin Mitchell to Paul Edens, June 4, 1971; Letter from
Paul Edens to Edwin Mitchell, June 11, 1971; Letter from Ben L. Smith, Project Planning Section, Tennessee Department of Highways, to Edwin Mitchell, June 22, 1971. The stringent
environmental protection requirements now in effect greatly aided the citizens' efforts. See Dep't
of Highway, State of Tennessee, Environmental Impact Statement (draft Feb. 23, 1971) (for
project U-021-1(4), State Route 12). It is also possible that planned private development in the
floodplain area caused the highway to be located nearer to it. See id. at 17, 19. See also note 187
infra.

104. In addition to the benefit gained by proving to themselves that black citizens can work
together, there were more tangible gains. First, the conflict caused a number of black leaders to
become concerned with the future of their community. Doctors Edwin Mitchell, Ralph Hinas, and
Flournoy Coles are excellent examples. Secondly, the struggle left as its residue a viable citizens'
advocacy group with working contacts in the community that were potentially invaluable for the
young Model Cities program. See generally Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger,
May 8, 1968; Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, July 26, 1968. It was clear,
however, that the city resented the 1-40 Steering Committee's efforts. See Letter from Flournoy
Coles, Chairman of the 1-40 Steering Committee, to Beverly Briley, Jan. 30, 1968.
105. There were 63 cities selected as first round cities in November 1967. Twelve subsequently were chosen for a first round total of 75. See Nashville Banner, Nov. 15, 1967, at 2, col.
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Nashville, as for other cities, this did not mean that the application
would be accepted in toto, but rather that HUD would work with the
selected cities to modify their programs to achieve conformance with
department guidelines. The most obvious alteration of the application
was in the amount of the federal grant-182,000 dollars of federal funds
as opposed to the requested 270,000 dollars.0 6 The structure for meaningful citizen participation and a workable financial system were the two
other major concerns. 07
As soon as the selection announcement was made, the Mayor appointed his Urban Renewal Coordinator to serve as Acting Director of
the program in addition to his other duties.0 8 Work began almost immediately in an effort to satisfy the HUD requirements. In a series of
meetings in November and December between the Mayor, his Fiscal
Administrative Assistant, the Metropolitan Finance Director, the Acting Director of Model Cities in Nashville, and federal agency representatives," 9 the exact problems were defined, and, at least in the area of
citizen participation, a final organizational structure was evolved. To
assure participation representative of all segments of the community, a
broadly based citizen participation structure to be known as the Citizens
Coordinating Committee (CCC) was proposed. This group was to have
75 members drawn from four separate categories: eleven members were
to be appointed by the three universities in the Model Neighborhood
Area; eleven members were to be appointed by the Mayor to represent
the total Nashville community; twenty-three members were to be appointed by community organizations that had been selected in public

4. Secretary Robert Weaver's main purpose in coming to Nashville was to try to settle a dispute
with the residents of a major urban renewal area.
106. Id., Nov. 28, 1967, at I, col. 4. Because of the reduced federal funds, Nashville's
matching share was cut from about $67,000 to approximately $43,000. See note 58 supra and
accompanying text. The failure to receive full funding was not unique to Nashville, but was
indicative only of decreased federal appropriations. See, e.g., THREE CITIES STUDY, supra note 28,
at 20, 43, 74. Nashville, like other cities, did become eligible for some additional planning funds
part-way through the planning year. Nashville Tennessean, May 29, 1968, at 7, col. 3 ($40,000
urban planning assistance grant supplemented with $20,000 of local money). See also Memorandum from Frank R. Garban, Fiscal Management Analyst, HUD Atlanta Regional Office, to Earl
Metzger, Oct. 29, 1968 ($62,500 additional federal grant).
107. Interview with William Reinhart, in Nashville, Feb. 15, 1972. These 2 areas of concern
were encountered in many other Model Cities programs. See generallyTHREE CITIES STUDY, supra
note 28, at 20-21, 43, 74-75.
108. Nashville Tennessean, Nov. 17, 1968, at 1, col. 4. William Reinhart had been serving
as the Mayor's Urban Renewal Coordinator since early 1967 and, in this position, was primarily
responsible for the Planning Grant Application. See note 31 supra. Reinhart served in this dual
capacity until his appointment as permanent Director in March 1968.
109. Nashville Banner, Nov. 28, 1967, at 1, col. 4.
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meetings of Model Neighborhood Area residents; and thirty members
were to be selected from the Model Neighborhood Area as grass-roots

representatives. This basic structure, along with a promise for some
small remuneration for participating citizens, was submitted to HUD
in January for approval."" Following a review of this organizational
plan at a meeting with the Mayor on January 29, 1968, the Assistant
Regional Administrator for Model Cities gave his general approval, but
some specific questions remained unanswered."' The CCC was estab-

lished in a role in which it would interact directly only with the CDA,
an arrangement that could insulate the Mayor from direct citizen input
and isolate the CCC from the real locus of decision-making power.
There was also some concern about the ability of Nashville to select
group representatives from MNA groups without alienating the excluded groups." 2 Except for these two points, however, the citizen par-

ticipation structure was approved and, with a financial program that
was at least sufficient to begin the planning year, the Metropolitan
Government and HUD signed a contract for a one-year planning grant
3
of 182,000 dollars on February 27, 1968."
B.

Staffing the City DemonstrationAgency

Most of the day-to-day coordinating work in a Model Cities program is normally conducted by a City Demonstration Agency. The staff
of a CDA is a group of full-time employees hired by the city but theoret-

ically responsive to all parties in the planning process. As crucial as this
coordinating role is in a program like Model Cities, it is surprising to

note the absolute lack of urgency exhibited by the Mayor's office in
filling vital positions and taking the steps necessary to begin planning.

For example, there was no North Nashville office of the CDA until
three weeks after the grant contract was signed,"' and a CDA Director
110. Nashville Tennessean, Jan. 19, 1968, at I, col. 4.
I11. See Letter from Beverly Briley to Earl Metzger, Feb. 5, 1968.
112. The primary concern on this point was that the selection of a few representatives from
a large number of groups would cause many citizens to become immediately disgruntled with the
program. The proposed solution was to utilize as much as possible existing federations of groups
with common interests as constitutencies for the group representatives.
113. Nashville Tennessean, Feb. 28, 1968, at 9, col. 6.
114. Nashville Banner, Mar. 21, 1968, at 37, col. 5. The HUD Washington office was aware
of Mayor Briley's apparently dilatory attitude and could discover no satisfactory explanation for
his inaction. See Memorandum from Stephen R. Barker to H. Ralph Taylor, Mar. 27, 1968. Other
cities apparently did not suffer the extensive delays encountered by Nashville. Dayton, Ohio, for
example, bad its Director and Assistant Director appointed, its citizen participation structure
selected, an office opened, and some staff hired by the time Nashville opened its office-with no
director, staff, or citizen structure. See THREE CITIES STUDY, supra note 28, at 74-77.
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was not named until one week after that."' This loss of planning time

could have been recouped if staffing had quickly accelerated, but the
progress continued to be slow. One staff member, technically assigned
from the Metropolitan Welfare Commission, was added to the general

staff almost immediately,"' and a black planner from Tennessee State
University was hired in early April to take charge of physical facilities

planning." 7 Shortly thereafter a fiscal man was added, followed by the
first coordinator of citizen participation. The first strictly socioeconomic planner was not hired until mid-July."'
Even after this staffing process had gathered some momentum,

however, the CDA as a unit remained far from full operational efficiency for several reasons. The first factor causing this inefficiency centered on the personality of the CDA Director. Although he was a skilled

and experienced planner, he had only limited administrative experience.
For some four months prior to the hiring of any CDA staff, the Director
had single-handedly administered the program, and as staff members
were hired he apparently was hesitant to delegate his accustomed

tasks."9 Although the staff generally accepted this diminished role, it
was not conducive to the formation of an effective organization.'" The
second factor causing delay in beginning effective staff planning activity
was the very practical one that, until the citizen participation structure
was implemented, very little planning could or should take place.' 2,

115. Nashville Tennessean, Mar. 27, 1968, at 1I,col. 1.This schedule compares very unfavorably with both the Atlanta and Dayton timetables. THREE CITIES STUDY, supra note 28, at 24,
74; see Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Mar. 14, 1968. See generally Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, July 26, 1968.
116. This staff member was Robert Meadows. Interview with Norman Moore, in Nashville,
Feb. 22, 1972. Meadows' formal assignment on the CDA staff was uncertain, but he served as a
general assistant to Reinhart in practice. Interview with Robert Meadows, in Nashville, Feb. 24,
1972; see Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Sept. 6, 1968.
117. Nashville Tennessean, Apr. 4, 1968, at 33, col. 1.
118. Interview with Norman Moore, in Nashville, Feb. 22, 1972. See also Memorandum
from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, July 16, 1968.
119. "The administrative organization still orbits very closely around Director Reinhart. He
exerts close control of all aspects of the program and, in fact, is the only one who has a clear idea
of the long range picture." Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Sept. 6, 1968. See
also Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, July 16, 1968; Memorandum from Deane
Tucker to Earl Metzger, Aug. 1968 (Reinhart's failure to submit reports "is probably because he
has not delegated enough authority to enable anyone else to prepare these things").
120. Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Sept. 6, 1968.
121. Despite the repeated representations by the city that no planning would be done without
citizen input (see note 60 supra and accompanying text), the CDA did move ahead and arrange
for substantial consultant work to be done prior to the completion of the citizen structure. See
notes 131-140 infra and accompanying text. The CDA was able to do this preliminary work without
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Instead, the summer of 1968 was filled largely with ironing out problems
in the financial operations and working toward the August political
23
elections 22 and with preparing for the long-overdue citizens elections.
A third factor that resulted in poor staff coordination was the addition
of the local Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) 1 4 to the administrative responsibilities of the CDA office without the appointment of
a separate director.12 . Consequently, the CDA Director, out of a sense
of necessity or a desire to control yet another program, administered
CEP as well as Model Cities. Moreover, because it was an "early impact" program, CEP required active attention. 26 The fourth factor that
hindered the efficiency of the CDA staff was an inability to retain
personnel in key positions. Within four months of the creation of the
CDA staff, both the citizen participation director and the physical planner had resigned. 2 7 The final, and perhaps most important factor in the

a large staff because Reinhart insisted on doing most of it himself. Interview with Norman Moore,
in Nashville, Feb. 22, 1972.
122. Interview with Norman Moore, in Nashville, Feb. 22, 1972.
123. See notes 146-149 infra and accompanying text.
124. The Concentrated Employment Program is an OEOofunded program that serves as a
local packaging and delivery system for a wide variety of OEO and Department of Labor employment projects. In areas having a Model Cities program, the CEP "target area" must be identical
with the MNA. Although the local Community Action Program agency is usually the prime
sponsor for the CEP operation, the CDA has served as prime sponsor since the beginning of the
CEP program in Nashville. With a total of approximately $1,600,000 in federal funding per year,
Nashville CEP is the only manpower development effort currently operating in North Nashville.
125. See Nashville Model Cities Agency, Bi-Monthly Planning Progress Report No. 1, at 2
(July 10. 1968). The position of CEP Director was not filled until December 1968 (Nashville
Tennessean, Dec. 4. 1968, at 38, col. 3), and this prolonged vacancy was a constant source of
irritation for HUD. See, e.g., Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Oct. 10, 1968.
126. The CEP, although administered through the CDA, was not a part of the Model Cities
program per se. As a result, the planning and funding requests for CEP could proceed far ahead
of the Model Cities work itself. For the progress of the CEP application see Nashville Banner,
Apr. 14, 1968, at 7, col. 2; Nashville Tennessean, June 11, 1968, at 9, col. 2; id., July 15, 1968, at
I, col. 3. For a discussion of the Nashville CEP program see Nashville Model Cities Agency, supra
note 125, at 3-4. The application and organization of CEP not only occupied a great deal- of
Reinhart's time (see Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Sept. 6, 1968; Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Aug. 1968; Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl
Metzger, July 26, 1968), but also required the efforts of the entire CDA staff (see Memorandum
from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, July 16, 1968; Nashville Model Cities Agency, Work Program Status Report No. I, at 2 (July 10, 1968)). The CEP project was not a total liability, however,
because its large staff provided a pool that Reinhart could call upon for manpower assistance. See
Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Sept. 6, 1968.
127. Both Cecil Cook, in charge of citizen participation, and Robert McClain, in charge of
physical planning, left the CDA during the summer of 1968. It was the feeling of the HUD leadman
that Cook was generally inadequate in his position and the lack of progress in that area does
nothing to relieve that impression. See Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, July

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

delay and inefficiency in staffing the CDA was the difficult relationship
that the CDA had with the Mayor's office.' 28 The Mayor's reluctance
to allow adequate staffing of the CDA was only symptomatic of a

continuing problem of hostility to the CDA's comprehensive planning
role, which was perceived by the Mayor's assistants and, to a lesser

degree, by other Metropolitan agencies as a threat to their traditional
prerogatives.'2 The most serious aspect of this difficulty was the line of
communication from the CDA Director to the Mayor. Although the
Mayor's assistants tended to act as a buffer and clearing house for
reports from the heads of various Metropolitan agencies, the CDA
Director insisted that he should have a direct line of communication
with the Mayor himself, free of any intermediate steps through the

Mayor's office staff. It is not surprising that this adamant position was
met with a significant amount of resistance on the part of the Mayor's

assistants who were not amenable to any invasion of their supervisory
prerogatives. By the end of the summer of 1968, however, the CDA
staff
Director had established himself as independent of the Mayor's
30
authority.
staffing
and
administrative
full
and possessed of

26, 1968. See also Memorandum from Henry Bankston to Earl Metzger, July 30, 1968. The failure
to implement a viable citizen participation structure, however, cannot be blamed solely on the
inefficiency of any one man. See notes 144 & 146 infra and accompanying text. McClain, the only
black in the original CDA structure, was by all accounts a talented individual; he soon received
far better job offers and finally accepted a job in Michigan. See Memorandum from Deane Tucker
to Earl Metzger, Sept. 6, 1968; Interview with Norman Moore, in Nashville, Feb. 22, 1972;
Interview with William Reinhart, in Nashville, Feb. 15, 1972.
128. The relationship of the CDA with the Mayor's office was usually discussed with reference to the personalities involved (see notes 129-30 infra and accompanying text), but there is some
indication that this problem was mirrored in an uncertainty over the exact status of the
CDA-department, direct arm of the Mayor's office, or independent agency-within Metropolitan
Government. See Letter from Earl Metzger to William Reinhart, Nov. 29, 1968; Memorandum
from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Dec. 13, 1968.
129. Interview with William Reinhart, in Nashville, Feb. 15, 1972. The CDA office staff was
a particularly sensitive issue because it could have developed into a self-contained planning and
implementation unit that would not have been dependent upon other Metro agencies. The jealousy
thus generated in these agencies, coupled with the financial capability of this relatively independent
program to provide a large source of jobs, made it politically expedient for the Mayor to delay
the full staffing of the CDA, especially with a city election approaching in August. This hesitancy
to commit local resources to the CDA effort also surfaced in the search for a permanent office for
the CDA in North Nashville. Following a summer of squabbling over which property should be
acquired, the present office was opened in September 1968, after the local elections had been held.
Interview with Norman Moore, in Nashville, Feb. 22, 1972; Nashville Tennessean, Sept. 5, 1968,
at 22, col. 2; Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, July 26, 1968.
130. Reinhart had previously worked on the Mayor's personal staff so he was no newcomer
to the tactics of insulation that prevailed. Throughout the summer of 1968 he had attempted to
clear his lines of communications with the Mayor, and to do so, had to go over the heads of some
of Briley's top assistants-Robert Horton and Joel Mosely-and of Briley's influential personal

NASHVILLE MODEL CITIES

19721
C.

Role of Consultants in Early Planning

As is typical in most small and medium sized American cities,
Nashville has frequently utilized the expertise of outside consultants in
the development of complex planning and the organization of federal
programs. The city made extensive use of such experts in early highway
planning 13' and in the development of several urban renewal projects. 3 2 Perhaps the most ambitious study undertaken prior to Model
Cities in Nashville was one conducted by Hammer and Company Associates on the economy of Nashville.'33 The impact on Model Cities

planners of this report, which strongly urged a governmental offensive
to broaden and strengthen the already diversified economy, cannot be
ignored. In fact, in the summer of 1967, when a follow-up report on the
Nashville Conference on Housing was written, the Hammer study was
relied upon heavily in the assessment of the progress that the Nashville

housing market had made and in the determination whether current
housing efforts were consistent with the goals that Hammer had defined.
The most important fact to note, however, is that this follow-up report

was written by the man who was later appointed CDA Director. 31
With this history of consultant use, it was no surprise when, soon
after his appointment, the CDA Director looked at his infant program
and began to identify various areas in which outside assistance might
be most beneficial. The resultant scheme embraced four components-physical environment, economic development, housing, and
transportation-which were oriented directly or indirectly toward physical planning. It was the Director's belief that the questions involved in
secretary. Interview with William Reinhart, in Nashville, Feb. 15, 1972. Despite the fact that this
problem apparently was resolved by early fall 1968 (see Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl
Metzger, Sept. 6, 1968; Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, July 16, 1968), some
areas of Metro Government continued to press for restrictions on CDA development (see id.). It
is significant to note that, although authority to staff the CDA had allegedly been granted to
Reinhart by the Mayor (see, e.g., Id.), the permanent CDA staff never totalled more than 4 during
1968. Reinhart apparently acquiesced in this miniscule staffing (see Nashville Model Cities
Agency, supra note 125, at 7), even though he lost the key Assistant Director for Physical Planning
in late August. See id., at attachment #3; Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Sept.
6. 1968. For a comparison with the staff development in other Model Cities see ELEVEN CITIES
STUDY, supra note 45, at 40-42.
131. See, e.g., notes 65-68 supra and accompanying text. See also Wilbur Smith & Associates, Nashville Metropolitan Area Transportation Study, vol. 1, Origin-Destination Survey and
Major Route Plan (1961), abstracted in Metropolitan Planning Commission, Model City Survey
Research Evaluation and Preliminary Data System Design 176-181 (1970).
132. Note 173 infra and accompanying text.
133. Hammer Study, supra note 37.
134. W. Reinhart, supra note 36.
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these components were too complex for local agencies. 3 ' Consequently, in the summer of 1968, he negotiated a 68,000 dollar contract
with Marcou, O'Leary and Associates to study the physical environ-

ment, housing, and economic development components." 6 An additional contract was soon let to Alan M. Voorhees and Associates for

an examination of the transportation component.3 7 These contracts
were negotiated long before any formal citizen participation had been
achieved. 38 The consultants were to report their findings by late in
1968.
Both of these contracts-Marcou, O'Leary and Voorhees-dealt
with the physical planning track of the program. The other components
were placed under the supervision of the Associate Director for Social
and Economic Planning. 39 It was decided that this type of planning

could be done locally without the aid of professional, non-Nashville
consultants. 4 0
D.

Development of a Citizen ParticipationStructure

The Model Cities program was conceived as a cooperative approach to the solution of urban problems and was intended to involve
widespread citizen participation. In Nashville, an organization to satisfy
this requirement was not formally created until well into the planning
year. The planning grant application had involved no real citizen participation, and the period of time immediately before Nashville's selection
as a first round city brought citizen participation only in the 1-40 dispute. In the first few months after selection, the city was too concerned
135. Interview with William Reinhart, in Nashville, Feb. 15, 1972; see Memorandum from
Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Aug. 1968.
136. Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Aug. 1968; Nashville Model Cities
Agency, supra note 125, at 1. This is the same firm that did the engineering studies for the 140
air rights deck. See note 87 supra.
137. Although the selection of Voorhees was apparently maae in the early summer of 1968
(see Nashville Model Cities Agency, supra note 125, at 1), the report itself (see Alan M. Voorhees
& Associates, Transportation Accessibility in the Model Cities Area (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Voorhees Report]) indicates that there was no contract until October 1968 (Id. at viii, xv).
138. The citizens in North Nashville held meetings on August 28, 1968 to nominate local
residents to serve as the grass-roots representatives to the CCC. At one of these meetings, more
than one month before the CCC held its first meeting, it was announced that 2 outside consultants
had been selected to study economic development, housing, and public transportation. Nashville
Tennessean, Aug. 29, 1968, at 5, col. 4.
139. Norman Moore not only supervised the entire social program, he served as the chairman for each of these components and was personally responsible for their progress. See Nashville
City Demonstration Agency, Work Program Status Report No. 3, attachments 1-4, 7-8 (Dec. 4,
1968). See also Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Feb. 12, 1969; Memorandum
from Norman Moore to Members of the CCC, Mar. 1969.
140. Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, July 26, 1968.
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with ironing out the details of the grant to worry about involving citizens. Nevertheless, one of the "wrinkles" that needed attention during
the spring of 1968 was the citizen participation structure. By February
of 1968 HUD had approved generally the 75-member Citizens Coordinating Committee proposed by Nashville. Despite this approved struc-

ture and prodding by the HUD Regional Office's leadman for Nashville, there was no effort to contact citizens about the CCC until after
the grant contract had been signed.' 4 ' Then, in a series of open meetings
in the MNA during March and April, 1968,12 the 23 representatives of

the community organizations in North Nashville were selected by allo43
cating a membership quota to each of several different kinds of clubs.
With this first step taken toward establishing the CCC, it appeared
that full membership would soon be achieved. Instead, four forces intervened. The first was the discontent that lingered in the community as a
result of the 1-40 controversy.'44 This general feeling was exacerbated
by the assassination of the Reverend Martin Luther King, which effectively precluded any immediate attempt to establish citizen cooperation
in North Nashville. By the time relationships returned to near normal,
the CDA staff member in charge of citizen participation had resigned.
His departure was not viewed as the loss of an invaluable individual, but
it did leave the CDA with an important position vacant at a crucial time
in the development of the CCC.'4 s The final factor that delayed the

filling of CCC positions was the refusal of the Mayor to allow the final
selection process to coincide with the summer primary elections. Conse-

CCC elections
quently, CDA staff personnel had to suspend work on the
4
in order to avoid confusion between the two elections. 6
141. Both the leadman and Reinhart apparently were concerned about the delays in implementing the citizen participation structure. The Mayor's office seemed to be the source of the delay.
See Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Mar. 14, 1968.
142. See Nashville Tennessean, Apr. 22, 1968, at 17, col. 3; id. Apr. 14, 1968, at 97, col. 2;
Nashville Banner, Mar. 30, 1968, at 6, col. 5; Nashville Tennessean, Mar. 28, 1968, at 67, col. 5;
id., Mar. 21, 1968, at 6, col. 3. Some groundwork had been laid earlier when 2 citizens-Dr. Edwin
Mitchell and Mrs. C.E. McGruder-were invited to attend a 4-day meeting in Atlanta with HUD
officials and local government personnel from the Southeast. See Nashville Banner, Mar. 6, 1968,
at I, col. I.
143. The task of apportioning the 23 representative positions among the numerous MNA
groups could have been troublesome but it was accomplished without visible antagonism; 8 were
allocated to religious organizations, 3 to business, one to labor, 2 to political groups, 4 to civic
clubs, 4 to social organizations, and one to a youth group. Nashville Banner, Apr. 23, 1968, at 14,
col. I.
144. See D. Tucker, Report-Nashville Tennessee, Feb. 1968, attached to Memorandum
from Donald Dodge, former desk officer for the Atlanta region, to H. Ralph Taylor, Feb. 8, 1969.
145. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
146. Interview with Norman Moore, in Nashville, Feb. 22, 1972.
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During this delay, two significant modifications were made in the
procedures to be used in selecting grass-roots representatives. As a result of citizen pressure, the grass-roots representatives were to be elected
by the MNA residents themselves and not selected through a canvass
conducted by city personnel.'47 Further, the five MNA councilmanic
districts were to serve as the foundation of the grass-roots representa-

tion. 4' This was intended to ensure the support of councilmen themselves and make possible the use of familiar voting places and districts.
The election procedure involved an organizational meeting in each district, a nominating meeting two weeks later, and an election ten days
thereafter, on September 7, 1968.11 A relatively healthy turnout was
received and the 30 grass-roots representatives joined the organized
group representatives and the institutional representatives, who had
been selected by the three universities in the MNA. The final obstacle
to full CCC membership should have been the easiest to overcome: the
appointment by the Mayor of the eleven representatives of the total
community. These members from the community-at-large were not
appointed, however, until October 1, more than seven months after the

grant and almost one month after the rest of the CCC had been selected.' 50
As soon as the last appointments were made, the CCC began to
organize to fulfill its planning role. The chairmanship went to a grassroots representative who was the minister at one of the North Nashville

churches.' 5 With the assistance of the CDA Director,'52 the CCC structured itself by establishing standing committees corresponding to the
147. The initial plan for selecting the grass-roots representatives was to use a questionnaire
survey of the MNA in an attempt to discover who the perceived leaders were. The process was
viewed with suspicion by the citizens, and the CDA finally modified the selection process to allow
for direct nomination and election by adult MNA residents. See Nashville Model Cities Agency,
supra note 125, at 2, 6; Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Aug. 1968; Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, July 26, 1968.
148. Nashville Model Cities Agency, supra note 125, at 6. This move had definite merit
because it would encourage the local councilmen to become involved in a program that would
vitally affect their districts. Because an unwritten role of "councilmanic courtesy" governs many
localized issues in the Metropolitan Council, the change could also have served to facilitate the
ultimate passage of the program by enlisting the early support of the MNA councilmen. These
councilmen, however, generally have not been too active in the Model Cities program.
149. Mass meetings were held in each of the 5 districts of the MNA on August 15, 1968 to
acquaint residents with the election process. Nominations were received at meetings on August 28,
1968, and the 30 positions were filled on September 7, 1968. See W. Reinhart, Model Cities
Elections-Voting Regulations, Aug. 1968; Nashville Banner, Aug. 10, 1968, at 3, col. 4.
150. Nashville Tennessean, Oct. 2, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
151. CCC, Minutes of Regular Meeting, Oct. 10, 1968, at 2.
152. Reinhart helped the citizens through the initial organizational difficulties by using his
staff to prepare such things as agenda and minutes for the first meetings.
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components planned for the final submission and by creating an executive committee composed of the CCC officers and the chairman of each
Standing Committee. Coincident with this citizen activity, the city was
organizing agency representatives, city staff, and local technicians into
groups to work in the various component areas. 5 3 What remained
seemed to be a simple job of matching the appropriate citizen committee
with the proper city group and starting these Task Forces, seven months

late, on the job of planning Nashville's Comprehensive City Demonstration Plan.
V.

EVOLUTION OF PROJECT PLANNING

Even though some of the joint city-citizen component task forces
had their initial meetings in early October, 54 it took the citizens another
month to work out the exact membership of each standing committee
and to designate the representatives from each committee to the corresponding joint Task Force.' In other words, very little meaningful
discussion for the problem analysis had taken place by mid-November
1968. Nevertheless, on November 14, 1968, the CDA Director suggested to the Executive Committee of the CCC that the planning process

be expedited and that, instead of aiming for the April 1, 1969 deadline,
they work toward a January 1969 completion date.' His reason for
suggesting the acceleration in planning effort was that, if Nashville met
this earlier deadline, it would receive a 75 percent increase in the level
of its first-year funding.

57

This recommendation and the CCC's ap-

153. See, e.g., Nashville Tennessean, Oct. 10, 1968, at 34, col. I.
154. See Nashville City Demonstration Agency, supra note 139, attachments 1-9. There was
no actual physical environment component at this time.
155. CCC, Minutes of Regular Meeting, Nov. 21, 1968, at 2; CCC, Minutes of Executive
Committee Meeting, Nov. 14, 1968, at I. Part of the cause for this delay was the citizens' rejection
of Reinhart's suggestion that each task force have only 2 citizen representatives. Instead, the CCC
voted to place 8 representatives on each task force in an attempt to ensure that their voice would
be heard. See Nashville Tennessean, Oct. 11, 1968, at 16, col. 3; id., Oct. 4, 1968, at 21, col. I.
Ultimately, the citizens agreed to have only 2 representatives per task force, with any other
interested citizens invited to attend the meetings, but this agreement was arrived at only after 6
weeks of discussion.
156. CCC, Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, Nov. 14, 1968, at 2.
157. Id. Although some cities did meet an earlier deadline and consequently received additional first year funds, most cities, including Nashville, were told exactly how much money they
were planning for (and ultimately did get). Some of the cities that received extra first year money,
however, had their second year budgets slashed. Dick Battle, a Nashville newspaperman who had
followed the Model Cities program closely, criticized the new January 1, 1969 deadline as an effort
by the Democrats in Washington to get the money spent before they left office; he felt that it could
only hurt the planning effort. Nashville Banner, Nov. 25, 1968, at 1, col. I.
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proval of it,'58 was made in the face of knowledge that much of the

information needed for planning would not even be available until December 1968.59 Despite this apparently optimistic, or seemingly naive
action, 6 " there was some progress in the identification and evaluation
of some of Nashville's problems. In order to appreciate this progress,
however, it is again necessary to realize that the program evolved into
two different tracks: the socio-economic components and the physical
components.'
A.

Socio-Economic Planning

The socio-economic components-health, recreation, education,
employment, social services, and crime reduction-never had the bene-

fit-or liability-of outside consultants. Instead, it was felt that local
experts and agency representatives would possess knowledge of these
topics sufficient to identify the problem areas and to suggest projects
for their solution. 6 2 The Health Component Task Force' 13 may be
typical of the success that this approach enjoyed in the development of
the Problem Analysis.' 64 As a complete task force it had seven meet158. CCC, Minutes of Regular Meeting, Nov. 21, 1968, at I. Approval followed a report
by the Planning Committee of the CCC recommending the speed-up in planning. CCC, Report of
the Planning Committee, Nov. 18, 1968.
159. CCC, Minutes of Regular Meeting, Nov. 21, 1968, at 1.
160. Perhaps a more plausible explanation of Reinhart's motives would be that he was trying
to stimulate the CCC to prompt action after the long delay in membership selection and committee
appointment.
161. This division of planning work was highly visible in the CDA's reports to HUD. See,
e.g., Nashville City Demonstration Agency, supra note 139, at 2.
162. One of the major questions that developed later in the program was whether outside
consultants had been relied on too heavily. In the early stages, however, there was at least some
doubt concerning whether consultants were being under-utilized, presumably in relation to the
social components. See Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Dec. II, 1968.
163. The Health Task Force consisted of representatives of the Citizens Standing Committee
on Health and agency representatives from the Tennessee Department of Public Health, the
Tennessee Department of Mental Health, Meharry Medical College, Meharry Neighborhood
Health Center, the Metropolitan Health Department, the Council of Community Agencies, and
the Model Cities staff. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Problem
Analysis, Health Component, at 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Problem Analysis].
164. Although the Health Task Force may have been typical of the success of this overall
planning approach, it was somewhat atypical in that it had a large amount of preexisting data to
draw upon for the Problem Analysis. See, e.g., Nashville Metropolitan Planning Commission,
Model City Survey Research Evaluation and Preliminary Data System Design 56-77 (1970) (3
relevant reports are included: (1) Mercer & Newbrough, The North Nashville Health Study:
Research into the Culture of the Deprived (1967); (2) Hines, the Health Status of Negroes in a
Mid-Southern Urban Community; pts. I-Il (1967); (3) Meharry Medical College, Community
Mental Health Center (1968) (application for staffing grant)).
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ings,6 5 at which the residents discussed the problems of health care
delivery from the residents' point of view. The CCC's Health Standing
Committee also met on its own in attempts to define more precisely the
priorities that should be set for the MNA.165 When the ideas had been
presented as carefully as possible, the joint city-citizen Task Force tried
to draft its section of the Problem Analysis as a committee of the whole.
This proved to be unwieldy, and as a result, the Mayor appointed a
four-man Technical Task Force from the larger joint city-citizen Task
Force in early 1969 to write the first draft of the health portion of the
Problem Analysis.' 67 After this draft was reviewed and revised by the
full joint Task Force, the component was approved in March 1969 for
inclusion in the Problem Analysis.18 The other five socio-economic
components developed in the same basic way: early discussion between
the citizen group's standing committees and concerned agency personnel as a joint task force, drafting and revision by a smaller technical
task force, and final approval by the full joint task force. The task
forces did vary considerably, however, in the availability of raw data
with which to work. The recreation task force, for example, had an
excellent study of the recreational space that different parts of the
county would need by 1980,69 and also had a recent inventory of

physical facilities in the MNA. 70 The Employment task force had a
1968 survey done by the Concentrated Employment Program,", and
the social services task force felt the need to run its own survey of community needs. These six task forces all made serious attempts to involve citizens, but there were practical differences in the extent to
could provide meaningful input for the technical
which the citizens
72
task forces.
165.
166.

Problem Analysis, supra note 163, Health Component, at 1.
See, e.g., CCC, Minutes of Regular Meeting, Dec. 19, 1968, at 1. Other standing

committees did not meet as frequently. Id.
167. The members of this Technical Task Force were Thomas W. Hunter, Administrative
Assistant in the Metropolitan Health Department; Abbie Watson, Director of Nursing for the
Metropolitan Health Department; Billy Tolbert, Administrator of the Metropolitan General Hospital; and Dr. Ralph Hines, Vice President of Meharry Medical College and an influential member
of the CCC.
168. Memorandum from Norman Moore to Members of the Citizens Coordinating Committee, Mar. 1969.
169. Nashville Metropolitan Planning Commission, Recreation Space-1980 (1965).
170. Nashville Metropolitan Planning Commission, Model City Area Community Facilities
Inventory (1968) (staff memorandum).
171. The survey, ultimately included in the appendix of the Problem Analysis, was conducted
and compiled by Dr. Flournoy Coles.
172. In one component, for example, Crime Reduction, the joint task force held a series of
meetings but had not made any real progress on problem identification and analysis. Consequently,
when its Technical Task Force was created, the bulk of the work on the Problem Analysis, in
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In general, the development of the Problem Analysis in the six

socio-economic components was a reasonably successful implementation of the Model Cities concept. The CDA coordinated the efforts of
local planners, agency representatives, and MNA residents, and, in the
effective elapsed time of five months, completed a significant portion of
the Problem Analysis. As a result, by April 1969 the citizens were ready
to move into. the program planning stage in each of the social

components. Although the citizen standing committees for each of the
six components differed in the degree of their continued interest and
effectiveness in completing the basic planning, lines of communication
between the citizens and the city still existed and could have been used.
A comparison with the citizens' efforts in physical planning makes the
social component work more noteworthy and also provides the background for the subsequent break in meaningful citizen participation.
B.

Physical Planning

Physical planning for the MNA raised the spectre of one of the

greatest concerns of North Nashville blacks-urban renewal. Since the
middle 1950's, the Nashville metropolitan area had been the recipient
of a substantial quantity of urban renewal development. Because an area

must be dilapidated before urban renewal funds can be used to redevelop
it, and because the city's black population is localized and predomi-

nantly poor, it hardly is surprising to discover that most of the projects
have centered on black neighborhoods which surround the downtown,
inner city area. The reaction of the black community to urban renewal,
consequently, is both personalized and extensive.7 3 The primary ingre-

dient of that reaction is fear. The foundation of this fear is the cumulative impact of the massive physical displacement experienced by black
addition to the basic writing function, was left for it to do. Interview with Robert T. Knupp, former
member of the Crime Reduction Technical Task Force, in Nashville, Feb. 12, 1972.
173. The Nashville area, especially in black residential communities, has undergone substantial urban renewal development. This began in the middle 1950's with one of the first projects in
the country. The development-Capitol Hill-totally cleared a black residential and business area
and converted it into an attractive white commercial section surrounding the state capitol building.
Later projects-especially East Nashville and Edgehill-were planned by the same consultant but
were developed with a different overall plan and focused primarily on the provision of decent
rehousing, with an emphasis on public housing. This residential emphasis was not, however, completely acceptable to local residents and drew fire from citizen groups who were concerned about:
(I) the destruction of black housing and supporting commercial establishments without adequate
relocation; (2) the concentration of black families caused by the public housing; and (3) an absence
of new commercial development to provide necessary services for the residents of the projects. See
Transcript, vol. 6, at 200-09, NNCCC, Inc. v. Romney, supra note 43 (testimony of Mansfield
Douglas, Metropolitan Councilman for the Edgehill Urban Renewal Area).

19721

NASHVILLE MODEL CITIES

neighborhoods in the urban renewal process. This fear of physical dis-

placement is compounded by a pervasive feeling that government is
either unable or unwilling to provide adequate relocation assistance for
the persons displaced. When these two factors are added together, urban
renewal is frequently perceived to be destructive-especially of black

neighborhoods-rather than constructive. The urban renewal process is
viewed as destroying the institutional heart of the affected neighbor-

hood-schools, churches, residential centers, small neighborhood business and commercial districts-and substituting barracks-style public
housing or, even worse, large-scale commercial and industrial development. The basic hostilities generated over individual urban renewal projects are intensified by the feeling of many black leaders that the overall
renewal program results in the displacement of poor blacks from one
renewal area only to begin the process of deterioration and
7
redevelopment in another.1 1

The acute awareness of urban renewal helped make the developments in the physical components-economic development, housing,

transportation, and physical environment-sharply contrast with the
relatively successful local planning accomplished in the social compo-

nents. The physical task forces, however, began the planning process in
October 1968 in much the same way as did their social services counterparts, with several organizational meetings to discuss the broad parameters of each group's intended future study. 75 This similarity was shortlived, as it soon became apparent to them that their roles did not perfectly parallel those of the other six task forces.176 In fact, the serious
activity of the physical component task forces was not going to begin
174. In addition to the fear that city planners are "chasing:' black residents from neighborhood to neighborhood, there is a belief that, within a neighborhood, certain forces are employed
by the city to assure its eventual selection as an urban renewal area. The best description of this
process was given by Edwin Mitchell in a tape recorded lecture to a Vanderbilt University urban
affairs seminar in April 1971. In order to qualify for urban renewal, an area must have more than
50% dilapidated structures. According to Dr. Mitchell, this can be accomplished in 4 stages. First,
codes enforcement is withdrawn from an area, which allows substandard conditions to remain and
proliferate. Secondly, capital improvements are suspended by the city-or at least decreased
markedly-making the area deficient in municipal service and less attractive as a residential
neighborhood. Thirdly, the private sector pulls out its assistance from the bad neighborhood that
is developing. Finally, those few middle- and upper-income blacks who are residents make "voluntary" decisions to leave the unattractive area that was once a respectable neighborhood, thus
leaving the community powerless and voiceless.
175. See Nashville City Demonstration Agency, supra note 139, attachments 5, 6, 9.
176. One of the consultants realized this difference and made a statement that was highly
appropriate to the Nashville situation. "Technical recommendations, no matter how expertly
conceived, have little value unless they are understood and desired by the people for whom they
are intended." Voorhees Report, supra note 137, at 9.
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until the consultants, hired the previous summer, had made preliminary
reports, which initially were expected on November 1, 1968.177 Finally,
in mid-December, ten weeks after the joint task forces had been formed
and almost ten months after the grant agreement for the planning year
had been signed, the consultants' reports were received.17 The report of
Alan Voorhees and Associates was fairly routine and raised little concern. 17 The Marcou, O'Leary report on housing, economic development, and physical environment, however, deliberately raised fundamental land use policy questions, and it quickly became the focus of
intense citizen concern.' 0
On December 18, 1968, a representative of Marcou, O'Leary met
with citizens from the Economic Development, Housing, and Physical
Environment Standing Committees and the Executive Committee of the
CCC to present the firm's initial report.' 8' The citizens had been given
little advance notice of the type of work that this firm was doing, and
at least two factors must have misled them. First, the ofher components
at this time were still involved with basic data collection and problem
analysis and, as far as the citizens knew, this had not yet been done in
the physical components. Secondly, the only contact that these citizens
had had with Model Cities planning was limited to the MPC data
surveys and inventories, and they reasonably could have been expecting
basic statistical compilations of the type the MPC had already prepared.
What they saw and heard, however, was far more comprehensive. When
contracting with Marcou, O'Leary, the CDA director had stressed the
need for an extremely broad examination of current land use patterns
in North Nashville and the future land use trends-especially those
resulting from 1-40-as a prerequisite for any physical planning. Consequently, the presentation went beyond mere statistics into analysis of
different fundamental approaches to land use that could be employed
in redeveloping the MNA. Marcou had prepared three internally consistent redevelopment planning alternatives that called for concentrated
177. Nashville Tennessean, Aug. 29, 1968, at 5, col. 4.
178. CCC, Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, Dec. 6, 1968, at 3.
179. The Voorhees Report suggested only 3 projects: (1) crosstown bus service; (2) a dial-abus system-centrally dispatched small buses for door-to-door service; and (3) a bus route information program. The only reaction to the report came from the black-owned taxi industry, but the
delay and ultimate failure to implement any of the 3 projects quieted even that criticism.
180. Memorandum from Marcou, O'Leary & Associates to William Reinhart, Dec. 26,
1968; Marcou, O'Leary & Associates, Nashville Model Neighborhood Area-Alternatives for
Housing and Industrial Development (1969) [hereinafter cited as Marcou, O'Leary Report).
181. Transcript, vol. III at 260, NNCCC, Inc. v. Romney, supra note 43 (testimony of
Edwin Mitchell); id., vol. V, at 618-19, (testimony of Mary Walker).
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employment (a euphemism for concentrated industrial development), 81 2
maximum housing,'8 or a blend of the two." 4 The immediate citizen
reaction was confusion coupled with defensiveness. The large planning
maps that had been prepared by the consultants made at least three
points painfully clear: First, a substantial amount of urban renewal was
182. The main goal of the concentrated employment approach, quite obviously, was to
"maximize employment opportunities in MNA." This was to be accomplished by utilizing all
vacant land for industrial use and by clearing some housing for industrial use. At the same time
new housing would be limited, dilapidated housing would be cleared, and deteriorated housing
would be rehabilitated. The projected land use would be:
NUMBER OF ACRES

Residential
Industrial
Trade
Other*
Undeveloped
Streets and ROW**
TOTAL

1968

1985

1460
360
220
1030
1200
1130

1535
935
475
1210
80
1165

5400

5400

*Includes services, cultural, recreation, and entertainment activities.
**Rights-of-way.
Memorandum from Marcou, O'Leary & Associates to William Reinhart, Dec. 26, 1968,
at 2-4.
183. The maximum housing approach would meet its objective by utilizing vacant land for
housing and by minimizing all forms of residential housing clearance. Industrial development
would not be ignored, but would be allocated space only after residential development. Dilapidated
and deteriorated housing would be handled in the same way as in the concentrated employment
approach. Note 182 supra. One key aspect of this approach was the planned rehousing within the
MNA of all displaced MNA families. The projected land use would be:
NUMBER OF ACRES

Residential
Industrial
Trade
Other*
Undeveloped
Streets and ROW**
TOTAL

1968

1985

1460
360
220
1030
1200
1130

1890
500
500
1480
80
1160

5400

5400

*Includes services, cultural, recreation, and entertainment activities.
**Rights-of-way.
Memorandum from Marcou, O'Leary & Associates to William Reinhart, Dec. 26, 1968,
0/062
at 4-6.
184. The blended housing and employment approach essentially tried to find a middle
ground between the 2 extremes. It attempted to avoid unnecessary residential clearance, but did
divide the new development between industry and housing. The projected land use would be:
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planned for the MNA;8 5 secondly, this renewal would involve largescale residential clearance regardless of which of the three planning
alternatives was chosen;" 6 thirdly, the large vacant floodplain of the
Cumberland River 81-located
in the northern one-third of the
MNA-would be used extensively for the development of replacement
NUMBER OF ACRES

Residential
Industrial
Trade
Other*
Undeveloped
Streets & ROW**
TOTAL

1968

1985

1460
360
220
1030
1200
1130

1705
720
400
1320
95
1160

5400

5400

*Includes services, cultural, recreation and entertainment activities.
**Rights-of-way.
Memorandum from Marcou, O'Leary & Associates to William Reinhart, Dec. 26, 1968,
at 5-6.
185. See, e.g., Marcou, O'Leary Report, supra note 180, at 46-47, 51.
186. Between 1968 and 1985 all 3 approaches had extensive projected residential clearance;
the reasons for the clearance, however, varied.
HOUSING CLEARANCE IN MNA 1968-1985 (in dwelling units)
INDUSTRIAL
APPROACH
Dilapidated
For Project Objectives*
For Road Projects
For Industrial Corridor
For Industrial Expansion
TOTAL UNITS CLEARED

HOUSING
APPROACH

BLENDED
APPROACH

2,300
467
186
385
1,161

2,300
525
186
385
0

2,300
496
186
385
581

4,499

3,396

3,948

*Calculated at 5% of remaining housing after all other clearance. Marcou, O'Leary
Report, supra note 180, Appendix Table 16.
187.
When the possible corridors for 1-40 were being considered, a route through the
floodplain was rejected because the ground was not safe for extensive development. See note 77
supra. Less than a year later, however, Marcou, O'Leary felt so confident that new dams had
eliminated the possibility of frequent flooding that they recommended using the entire floodplain
for new development-residential and/or industrial. Marcou, O'Leary Report, supra note 180, at
38-39, 47. After the publication of these Model Cities studies, however, one large private developer
acquired ownership of all the land in the floodplain and announced an extensive balanced community development there. Nashville Tennessean, May 16, 1971, at 1, col. 7. There have been
indications recently, however, that the residential portion of the plan has been reduced. This flipflop of expert opinion on the usefulness of the floodplain has been especially difficult for the citizens
to understand. Many of the current community leaders in the MNA were active in the 1-40 dispute
and remember the short shrift given the recommendation of their planner that the floodplain be
used for the interstate right-of-way.
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housing. " ' Because the report of Marcou, O'Leary had not only compiled data, but had analyzed it and proposed detailed program approaches, the citizens group representatives felt that their statutory right
of widespread citizen participation had been usurped. Although the
three planning alternatives developed by. Marcou, O'Leary had been
intended to facilitate the citizens' involvement in the policy decisions on
how the MNA should develop, the members of the CCC felt they were
being stampeded into approving a large-scale urban renewal project that
would destroy the residential character of the MNA. 19 The sophistica-

tion and detail of the consultant's presentation intimidated the citizens.
On the one hand, the CCC felt that it lacked the technical expertise
needed to comprehend the full significance of the alternative plans being
urged upon them. On the other hand, the CCC realized that without
expert technical assistance its membership could not begin to prepare a
viable substitute program to replace the detailed plans of Marcou,

O'Leary. For more than a month the citizens puzzled over what position
the CCC should take on the physical development alternatives. The
Marcou, O'Leary staff, however, apprised of the deadlines that the
CDA was under, did not cease their activities in the face of the residents'
lack of action, but completed the work on the physical components
section of the problem analysis 9 " and proceeded on to actual program

planning. In late January 1969, the full CCC finally faced the issue of
selecting one of the three Marcou, O'Leary alternatives. 9' Instead of
selecting one of the options, however, the CCC voted to have its Executive Committee select a black consultant to explain the plan to them.'92

188. Both the maximum housing approach and the blended approach utilized significant
portions of the floodplain for relocation housing. The concentrated employment approach increased the citizens' concern for housing because it provided for very little replacement housing of
any kind.
189. Despite statements in the Marcou, O'Leary Report that none of the 3 alternatives was
a "straw man" (see Marcou, O'Leary Report, supra note 180, at 59) and that the suggested
approaches were merely 3 possible points on a continuum from all housing to all industrial (see
Memorandum from Marcou, O'Leary & Associates to William Reinhart, Dec. 26, 1968, at 2), it
was soon clear that the blended approach was the city's choice. See, e.g., Problem Analysis, supra
note 163, Program Strategy Under the Blended Housing-Employment Approach; Letter from John
Van Ness, Planning Supervisor, Nashville Housing Authority, to Mary Walker, Chairman of the
Citizens Standing Committee on Housing and Relocation, Nov. 18, 1969. It is conceivable that, if
the citizens had reacted promptly, they could have modified the approach, but they in fact made
no progress in this direction.
190. The Problem Analysis for the 4 physical components consists totally of materials that
were prepared by Marcou, O'Leary. Because they had not contacted citizens before December 18,
1968, and because after that the relationship developed with growing antagonism, this portion of
the Problem Analysis did not have any citizen participation.
191. Memorandum from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Feb. 12, 1969.
192. CCC, Minutes of Regular Meeting, Jan. 24, 1969.
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C. Planning Without the Citizens
By early February 1969, a two-fold pattern had begun to emerge
that tended to maximize the differences between the city and the citizens
group. While the city officials had begun to intensify their efforts to
meet the impending April 1 submission deadline for the CCDP, the
citizens had become increasingly reluctant to participate at all without
the benefit of expert technical assistance. Had there been more time
available to the city, these differences might have been resolved. The
Mayor, however, felt he could not halt the planning process for the
period of time necessary to quiet the CCC's apprehension. Consequently, the Mayor ordered the various departments to proceed with the
preparation of projects without awaiting citizen involvement.,"
The best description of this planning process by the city departments is found in a letter from the Nashville Housing Authority Planning Supervisor to the chairman of the citizens' Standing Committee on
Housing and Relocation. This letter describes the work of the Housing
Technical Task Force in its preparation of the projects that would constitute the Housing Component of the CCDP:
Last spring, the five of us [the members of the Housing Technical Task Force]
were requested to serve as an ad hoc committee to prepare a draft of the Housing
Component. Although we worked for various agencies of the Metro government,
namely, the Housing Authority, Metro Codes Administration and the Office of the
Mayor, we were not to serve as representatives of these agencies nor were we to
seek the approval of these agencies or of your Committee-that was to be done by
the CDA staff. Rather, we were asked to devise programs in response to the various
objectives that had been developed by the CDA staff as they related to improved
housing. These objectives related to the "Blended Approach" for neighborhood
development [the Marcou, O'Leary alternative favored by the city].
Within a three week period of time, we suggested the various major activities
to meet these objectives, estimated the degree of activity and attempted to estimate
the cost of the programs. It was our understanding that these programs were then
to have been presented to the Citizens Housing Committee by the CDA staff for
their review and for whatever action was desired. The CDA staff was then to put
the application for funds together for submission to the Metropolitan Council.",

Although the planning process varied somewhat in detail from
component to component, the basic planning pattern was the same as
that described for the Housing Component: detailed project planning by
a technical task force of agency personnel for the implementation of
goals and objectives prepared by the CDA staff. Citizen participation
was to be obtained by the CDA office only after it received the completed draft component from the task force. The strategy of the city was
193.
194.

See Nashville Banner, Feb. 7, 1969, at 2, col. 1.
Letter from John Van Ness to Mary Walker, Nov. 18, 1969.
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thus aimed at completing the CCDP as quickly as possible, and obtaining whatever citizen participation might be possible once a draft plan
was ready for submission. Although there had been a substantial

amount of citizen involvement in the socio-economic components in the
early data collection stages, even this involvement was effectively termi-

nated when the technical task forces initiated project planning.
By mid-March the technical task forces had completed the Prob95

lem Analysis and it was submitted to HUD after a brief citizen review.

At the same time the CDA Director persuaded the CCC to form a

Priorities and Funding Committee, which would review projects as they
were prepared for the CCDP and which could negotiate any major
objections the citizens might have to these projects. The city officials
hoped that this preliminary citizen review would make possible a simple
vote of approval by the CCC that could be used by the city to satisfy

the widespread citizen participation requirement of the statute. The
meetings of the Priorities and Funding Committee, however, did little
to resolve the doubts of the CCC. Instead, these meetings merely be-

came briefing sessions in which the citizens' representatives were informed of the projects that had been completed for inclusion in the
CCDP.19 ' It was against this background of growing divergence and
hostility that the CCC engaged the services of the urban planning consulting firm, Simmons, Ussery, Streets and Associates.
VI.

A.

CITIZEN STRUGGLE FOR ROLE DEFINITION

Withdrawalfrom the PlanningProcess

Two major considerations governed the selection by the CCC of its
consultants. The citizens' group wanted a black consultant," 7 and it
195. The CCC had received copies of at least part of the Problem Analysis, but never took
formal action on the entire document. The preparation and submission of the Problem Analysis,
however, was not a major source of controversy. See generally Memorandum from Dogan
Williams, Chairman, Citizens Coordinating Committee, to Members of the Citizens Coordinating
Committee, Mar. 21, 1969; note 164 supra.
196. Interview with Edwin Mitchell, in Nashville, Apr. 20, 1972.
197. The issue of having black consultants was not a new one for the CCC and was not
related solely to the Marcou, O'Leary report. One CCC member, Mrs. C.E. McGruder, had
travelled to several national meetings and had learned of various black consultants who were
helping other Model Cities citizens groups. On November 21, 1968, she recommended that the
CCC Executive Committee consider hiring a black consultant for the citizen planning effort. CCC,
Minutes of Regular Meeting, Nov. 21, 1968, at 2. The proposal was discussed in December, before
the Marcou, O'Leary presentation, but no final action was taken. CCC, Minutes of Executive
Committee Meeting, Dec. 6, 1968, at 2. Soon after the presentation, Mrs. McGruder publicly
complained about the all-white planning and asked for black experts. Nashville Tennessean, Jan.
8, 1969, at 6, col. 3. Consequently, when the 3 Marcou, O'Leary choices were put to the citizens,
the immediate reaction was a request for black consultants. The CCC voted to seek consultants
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wanted a qualified physical development planning consultant. 9" It was
clear from the outset that the CCC was primarily concerned with the
redevelopment plans for the MNA that had been prepared by Marcou,
O'Leary and the Housing Technical Task Force. Nonetheless, by the
time the CCC consultants arrived in Nashville-late March of
1969-the question of physical planning had been largely overshadowed
by the broader issue of the CCC's role in the planning process.
Although HUD regulations clearly authorize the provision of cons'ultants for the citizens, 9 ' the hostility of most city officials toward the
consultants was manifested immediately. For example, the CDA Director refused to allow the consultants to use the office facilities of the
CDA, despite the more than adequate available space and the temporary nature of the use desired-the consultants' contract was for only
thirty days. More importantly, the city refused to provide the CCC
consultants with copies of the physical development projects that had
been drafted for the CCDP. These obstructive gestures were surmounted easily by the citizens,"'0 but the broader implications of this
hostility were readily perceived by the consultants. 0' Almost immediately the consultants emphasized to the CCC the importance of clarifying the group's role in the planning process. Preparation of criticism and
alternative plans, the consultants argued, would be meaningless if the
22
11
city officials were not willing to listen to the citizens' proposals.
Following the advice of their consultants, the citizens requested and
obtained a meeting on April 18, 1969, with the Mayor to discuss the
CCC's role. At this meeting, the Mayor informed the citizens' representatives and their consultants that the CCC's role was to be essentially
and began looking immediately. When a suitable planner was found, city officials were not totally
cooperative because they felt that only a small minority of citizens wanted a black consultant and
because at that time they were encountering difficulties with the Edgehill citizens. Memorandum
from Deane Tucker to Earl Metzger, Feb. 12, 1969.
198. Interview with Edwin Mitchell, in Nashville, Apr. 20, 1972.
199. HUD, CDA Letter No. 3, HUD Handbook MCGR 3100.3 (Nov. 30, 1967). "In order
to initiate and react intelligently in program matters, the [citizen participation] structure must have
the technical capacity for making knowledgeable decisions. This will mean that some form of
professional technical assistance, in a manner agreed to by neighborhood residents shall be provided." Id.
200. Interview with Edwin Mitchell, in Nashville, Apr. 20, 1972.
201. The consulting firm chosen by the citizens, Simmons, Ussery, Streets & Associates, had
previously encountered role-oriented citizen participation disputes. Both Kenneth Simmons and
William Ussery had begun their careers in controversial citizen participation programs in the San
Francisco area. For a discussion of their experiences see R. KRAMER, PARTICIPATION OF THE POOR
25-67 (1969).
202. Interview with Edwin Mitchell, in Nashville, Apr. 13, 1972.
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advisory in nature.113 On the following day, at a meeting of the Priorities and Funding Committee, the city officials were even more blunt: the
CCC's role was to advise and recommend; if the citizens did not wish
to participate in2 this capacity then the CCDP would be submitted directly to HUD . 11
Predictably, the citizens refused to accept the city's unilateral limitation of their group's role. At their next meeting, on April 24, the
members of the CCC voted to suspend all participation in the planning
process until a meaningful role for the group could be defined and
established."'5 All standing committees ceased operation, and a negotiating group, the Ad Hoc Committee, was selected by the citizens to seek
a satisfactory role definition from the Mayor. Finally, the CCC made
two specific requests of the Mayor: first, that the Mayor schedule another meeting with the citizens' group before the current consultants'
contract expired on May 3, and secondly, that the 30-day consultants'
contract be extended for the duration of the planning period. When the
Mayor refused to grant either of the specific requests, the CCC decided to carry its protest directly to HUD.
On May 2, 1969, the CCC mailed a letter of formal protest to the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. 206 The letter explained
the reasons that motivated the CCC to withdraw its participation from
the Nashville Model Cities program "until a voice and decision making
power are obtained by its representatives." It was specifically asserted
that the major thrust of the CCDP was directed toward the industrial
development of North Nashville rather than toward the type of human
development envisioned by the Model Cities legislation. The citizens
emphasized'that the CCDP was composed of programs prepared without the participation of MNA residents by technical task forces of city
personnel and the city's consultants.2 ' The letter concluded with four
formal requests of Secretary Romney:
203. Transcript, vol. III, at 291-92, NNCCC, Inc. v. Romney, supra note 43 (testimony of
Edwin Mitchell).
204. Interview with Edwin Mitchell, in Nashville, Apr. 13, 1972.
205. Letter from Dogan Williams and Edwin Mitchell to George Romney, May 2, 1969.
206. Id. Copies of the letter were sent to President Nixon; Senators Gore and Baker; Congressman Richard Fulton; Daniel P. Moynihan, Chairman of the President's Council on Urban
Affairs; Nicholas Pharr, Director of Model Cities Administration; Terry Chrisholm, Citizens
Participation Advisor; Donald Dodge, Department of HUD; Floyd Hyde, Assistant Secretary for
Administrative and Intergovernmental Relations; and 7 others.
207. The citizens also objected to the city's use of the Marcou, O'Leary consulting firm on
the grounds that (I) the firm had been hired without CCC approval and (2) Mr. Marcou had begun
his career as a staff member of the Metropolitan Planning Commission in Nashville, which made
the objectivity of his work with the present staff of the Metro agencies suspect.
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1. That HUD refuse to accept or fund any CCDP from Nashville
until the CCC had secured the right of prior approval of the plan;
2. That the final date for CCDP submission be extended 60 days
to allow the CCC to prepare alternatives to objectionable components;
3. That the contract for the services of the Simmons firm be extended for the duration of the replanning period; and
4. That funds be authorized for the CCC to compensate its attorney for the legal services he had rendered.
Although HUD never responded specifically to the citizens' four
formal requests, 2 8 the May 2 letter had a significant impact on the
department's attitude toward the Nashville program. HUD normally
reserved the question of the citizens' role in a Model Cities program for
resolution by local participants.2 9 This pattern had been followed generally in Nashville as well. By the spring of 1969, however, Model Cities
officials at the HUD Atlanta Regional Office had begun to question the
effectiveness of citizen participation in the Nashville program. On April
28, the HUD Regional Citizen Participation Adviser arrived in Nashville for a two-day survey of the status of citizen involvement in the
Model Cities program. 210 The Citizen Participation Adviser adopted no
official position on the dispute between the city and CCC during his visit
in Nashville, but his concern about the situation in Nashville was clearly
reflected in the intra-office report he submitted after his return to Atlanta. 21' Thus receipt by HUD of the May 2 letter of protest only served
to confirm the fears that had already developed about the adequacy of
the citizen participation in Nashville.
Instead of responding directly to the citizens' letter, HUD began
to discuss the program informally with city officials. The CDA Director
informed the regional officials that the CCDP was almost completed
208. It was not until June 26 that the citizens received a formal reply from HUD to their
May 2 letter. Letter from Floyd Hyde to Dogan Williams, June 26, 1969. That letter merely
acknowledged receipt of the CCC's dispatch. A more detailed response followed one month later
in a letter that praised both the city and the CCC for "the manner in which they have dealt with
the current situation." Letter from Floyd Hyde to Dogan Williams, Aug. 26, 1969.
209. "HUD will not determine the ideal organizational pattern designed to accomplish...
[citizen participation]. It will, however, outline performance standards for citizen participation
which must be achieved by each City Demonstration Agency . . . . The city government, as the
principal instrument for carrying out the Model Cities program, will be responsible for insuring
that whatever organization is adopted provides the means for the model neighborhood's citizens
to participate and be fully involved in policy-making, planning and the execution of all program
elements." HUD, CDA Letter No. 3, HUD Handbook MCGR 3100.3 (Nov. 30, 1967).
210. Memorandum from Henry Bankston to Earl Metzger, May 6, 1969.
211. Id.
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and ready for submission. Although HUD accepted a copy of the draft
proposal, the city was informed that evidence of citizen participation
would be required. The regional officials made it clear that the citizen
involvement that had already occurred was not sufficient to comply with
the statutory and regulatory requirements. 212 The regional officials required that the city obtain citizen approval of the CCDP if the proposal
was to be submitted as drafted by the city officials and consultants. 2 '
In effect, the city had been caught in a trap of its own making. Although
the HUD regulation that defined the statutory phrase "widespread citizen participation" contemplated meaningful citizen involvement, the
provision clearly did not require citizen veto or final approval of the
CCDP. 214 The Mayor's decision to plan the CCDP without citizen in212. Interview with Earl Metzger in Atlanta, Mar. 17, 1972; Interview with Henry Bankston,
in Atlanta, Mar. 17, 1972.
213. Id.
214. Citizen Participation-CDA Letter No. 3 reads as follows:
"(I) INTRODUCTION. Section 103(a)(2) of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 requires that a Model Cities program provide for 'widespread citizen
participation in the program.'
"(2) POLICY STATEMENT ON CITIZEN PARTICIPATION. The implementation of this
statutory provision requires: (1)the constructive involvement of citizens in the model neighborhood
area and the city as a whole in planning and carrying out the program, and (2) the means of
introducing the views of area residents in policy making should be developed and opportunities
should be afforded area residents to participate actively in planning and carrying out the demonstration.
"This requirement grows out of the conviction that improving the quality of life of the
residents of the model neighborhood can be accomplished only by the affirmative action of the
people themselves. This requires a means of building self-esteem, competence and a desire to
participate effectively in solving the social and physical problems of their community.
"HUD will not determine the ideal organizational pattern designed to accomplish this objective. It will, however, outline performance standards for citizen participation which must be
achieved by each City Demonstration Agency. It is expected that patterns will vary from city to
city, reflecting local circumstances. The city government, as the principal instrument for carrying
out the Model Cities program, will be responsible for insuring that whatever organization is
adopted provides the means for the model neighborhood's citizens to participate and be fully
involved in policy-making, planning and the execution of all program elements. For a plan to be
approved, it must provide for such an organization and spell out precisely how the participation
and involvement of the residents is to be carried out throughout the life of the Model Cities
program.
"(3) PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN MODEL
NEIGH BORHOOD PROGRAMS. In order to provide the citizen participation called for in the
Act, there must be some form of organizational structure, existing or newly established, which
embodies neighborhood residents in the process of policy and program planning and program
implementation and operation. The leadership of that structure must consist of persons whom
neighborhood residents accept as representing their interests.
"The neighborhood citizens participation structure must have clear and direct access to the
decision making process of the City Demonstration Agency so that neighborhood views can influence policy, planning and program decisions. That structure must have sufficient information about
any matter to be decided for a sufficient period of time so that it can initiate proposals and react
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volvement, however, left the city with the alternatives of subjecting the
completed proposal to the citizens' final approval-in effect a veto
power-or of reopening the planning process so that the citizens' group
could contribute meaningfully to the preparation of the CCDP.
B.

Negotiations and Deadlock

Immediately following the CCC protest to HUD, the attitude of
the Mayor and the city officials mellowed appreciably. A series of meetings was held between the Mayor, the CDA Director, and the CCC Ad
Hoc Committee.21 5 In these early meetings the negotiations centered
upon the four requests made by the citizens' group in its May 2 letter
to HUD. After initial bargaining, the Ad Hoc Committee requested
that the Mayor issue a formal written response to the four issues. The
Mayor complied with this request and his letter was surprisingly conciliatory.2 6 On the issue of prior approval, i.e. the right to veto an objectionable proposal before it could be sent to the mayor for approval, the
Mayor spoke of an equal partnership between the CCC and the CDA,
with both organizations working for the welfare of the MNA residents.
Any disagreements between these partners would be resolved by the
Mayor after hearing the recommendations of both. On the question of
a 60-day extension for citizen review and replanning of the CCDP, the
Mayor expressed the hope that the CCC's objections could be resolved
informally. If, however, the citizens felt a process of replanning was
necessary, the Mayor requested that the CCC arrange a firm time
schedule for review. Rather than an extension of the Simmons contract,
which had by that time expired, the Mayor assured the CCC that it
could hire whichever consulting firm it chose, within the limits of the
present budget. The Mayor likewise allowed the CCC to select an attorney of its choice, again with the stipulation that the costs remain within
knowledgeably to proposals from others. In order to initiate and react intelligently in program
matters, the structure must have the technical capacity for making knowledgeable decisions. This
will mean that some form of professional technical assistance, in a manner agreed to by neighborhood residents shall be provided.
"Where financial problems are a barrier to effective participation, financial assistance (e.g.,
baby sitting fees, reimbursement for transportation, compensation for serving on Boards or Committees) should be extended to neighborhood residents to assure their opportunity to participate.
"Neighborhood residents will be employed in planning activities and in the execution of the
program, with a view toward development of new career lines, including appropriate training and
modification of local civil service regulations for entry and promotion." HUD, CDA Letter No.
3, HUD Handbook MCGR 3100.3 (Nov. 30, 1967).
215. Interview with William Reinhart, in Nashville, Feb. 15, 1972; Interview with Edwin
Mitchell, in Nashville, Apr. 13, 1972.
216. Letter from Beverly Briley to Edwin Mitchell, May 22, 1969.
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the CCC budget. In concluding his letter, the Mayor reminded the CCC
that the first year action grant would include ample funds for citizen
consultant and contract services. The intent of this final statement was
clear: to promise a full opportunity for citizens revision of the CCDP
during the first action year in exchange for pro forma approval of the
CCDP by the CCC.
The Ad Hoc Committee had three basic objections to the Mayor's
May 22 letter. First, the committee felt that it was imperative that the
citizens proceed with a formal replanning process in their review of the
CCDP rather than negotiate differences informally. 2 7 Secondly, the
citizens accepted the basic concept of the proposed "equal partnership"
between the CCC and the CDA as a substitute for the power of prior
approval. The citizens argued, however, that "since the CDA for practical purposes considers itself responsible to the Mayor rather than to the
CCC, the approach of [the Mayor's] acting as mediator between CDA
and CCC is unrealistic. 2 18 Finally, the Ad Hoc Committee felt that the
Mayor's position on citizen review, consultants, and legal counsel was
acceptable if, and only if, adequate funding could be allocated to the
CCC.219
The CDA Director formulated a novel proposal to solve the funding problem: to submit the CCDP as it stood, but under a cover letter
signed by the CCC, the CDA, and the Mayor, stating that all or part
of the CCDP would be subject to review and replanning by the city and
the citizens. 220 The advantage of this proposal was that submission of
the CCDP would entitle Nashville to receive funds that had been reserved by HUD for Nashville's first action year. Furthermore, the review and replanning requested by the CCC did not vary appreciably
from the continuing planning and evaluation that HUD expected of a
Model Cities program following action year funding. 22' The Ad Hoc
Committee tentatively agreed to the suggestion of submitting the CCDP
under a cover letter, but expressed doubt that HUD would accept this
proposal. The precise conditions under which such a cover letter submis217. The CCC objected to a negotiated resolution of differences over the projects as planned
for two reasons. First, the citizens felt that the physical components, because they were based on
the use of urban renewal, were totally unacceptable. Secondly, the citizens wanted to be involved
in the planning process itself, and not limited merely to an approval role. Interview with Edwin
Mitchell, in Nashville, Apr. 13, 1972.
218. Letter from Edwin Mitchell to Beverly Briley, June 22, 1969.
219. Without additional funding, the CCC would have been limited to a total expenditure
of $3,750 for additional technical and legal assistance. Letter from Beverly Briley to Edwin Mitchell, Aug. 13, 1969.
220. Letter from Edwin Mitchell to Beverly Briley, June 26, 1969.
221. HUD, CDA Letter No. 1,§§ 2.3, 6.1 (Oct. 30, 1967).
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sion would be accepted by HUD were of particular concern to the
committee because the citizens realized that their primary negotiating
leverage was the program's dependence upon CCC approval.212 The
committee was therefore understandably reluctant to recommend any
step that would surrender its bargaining advantage.
On June 26, 1969, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee sent
to the Mayor a formal response to the May 22 statements.113 In this
reply the Ad Hoc Committee accepted the Mayor's proposal for an
equal partnership between the CCC and the CDA on the condition that
a mechanism acceptable to the CCC be established for the final mediation of disagreements. The committee also accepted the Mayor's
suggestion for establishing a strict timetable for CCC review of the
CCDP, but only if the timetable afforded sufficient time for serious
citizen replanning. Finally, the citizens requested clarification by the
Mayor of the regulatory authority that would permit the cover letter
submission procedure.
Although the letter from the Ad Hoc Committee appeared to suggest grounds upon which the negotiations could be quickly concluded,
no response from the Mayor was forthcoming. Instead, the negotiations
dragged on and began to assume a subtly different nature. Whereas the
Ad Hoc Committee initially had met frequently with both the CDA
Director and the Mayor, the July meetings were primarily between the
citizens' committee and the CDA Director. By late July the Ad Hoc
Committee and the CDA Director had apparently reached some sort of
informal agreement.22 4 At this point the CDA Director drafted a letter
to the Ad Hoc Committee for the Mayor's signature, which outlined
very specifically the authority under which the replanning process was
to be conducted and assured the citizens that approval of the CCDP
would be only the first step in a continuing process of planning and
programming. 225 Once again, however, the lines of communication between the Mayor and the CDA Director appear to have become blurred.
The letter drafted by the CDA Director was rewritten by the Mayor's
staff. As rewritten, the letter substituted very general language for specific details and expressed the Mayor's pleasure that agreement had
222. During the negotiation process the citizens were not aware of HUD's refusal to accept
the CCDP without further evidence of citizen participation. Interview with Edwin Mitchell, in
Nashville, Apr. 20, 1972. The citizens were, however, fully aware of the general importance of
citizen approval of the CCDP. E.g., CCC, Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, June 12,
1969, at 3.
.223. Letter from Edwin Mitchell to Beverly Briley, June 26, 1969.
224. Interview with William Reinhart, in Nashville, Feb. 15, 1972.
225. Letter from Beverly Briley to Edwin Mitchell, July 22, 1970 (unsigned).
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been reached with regard to the relationship of the City Demonstration
Ageaicy and the Citizens Coordinating Committee.2 The second letter

confused and frustrated the citizens' group because it clearly stated that
agreement had been reached, but failed to describe adequately the nature of that agreement. 2 27 Realizing the necessity for a more specific
response, the CDA Director drafted yet another letter for the Mayor's
signature to be sent to the CCC. This time, however, a copy of the draft
letter was also sent directly to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. 2 2 The response from the Mayor's office to the CDA Director's
action was instantaneous: the Mayor demanded the Director's resigna-

tioh. Although the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of the CDA

Director remain something of a mystery, 229 the effect of the dismissal

on the negotiations was the elimination of the only city official3 with

2
whom the citizens' committee had established working rapport.

1

In the two weeks that followed the CDA Director's dismissal, the
negotiations between the city and the CCC ground to a complete halt.
The citizens had objected vigorously to the dismissal of the Director of
the CDA. Their protest did not reflect their dismay at the loss of a
sympathetic administrator-indeed the CDA Director had always been
a tough-minded advocate of the city's position-but was directed at the
Mayor's failure to consult the CCC or even give the group prompt

notice of the decision.23' Within a week of the dismissil, the Mayor's
staff sent a letter to the Ad Hoc Committee in an effort to salvage the
faltering negotiations. The letter from the Mayor followed very closely
the wording of the very specific letter drafted by the former CDA Director for the Mayor on July 22.232 In essence the letter offered to confer
226. Letter from Beverly Briley to Edwin Mitchell, July 30, 1969.
227. CCC, Minutes of Ad Hoc Committee Meeting, Aug. 2, 1969.
228. See Letter from William Reinhart to Beverly Briley, Aug. 6, 1969.
229. It appears that Reinhart had served the Mayor well, yet had been a thorn in the Mayor's
side because of his unusual independence. Local newspapers proposed several hypotheses explaining the dismissal, among them the following: lack of progress in the program; disagreement over
citizen participation; disagreement over the drafting of a letter to the CCC. Nashville Tennessean,
Aug. 8, 1969, at 1, col. 8; id., Aug. 7, 1969, at 11, col. 1. Reinhart attributed his dismissal to
political machinations within the Mayor's office. Interview with William Reinhart, Feb. 15, 1972.
It does appear that Briley dictated a letter of dismissal with instructions to his secretary to delay
its dispatch until he returned from an imminent trip. The secretary apparently ignored these
directions and sent the letter without delay. Interview with Norman Moore, in Nashville, Feb. 22,
1972.
230. Interview with Dick Battle, in Nashville, Feb. 14, 1972; Interview with William Reinhart, in Nashville, Feb. 15, 1972.
231. The CCC adopted a resolution insisting that the CCC "should participate in the
selection, hiring or discharge of any Executive Director of Model Cities." CCC, Minutes of Called
Meeting, Aug. 6, 1969.
232. The letter was initially drafted by two CDA staff members, Norman Moore and Robert
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upon the citizens authority to replan the CCDP during the first action
year with a conflict resolution mechanism of their own choosing if the
citizens would provide the approval necessary to submit the already
completed proposal to HUD.2 33 Although the initial reaction of the
CCC to this letter was favorable, the citizens decided, on the advice of
their attorney, to remain firm in their position that the CCDP be replanned prior to submission to HUD. 234 On August 19, 1969, the CCC
voted to reject the Mayor's proposal and to adopt the letter embodying
the advice of the group's attorney as its official position.235

At this juncture the CCC, with the urging of its attorney, decided
to implement a suggestion, offered originally by the city's consultants,

Marcou, O'Leary, that the CCC incorporate itself. The original purpose
of incorporation was to qualify the CCC for direct sponsorship of cer-

tain projects in the housing component.? 6 Now, however, the purpose

was different. The citizens' consultants, in their report, indicated the
desirability of incorporation not only to sponsor projects, but also to
facilitate the solicitation of private funds with which to hire black planners and consultants on a continuing basis.237 Corporate papers were
ratified by the full CCC on June 19, 1969.3 s When the corporation was
activated on August 29, new officers were elected to run the new organi-

zation, officially designated as the North Nashville Citizens Coordinating Committee, Inc. (NNCCC, Inc.).2 39 The old CCC and the new
NNCCC, Inc., were identical in all respects, except for the new name
Meadows, who enjoyed particularly good working relations with the members of the CCC, at the
request of Robert Little, the Mayor's Urban Coordinator, and signed by the Mayor after only
minor revisions. Compare Letter from Beverly Briley to Reverend Dogan W. Williams (unsigned,
undated draft) with Letter from Beverly Briley to Edwin Mitchell, Aug. 13, 1969.
233. Letter from Beverly Briley to Edwin Mitchell, Aug. 13, 1972.
234. CCC, Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, Aug. 14, 1969, at 1;Interview with
Edwin Mitchell, in Nashville, Apr. 13, 1972.
235. CCC, Minutes of Called Meeting, Aug. 19, 1972, at 2; Letter from Avon N. Williams,
Jr., Attorney for the CCC, to Rev. Dogan W. Williams, Chairman of the CCC, and Edwin
Mitchell, Aug. 19, 1972.
236. CCC, Minutes of Regular Meeting, May 15, 1969, at 2.
237. Beyond the Ballot, supra note 65. See CCC, Minutes of Regular Meeting, May 15,
1969, at 1.
238. The CCC's attorney, Avon Williams, prepared the charter in April. CCC, Minutes of
Regular Meeting, May 15, 1969. The charter was filed with the Tennessee Secretary of State on
August 9, 1969, and approved by the CCC membership in June. CCC, Minutes of Regular
Meeting, June 19, 1969. Although the full CCC voted to accept the corporate papers as drawn in
June, the corporation was not activated until August. The original incorporators of the NNCCC,
Inc., were Dr. Edwin Mitchell, Rev. Dogan Williams, Mrs. C.E. McGruder, Robert Payne, Mrs.
Mary R. Walker, and Herbert Collier. Charter of Incorporation, in CCC, Minutes of Regular
Meeting, June 19, 1969.
239. CCC, Minutes of Called Meeting, Aug. 29, 1969.
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and slate of officers. Although there were rumors that the Mayor would
refuse to recognize or negotiate with the incorporated body, 4 the issue
did not mature until much later.
C. Citizen Role Defined
In the weeks following the August 19 CCC meeting, the conflict
between the citizens and the city seemed hopelessly deadlocked. HUD
still refused to accept the city's CCDP unless an acceptable form of
citizen participation in the program could be shown. The citizens refused to approve the program until they were afforded the opportunity
to review and replan the entire proposal. The negotiation had come to
a standstill following the CDA Director's dismissal, and the post he had
vacated was yet to be filled. It was also clear, however, that HUD would
not allow the Nashville Model Cities program to remain suspended
indefinitely. 24' The April 1 HUD deadline for submission of the CCDP
and a two and one-half month extension had long since passed. The city
was now operating under a temporary funding mechanism called a Letter to Proceed by which Nashville paid 100 percent of the costs incurred
by the program, subject to 80 percent reimbursement by HUD upon
approval of the city's CCDP. 412 The Letter to Proceed mechanism had
been designed by HUD to enable cities to maintain their CDA staffs
and offices during the period following submission of the CCDP when
HUD was reviewing the proposal for funding.2 3 In Nashville's case,
however, the Letter to Proceed had been issued by HUD prior to receipt
of the CCDP, and as the deadlock continued, HUD was increasingly
244
reluctant to grant extensions of the city's Letter to Proceed.
In early September the negotiations between the Mayor's office
and the Ad Hoc Committee were revived. This renewal of the negotia240. Memorandum from Melvin Randolph to Wallace Cheatwood, Oct. 8, 1969.
241. Id.
242. Although supplemental funds used for operating projects were subject to 100% reimbursement, those used for administrative expenditures were only 80% reimbursable. Since all of
the Nashville CDA's expenditures were for administration, only 80% of the city's outlay was
recoverable from HUD, and that reimbursement was contingent upon ultimate approval of Nashville's CCDP.
243. HUD, CDA Letter No. 2, HUD Handbook MCGR 3100.2A, Chap. 5 (May 26, 1969).
244. The financial pressure that HUD exerted on the city tended to be inversely proportionate to the progress being made by the city. Thus during September 1969, as the negotiations
dragged on, HUD indicated that the program could not remain "suspended indefinitely." Memorandum from Melvin Randolph to Wallace Cheatwood, Oct. 8, 1969. After agreement was reached
on October 20, 1969, this pressure was eased. As the replanning process dragged on in early 1970,
however, HUD decided to terminate the Letter to Proceed. E.g., Memorandum from Melvin
Randolph to Wallace Cheatwood and Earl Metzger, Jan. 26, 1970.
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tions was precipitated by the intervention of a newspaperman who had
been following the progress of the Model Cities program closely and
who was personally acquainted with both the Mayor and the Chairman
of the Ad Hoc Committee.2 5 Although a new CDA Director was appointed at approximately the same time that the negotiations were resumed, the meetings usually included only the Chairman of the Ad Hoc
Committee, the Mayor's chief administrative assistant, and the newsman who had initiated 2 the effort. Finally, on October 20 a written
agreement was reached. 1
The agreement, or "working partnership," as it was later designated, was hailed by the citizens as a major victory. The CDA structure
remained intact and the CCC recognized the Mayor's ultimate control
of the program, but the CCC won not only the right of prior approval
of the program but also the right to replan the entire CCDP prior to
submission to HUD. The CCDP that already had been completed was
officially designated "Working Papers" to serve only as a guide for
replanning. The partnership agreement seemed to produce a format for
the constructive resolution of the underlying land-use issue. The CCC
was to have consultants to aid it in reprogramming those parts of the
Working Papers that it found objectionable. The replanning process was
to be accomplished through the standing committees working with
members of the task forces. Negotiation of differences would take place
at this level with the CCC and its Executive Committee passing on the
finalized proposals before they went to the Mayor for his approval and
ultimate submission to the Metropolitan Council. 247 This arrangement
was symbolized in a diagramatic flow chart and termed "concurrent
approval." Despite the new name, the CCC obtained what it had requested in its May 2 letter. No propdsal was to become a part of the
CCDP until agreement had been reached between the CCC, the CDA,
and other appropriate agencies.
Although HUD's decisions to refuse approval of the CCDP without further citizen involvement and to fund Nashville under a Letter to
Proceed facilitated the negotiations, the Department maintained a policy of noninvolvement in the substantive negotiations themselves. It has
been suggested that this hands-off policy was a response to the desires
245. This newspaperman was Dick Battle of the Nashville Banner. Battle's primary tie with
the citizens' group was his friendship with Edwin Mitchell, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee
and newly elected Chairman of the full CCC.
246. Nashville Tennessean, Oct. 21, 1969, at 1,col. 1.The text of the agreement is reproduced as Appendix B of the Program Administration Component of the Nashville CCDP submitted
March 11, 1970.
247. Interview with Norman Moore, in Nashville, Mar. 16, 1972.
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of both the CCC and the city since neither was willing to risk the
unknown influence of the Department. 28 The forbearance of the HUD
officials, however, was also due in large part to a settled policy of
avoiding sensitive local problems. 2 1 In fact, the Model Cities Regional
Office Coordinator for Nashville did not even visit the city during the
critical periods of negotiation."" When agreement was finally reached,
the HUD officials were undoubtedly pleased, but they were also concerned about the delay that the replanning process would necessarily
involve.
D. Replanning of the CCDP
Following the October signing of the working partnership agreement, the standing committees of the CCC were revived and a schedule
developed for the review of the Working Papers. The committees and
the CCC began the review with three goals in mind: (1) to preserve the
residential character of the neighborhood, (2) to utilize fully the facilities within the MNA, and (3) to create those necessary facilities not in
existence in the MNA.2 1 In short, the CCC's position was to prevent a
nonresidential land-use plan for the MNA from being implemented and
to maximize the economic benefits of the Model Cities project expenditures for the businesses and residents of North Nashville.252 As had been
the case in the spring of 1969, no serious problems arose in the social
services components of the Working Papers. Once again, however, the
housing, economic development, and physical environment components
posed the serious problems. During the month of December, the CCC
attempted to exercise the power to secure technical consultants to help
translate the citizens' proposals into programs, a power the CCC
thought had been conferred by the partnership agreement.25 3 Although
$10,000 in additional funds had been allocated for consultants in the first
248. Citizen Participation Coordinator Henry Bankston offered to both Reinhart and
Mitchell to arrange a meeting with concerned city officials, citizens, and regional HUD staff
members. Both Mitchell and Reinhart, however, apparently felt the problem could best be solved
at the local level.
249. Interview with Steve Vilvens, in Knoxville, Jan. 28, 1972.
250. Memorandum from Melvin Randolph to Wallace Cheatwood, Dec. 18, 1969.
251. Transcript, vol. III, at 306, NNCCC, Inc. v. Romney, supra note 43 (testimony of
Edwin Mitchell).
252. The citizens hoped to design the Model Cities projects so that the economic multiplier
effect of the money expended would accrue to the benefit of the MNA. Thus, for example, the
CCC intended that the Economic Development Corporation would utilize MNA contractors who
hired MNA residents and obtained building materials from MNA businessmen, etc.
253. Letter from Edwin Mitchell to Buford Drake, Dec. 15, 1969.
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extension of the Letter to Proceed, 254 the citizens were unable to obtain
action on their request until January 1970.255 The consultant selected by

the CCC was The National Committee Against Discrimination in
Housing, whose director, Clarence Funnye, and one associate began a
fifteen-day consultation contract on January 26.111 The consultants' duties under the contract were to assist the CCC in assessing the Working
Papers and indicate needed modifications, to set priorities among the
components of the CCDP, and to study the impact on the CCDP of the

proposed 1-40 frontage roads.217 Unlike the Simmons firm, the CCC's
new consultants were program-oriented rather than role-oriented. Fun-

nye's work reflected this program-orientation and the few substantial
changes made in the CCDP during this replanning period indicate how
easily agreement could have been reached the previous summer. The

consultants met regularly with the CCC standing committee chairmen
and task force members and guided their consideration of the Working

Papers according to two basic tests: (1) whether the programs complied
with HUD guidelines, and (2) whether the programs benefited the MNA
without undue disruption of the quality of life in the MNA.28

With the two basic criteria in mind, Funnye met with the Standing
Committee on Housing to examine the programs prepared by the city's

Housing Technical Task Force259 the previous spring. That technical
task force had operated according to a different set of standards and
had sought to implement Marcou, O'Leary's blended approach to
MNA development.

Objectives I and II of the Marcou, O'Leary plan contemplated the
elimination of at least 2,400 units of housing. 20 This and other objectives were to be carried out through urban renewal projects since that
254. Letter from Earl Metzger to Beverly Briley, Oct. 6, 1969.
255. Transcript, vol. III, at 305, NNCCC, Inc. v. Romney, supra note 43 (testimony of
Edwin Mitchell). The official third-party contract was signed on Feb. 9, 1970 (Contract for Technical or Professional Services between CDA and The National Committee Against Discrimination
in Housing).
256. CCC, Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, Jan. 15, 1970.
257. Contract for Technical or Professional Services between CDA and The National Committee Against lRiscrimination in Housing (Feb. 9, 1970).
258. Funnye, Addendum No. Ito Report; CCC, Minutes of Regular Meeting, July 19, 1970,
at 2-3.
259. Serving on that Task Force had been: John Van Ness of the Metro Planning Commission, Gil Swinea of the Nashville Housing Authority, Robert Crownover of the Nashville Housing
Authority, Robert Little of the Office of the Mayor, and Robert Walker, Metro Codes Administration. Letter from John Van Ness to Mary Walker, Nov. 18, 1969.
260. These figures appeared in Objectives I and II of the Housing Component of the initial
CCDP. Nashville CDA, CCDP [Working Papers], Housing Component at I. Other figures in the
objectives indicate removal of more than 5,000 units of housing.
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was the major source of funds. Programs designed to implement these
earlier plans were the first targets of the rejuvenated CCC Standing
Committee on Housing. The citizens had not made much headway
toward the formulation of an alternative housing component when Funnye was hired. Funnye's response to the housing component was inseparably linked to the economic development component. The CCC's
version of these components included the creation of a non-profit Economic Development Corporation (EDC) to administer a program designed to displace a minimum of homeowners by building on vacant lots
and undeveloped land within the MNA. The EDC would utilize a revolving fund to purchase vacant lots in the MNA which would then be
resold to persons buying or renting homes through various federal programs. To construct the housing for those programs, the EDC would
create a consortium of black contractors from the MNA to build and
repair homes utilizing MNA job trainees from employment programs.
The EDC would also have been in charge of constructing the proposed
air-rights deck over 1-40.216 Perhaps the feature of the EDC most important to the citizens was a provision that two-thirds of the board of
directors of the corporation were to be drawn from the MNA, with the
remaining third to be chosen by MNA residents, thus affording substantial control by the area residents over the program that was to redevelop
their neighborhood.2 12 Any mention of urban renewal in the Working
Papers was deleted, and clauses prohibiting the use as urban renewal
matching funds of expenditures on street and park improvements in
other components were inserted. In a similarly motivated action, the
CCC created a new program in the Physical Environment Component,
"The Expansion and Development of Cumberland Park." On its face,
the program called for the addition of nine holes to the existing Cumberland Park golf course. The real intent of the citizens, however, was to
utilize a large plot of vacant land for nonindustrial purposes. The writing of the citizen participation provisions had been left to the CDA staff
as a part of the preparation of the Program Administration Component.
This arrangement failed to satisfy the citizens,2 3 so the CCC and its
consultants proposed a citizen participation section to be included in
appropriate parts of the CCDP and to supplant the "Citizen Participation Provision" boilerplate in each project description. The proposed
citizen participation section also was to replace each reference to the
management and evaluation program with a phrase indicating the joint
261.
262.
263.

See discussion supra note 86-96 and accompanying text.
Memorandum from Allen Polsby to Earl Metzger, July 22, 1970.
Letter from Edwin Mitchell to Buford Drake, Feb. 21, 1970.
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CCC-CDA nature of continuing decision-making in compliance with
section changed all referthe October 20 agreement.26 In addition the
' '265
Inc.
"NNCCC,
read
to
CCC
ences to the
One change made throughout the CCDP by the citizens was in the
designation of program sponsor. In many instances, especially when the
original sponsor was to have been a Metro agency, such as the Nashville
Housing Authority, the citizens substituted the "NNCCC, Inc." as
sponsor. There were two motivations for the change. First, the CCC was
aware of the limited political influence of the MNA and it was therefore
unwilling to entrust the administration of crucial programs to agencies
it deeply distrusted. For this reason, they deleted the Nashville Housing
Authority from sponsorship of the seven housing programs and four
economic development programs in which it appeared and the Chamber
of Commerce from the two economic development programs in which
it appeared. Whenever the sponsor was deleted or had not been announced, the CCC inserted either "NNCCC, Inc." or "NNCCC-CDA"
to ensure the citizens a role in the selection of replacement sponsors.2 6
The second idea motivating the sponsorship changes was the CCC's
belief at that time that it could properly sponsor some of the Model
Cities projects itself. For this reason CCC sponsorship was inserted for
67
several programs in which HUD supplementary funds were available.
Although HUD did not announce formal prohibition of the CCC sponsorship until November 1970,26 there is reason to believe that city officials had some knowledge that direct sponsorship would be forbidden.
At a called meeting of the CCC on February 25, 1970, more than
10 months after the CDA had requested the citizens to approve a
CCDP, the CCC voted unanimously to approve each of the ten components and the entire package as amended and modified during the period
of replanning.269 The CDA Director, in attendance at this meeting, was
264. CCC, Citizen Participation during First Year Operations § 3.2 (Draft Citizen Participation Section for Program Administration Component).
265. Id. at § 3.5.
266. At a regional Model Cities meeting in April to which Nashville citizen leaders were
invited, Dr. Mitchell stated that he now knew that the CCC would not administer programs, but
he wanted to know who was going to sponsor them. RICC Secretariat, Notes on RICC meeting,
Apr. 15, 1970, at 7.
267. Interview with William Reinhart, in Nashville, Feb. 15, 1972.
268. HUD, CDA Letter No. IOD at 1 (Nov. 1970). "Neither the CDA staff nor the citizen
participation structure shall operate projects, with the exception of projects which are necessarily
related to their basic responsibilities, or are minor and temporary in nature." Id.
269. CCC, Minutes of Called Meeting, Feb. 25, 1970. At this meeting the chairman of each
Standing Committee made a short report on his component and the CCC voted to accept or reject
that component.
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asked to offer his comments. At this moment of high emotion for the
citizens, his remarks must have seemed inappropriate. He expressed his

belief that there were disagreements with the Mayor's office on two
points affecting the CCDP: (I) the legality of CCC sponsorship of pro-

grams and, (2) the legality of the use of "NNCCC, Inc." rather than
"CCC" throughout the package.2 70 It is strange that the CDA Director
should have raised these issues, which certainly were not new to him, at
this point, rather than having attempted to resolve them before the
completion of the replanning and approval of the CCDP. The only

explanation for his behavior is that the Director and the City had
wanted some output from the CCC replanning period and simply intended to alter the product unilaterally to reflect the desires of the
Mayor. This hypothesis is borne out by the subsequent actions of the

City.
E. Revision and Submission of the CCDP
In the week following the February 25 approval of the CCDP, city

officias271 edited the CCC version of the CCDP. As might have been
expected, the city officials concentrated on the physical development,
rather than social services, components. All mention of direct sponsorship by the CCC and/or CDA was deleted and the phrase "To Be

Announced" was inserted.2 12 The new provisions for citizen participation in management and evaluation were also deleted in an effort to
remove any explicit recognition of CCC veto power.2 73 The Expansion
270. Id.
271. These officials included Robert Horton, Robert Little, and Joe Ragland.
272. There were 17 projects in the February 25 document which mentioned either a CCCCDA joint sponsorship alone or CCC sponsorship in cooperation with another named agency or
organization. Each of these sponsorship designations was deleted by the city officials in their
redrafting session.
273. The first three paragraphs of the provisions deleted by the city read as follows:
"Section 3.1-The North Nashville Citizens' Coordinating Committee will provide direct citizen
participation activities which may be supplemented by any additional councils, committees or other
groups the CDA-CCC Consortium may create or authorize. This provision applies to all projects
under the jurisdiction of the Model Cities Program, and expressly takes precedence over any
statements appearing under '9. Citizen Participation Provisions:' in each project description.
"Section 3.2-The phrase 'MCA Management and Evaluation Program,' wherever it is found in
any part of this document is amended to read, 'The NNCCC-CDA Management and Evaluation
Program. . ..
"Section 3.3-Wherever professional and/or non-professional services may be required to carry
out any of the projects of the Model Cities Program, MNA resident firms and individuals, or such
firms and residents as designated by the NNCCC, will be given first preference to provide these
services."
Trial Transcript, vol. VII, at 33, NNCCC, Inc. v. Romney, supra note 43 (Horton testified
that "I felt the CCC . . . wanted the. . . control of this entire. . . program").
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and Development of Cumberland Park Project was eliminated, as were

the statements that certain supplemental funds in Physical Environment
Component programs would not be allocated for urban renewal match2 4
ing fundsY.
Every reference to the NNCCC, Inc. was changed to read

merely "CCC." The Mayor's staff later told the citizens that the Mayor

would not and could not recognize the corporate entity.
The city's motivation for the changes in the CCDP is not entirely
apparent. One explanatory factor was probably the lack of good will

between the CDA staff and the CCC leaders. The city's changes were
mainly deletions of material inserted by the CCC Executive Committee

and the Funnye consultants. Another factor was that the city officials
felt that many CCC changes were contrary to HUD guidelines. This
explanation represents a particularly uncompromising attitude, however, because the city officials had refused an offer by the HUD Re-

gional Office to edit out all the unacceptable CCC provisions after
submittal.
The CCC Executive Committee was invited to attend a meeting to
approve the Program Administration Component z 5 on March 3 .211 At
this meeting the city officials presented the edited version of the CCDP

to the citizens. According to later accounts,2" the city officials attempted to explain the alterations that had been made but never completed their presentation because of constant interruptions by the citizens. The citizens were visibly angered by what, at first glance, appeared
to be a wholesale revision of the CCDP that had been approved. In
reality, the city had made relatively few substantive changes, but some
of these changes, such as substituting "CCC" for "NNCCC, Inc.,"
required alternations throughout the CCDP. The City committed the

unfortunate tactical error of presenting the citizens with the freshly
edited version of the CCDP which was covered with magic marker.
274. The phrase deleted was "These funds are not to be used as matching funds for any
Urban Renewal project or program unless approved by the NNCCC, Inc."
275. The Executive Committee had been empowered to grant CCC approval to the Program
Administration Component, which had not been finalized at the time of the February 25, 1970
meeting. CCC, Minutes of Called Meeting, Feb. 25, 1970, at 3.
276. There are apparently no minutes or official records of this "confrontation" meeting.
The date is referred to in a letter from Mrs. George N. Bennett, CCC Secretary, to Beverly Briley.
Letter from Mrs. George N. Bennett to Beverly Briley, Mar. 5, 1970. This letter complains of the
changes made by the city officials between "the time of unanimous approval by the entire CCC
(Feb. 25, 1970) and the next meetings of the Executive Committee (3-3/4-70)."
277. This meeting was described by one of the participants, Norman Moore, then of the
CDA staff, as a shouting match. Interview with Norman Moore, in Nashville, Feb. 21, 1972. As
Moore reports, only a few of the components were actually brought to the Executive Committee
at this meeting, and the rest apparently had not yet been edited.
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Moreover, the city's attitude apparently precluded negotiation with the
citizens on the alterations. Had the city presented the revised CCDP
differently and explained precisely the nature and extent of the changes
to the citizens, the meeting might have been more productive. Instead,
the March 3 meeting served only to anger the citizens and to perplex
city officials who may have been genuinely surprised at the CCC reaction to what the officials had considered minor changes.
The CCC Executive Committee regrouped to consider the city's
actions. The Program Administration Component, developed by the
CDA staff, was approved on the condition that it include the citizens'
sections on program control that had been deleted in the CCDP.2 7 8 At
the general CCC meeting on March 10, the citizens voted 27-3 with 10
abstentions to reject the city version of the CCDP.29 The citizens may
have hoped that the Metropolitan Council would be influenced by their
rejection and refuse to approve the CCDP for submission to HUD. The
Metro Council and its Model Cities Committee, however, had consistently rubber-stamped every proposal made to it by the City, critically
examining only the outlay of local funds. A special session of the Council was called on March 11 to consider the proposed CCDP. The Model
Cities Committee met in the afternoon, heard a presentation of. the
CCDP by the CDA Director and a general criticism.by the CCC chairman, and voted 9-5 to approve the proposal. 2 A synopsis28 ' of the 700page CCDP was presented to the members of the Metro Council on the
afternoon of the 11th and that night the Council voted to submit the
document to HUD. The intent and concern of the Council is most
clearly expressed in a letter it received from the Mayor: "I recommend
that you vote to submit this planning program to Atlanta. Otherwise,
278. CCC, Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, Mar. 5, 1970, at 1.
279. CCC, Minutes of Called Meeting, Mar. 10, 1970, at 3. "Mr. Adams made the following
motion and it was seconded by Mrs. McGruder:
"Because it is felt that this document [the last prepared proposal for submission to the Mayor,
Metro Council, and HUD, March 9, 1970] does not safeguard the community's interest with regard
to the necessity for the right of concurrent approval, throughout the planning year and subsequent
years, and because there are discrepancies between this document and that which was approved
by the NNCCC, Inc. on February 25, 1970, 1 move that this document be rejected."
280. Minutes of the Model Cities Council Meeting, Mar. 11, 1970, at 3.
281. The synopsis was an updated version of the summaries prepared in July and August of
1969 by newspaperman Dick Battle under contract to the CDA. Interview with Dick Battle, in
Nashville, Feb. 14, 1970. Although there was nothing objectionable in the manner in which the
programs were summarized, the CCC was greatly disturbed when it learned that the synopsis was
sent to HUD along with the CCDP. The reason for the concern was that the synopsis included
the obsolete five-year forecast as it applied to the first action year. The submission of the synopsis
revived the citizens' fears that urban renewal was still being planned for the MNA.
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'8 2

Reaction to the Submission

The approval of the Nashville CCDP by the Metropolitan Council

fundamentally altered the context within which the CCC and the CDA
had been interacting. Prior to Council approval and submission, each
side had been vying to shape the CCDP in terms most favorable to its

own view. After the submission of the proposal, however, the parties
were contesting the proper status of a completed CCDP. Furthermore,

presentation of the CCDP to HUD shifted the focus of the contestants
toward Atlanta and Washington, each hopeful that the HUD disposi-

tion would vindicate its own position.
The initial response of the citizens' group to the submission of the
altered CCDP was vigorous protest. Almost immediately the CCC sent

telegrams to regional and national HUD officials informing them of the
CCC's repudiation of the submitted document.2 n Community meetings
were organized in the Model Neighborhood Area to mobilize broadly
based popular support for the CCC position.8 4 Although some personal

criticism was inevitable at this stage of the conflict, 2 5 the actions and
language of the citizens were surprisingly calm. Indeed, the relative
restraint exercised by the primary participants on both sides suggests
factions were consciously seeking to
that even at an early stage, both
28
1
actions.
their
document all of

On April 2, 1970, the full Citizens Coordinating Committee met
to discuss long-range strategy. The first element in the strategy adopted

at the meeting was familiar: once again, as it had done in 1969, the CCC
282. Letter from Beverly Briley to Vice-Mayor Jerry Atkinson and members of the Metropolitan Council, Mar. I1, 1970.
283. The telegrams, signed by the CCC Chairman, alleged that the CCDP proposal did "not
represent the desires of the citizens of the community nor afford them adequate involvement in its
operations." Further details were promised. Telegram from Edwin Mitchell to George Romney,
Mar. 13, 1970; Telegram from Edwin Mitchell to Earl Metzger, Mar. 16, 1970. The texts of the 2
telegrams were identical.
284. Nashville Tennessean, Mar. 18, 1970, at 5, col. 1.
285. There were, for example, heated public exchanges between members of the CCC and
some of the black Councilmen who voted to approve the CCDP. See, e.g., Nashville Tennessean,
Mar. 30, 1970, at 4, col. I (councilman called CCC leaders "greedy" and power hungry); Nashville
Tennessean, Mar. 17, 1970, at 1, col. 2 (circular accused 2 MNA councilmen who voted for CCDP
submission of "selling out" MNA).
286. This tendency of both the CDA and the CCC to document their positions and to
demand written responses became more marked as the program progressed. The effort by each
side to compile a "record" frequently seemed to color the written statements; therefore, written
exchanges should be considered with this in mind.
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voted to withdraw all participation in planning and implementation of
the program. 2 7 Although a few parts of the CCDP were still unfinished
at this point,8 8 the second withdrawal was essentially symbolic. The
1969 withdrawal had been an effective maneuver primarily because the
city had needed some form of citizen involvement in order to satisfy the
requirementsof HUD and the statute. During the intervening replanning
process, however, the CCC had, in theory, rewritten the CCDP to its
unanimous satisfaction. Thus, by the time of the second withdrawal, the
citizen participation in the planning process had already taken place.
Withdrawal at this stage merely served to emphasize the CCC's resentment toward the alteration that the city had made in the CCC-ratified
program.
The second element of strategy selected by the CCC at the April 2
meeting was the drafting of a formal protest. Although the CCC had
already notified HUD by telegram of its objection to the submitted
plan, the CCC clearly anticipated a more formal presentation of its
case, complete with documentation. To this end, the CCC requested
copies of the CCDP as it had been submitted to HUD, as well as a
reproduction of the plan that had been approved by the group on
February 5.289 The citizens also requested copies of the Synopsis of the
CCDP, which had included the controversial goals and objectives.29
Funds were sought from the CDA to finance a trip to Atlanta for a
group of representatives to investigate HUD's attitude toward the
CCDP and the status of the Nashville proposal.2 1 Finally a motion was
passed requesting the CCC's attorney to prepare "a formal complaint
'292
to be submitted to HUD.
The response of the city to the CCC actions was marked by coolness and mechanical formality that could hardly have been expected to
effect a reconciliation between the opposing groups. While the strained
temper of city officials might have been understandable in light of all
287. CCC, Minutes of Called Meeting, Apr. 2, 1970, at 2. The vote on the motion to
withdraw was 25-0.
288. Three portions of the CCDP remained to be completed: the relocation plan, the
evaluation program, and the federal base statement. All of these were required by HUD regulations
and the CDA Director was aware of their absence when the plan was submitted to the Council
and to HUD. Interview with Norman Moore, in Nashville, Feb. 21, 1972.
289. CCC, Minutes of Called Meeting, Apr. 2, 1970, at 2; Letter from Edwin Mitchell to
Buford Drake, Apr. 3, 1970. It should be noted, however, that copies of the CCDP and the
Synopsis had been distributed to members of the CCC just prior to the March I I Council meeting.
290. Materials cited note 289 supra. See also note 260 supra and accompanying text.
291. CCC, Minutes of Called Meeting, Apr. 2, 1970, at 2.
292. Id. The preparation of a formal complaint to HUD had been recommended by the CCC
counsel, Avon Williams.
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the circumstances, the attitudes of the two parties tended to breed further misunderstanding. Thus, for example, the CDA Director refused
to supply the CCC with the requested copies of the submitted version
of the CCDP.29 3 The explanation for this refusal was that the CCDP
would be undergoing extensive revision to conform with HUD recommendations, and that copies of the plan would be made available to the
CCC as the plan was revised. 294 Similarly, the CDA refused to reproduce
the CCC-approved version of the CCDP, contending that the expense
was not an allowable item under HUD regulations.2 9 5 Aside from the
questionable merit of this reasoning, the CDA's response could hardly
have been better designed to enrage the citizen group.
It is clear that if any goodwill between the city and the CCC in fact
had been cultivated during the replanning process, both parties readily
abandoned any reconciliation effort in the wake of the hurried submission of the CCDP.
VII.

HUD

REVIEW OF THE NASHVILLE PROPOSAL

A.

Initial Review

Immediately upon receipt of the Nashville CCDP in Atlanta, HUD
officials distributed copies of the material to members of the Regional
Interagency Coordinating Committee (RICC) for review.29 This procedure, which was standard for all Model Cities proposals, had a dual
purpose. First, the RICC review was intended to permit an analysis of
a completed CCDP that would lead eventually to a recommendation
that the program be accepted and funded or that it be rejected. In
reality, however, the rejection of a proposed CCDP was rarely considered. 9 7 Thus, the approval process of the RICC was really directed
toward identifying those weaknesses in a proposal that would require
correction as a prerequisite to the funding of particular elements of the

program .211
The second function of the RICC review of a CCDP was, theoreti293. Letter from Buford Drake to Edwin Mitchell, Apr. 6, 1970.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. The departments that participated in the RICC evaluation of the Nashville program
included: HEW, HUD (Equal Opportunity Office, FHA Area Insuring Office, Housing Assistance
Office, Renewal Assistance Agency), Justice (Law Enforcement Assistance Administration),
Labor (Manpower Administration), OEO, and the Small Business Administration. The RICC
meetings were chaired by the HUD Assistant Regional Administrator for Model Cities.
297. See notes 370-95 infra and accompanying text.
298. Interview with Earl Metzger, in Atlanta, Mar. 3, 1972.
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cally, to assure coordination between the various departments from
whom funds were sought. Thus, any Model Cities package that contemplated an application for a grant-in-aid from the Department of Transportation (DOT), for example, would have to be submitted to the regional office of DOT for study and recommendations as a part of the
complete RICC review. No structural mechanism was established, however, by which the RICC could ensure approval of meritorious applications for grants seeking non-Model Cities funds.299 Therefore, the success of a Model Cities program in obtaining the non-Model Cities funds
requested in its CCDP depended largely on the city's initiative in pressing each of its separate grant-in-aid applications with the appropriate
agency."'
The first meeting of the RICC to discuss the Nashville proposal
was held on April 8, 1970.31 At this meeting, a representative of each
of the departments concerned gave his initial impression of the Nashville application. Most of the comments were very general and superficial. Indeed, it appears that the main purpose of the meeting was for
the Model Cities representatives to familiarize the other RICC members with the controversy surrounding the Nashville program in preparation for the formal RICC review the following week, which would be
attended by representatives of both the city and the CCC. After a fully
detailed description of Nashville's problems, the chairman of the RICC
informed the members that "the meeting with the city will probably be
a very tense and sensitive one," and he suggested that "it would be best
if the RICC refrained from any open debate of the issues while meeting
'32
with these people.
By April 14, 1970, the date of the formal RICC review of the
Nashville CCDP, most of the RICC agencies had submitted memo299. There has been some effort to coordinate interagency funding for local Model Cities
programs by requiring each department to "earmark" a portion of its budget for Model Cities
categorical grant-in-aid applications. In theory each department earmarked these funds and allocated a portion of them to its regional office. The RICC and WICC were then to apportion these

earmarked funds among the various Model Cities proposals as a part of their review and approval
process. The practice, however, has fallen far short of the theory. As Daniel Moynihan has noted,
"Interdepartmental earmarking is always murky and ambiguous. . . and worst of all people are
always sneaking out of them later on in the fiscal year." Quoted in Lilley, Urban Report: Model
Cities ProgramFaces UncertainFuture Despite Romney Overhaul, 2 NAT'L J. 1467, 1476 (1970).
This article presents an excellent discussion of both the earmarking problem and the broader

question of interagency coordination.
300. Interview with Charles Straub, in Atlanta, Mar. 2, 1972; interview with Earl Metzger,
in Atlanta, Mar. 3, 1972.
301. Information about this meeting is drawn largely from minutes taken by the RICC
secretary. RICC Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 8, 1970.

302. Id. at 2.
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'
randa evaluating the proposal's relation to their departments." The
evaluations of the non-Model Cities RICC agencies were generally quite
brief and superficial. Although the non-Model Cities agencies praised
the overall package, they were noncommittal or pessimistic in their

attitude toward the specific projects in the CCDP that required funds
from their own departments."' The unenthusiastic tone of these nonModel Cities RICC evaluations was a clear manifestation of the short-

program without the "insightedness of Nashville's decision to plan3 its
05
terference" of federal technical assistance.
The evaluations of the Nashville proposal prepared by the Model

Cities RICC members were far more'detailed and critical than their
non-Model Cities counterparts.3

°

First, the Nashville proposal had

been submitted with three essential elements of the CCDP missing alto303. Memorandum from John T. Edmunds, Assistant Regional Administrator for Renewal
Assistance, to Earl Metzger, Mar. 20, 1970 (Renewal Assistance Administration); Memorandum
from John T. Edmunds, Assistant Regional Administrator for Renewal Assistance, to Earl Metzger, Mar. 23, 1970 (Renewal Assistance Administration); Memorandum from Edwin H. Sims, Jr.,
Housing Assistance Officer, to Earl Metzger, Mar. 27, 1970 (Housing Assistance Office); Memorandum from Floyd Nichols to Melvin Randolph, Mar. 27, 1970 (Model Cities Regional Office);
Memorandum from Roy C. Huskey, Director FHA Knoxville Insuring Office, to Harold Albright,
Assistant Regional Administrator for FHA, Mar. 30, 1970 (FHA); Memorandum from Fred A.
Frey, Technical Assistance Coordinator, to George M. Murphy, LEAA Regional Director, Mar.
31, 1970 (LEAA); Memorandum from Henry Bankston to Melvin Randolph, Apr. 1, 1970 (Model
Cities Regional Office); Memorandum from William U. Norwood, Jr., Regional Manpower Administrator, to Earl Metzger, Apr. 8, 1970 (Manpower Administration); Letter from Norman Van
Ness to Earl Metzger, Apr. 9, 1970 (Federal Highway Administration); Memorandum from Clyde
E. James, Interagency Relations Coordinator, to Earl Metzger, Apr. 14, 1970 (OEO).
304. See, e.g., Memorandum from Roy C. Huskey, Director FHA Knoxville Insuring Office, to Harold Albright, Assistant Regional Administrator for FHA, Mar. 30, 1970 (FHA Insuring
Office indicating doubts about the proposed large scale use of § 235 and § 236 housing development); Letter from Norman Van Ness to Earl Metzger, Apr. 9, 1970 (Federal Highway Administration suggesting that the proposed Cross Town Bus System should be developed by the privately
owned Nashville Transit Company).
305. In an interview, the former CDA Director, William Reinhart, stated that he had generally avoided the use of federal technical assistance. Reinhart clearly felt that the city had sufficient
grantsmanship expertise to get adequate amounts of federal funding without having to subject the
planning process to what he viewed as federal interference. Interview with William Reinhart, in
Nashville, Feb. 15, 1972.
306. At least 2 memoranda were prepared by the Model Cities Regional Office for the RICC
review. Memorandum from Floyd Nichols to Melvin Randolph, Mar. 27, 1970 (review of physical
projects by the Regional Office Urban Planning Adviser); Memorandum from Henry Bankston
to Melvin Randolph, Apr. 1, 1970 (review of the CCDP by the Regional Office Citizen Participation Adviser). It is likely that additional memoranda were prepared by Joseph Fischer, the Regional Office Social Service Adviser, and Melvin Randolph, the Model Cities Coordinator
(Leadman) responsible for Nashville. In any event, the regional officials for Model Cities worked
closely with one another, and they frequently exchanged ideas about specific programs informally.
A memorandum surveying social service oriented components was prepared subsequent to the
RICC review. See note 326 infra and accompanying text.
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gether.3 0" Secondly, there was no indication that Nashville could successfully secure the non-Model Cities federal grants necessary for the
complete funding of many projects.1 8 Thirdly, the large number of
individual projects proposed was criticized as presenting an unmanageable program, especially in light of the failure even to name many project
sponsors.3 9 Finally, the proposal did not include a coordinating mechanism or outreach capabilities for the social services, health, and manpower programs.3 0 None of the criticisms of the Nashville proposal,
however, were directed toward the question of citizen participation.
Indeed, HUD's Citizen Participation Adviser prepared a memorandum
for the RICC review that stated conclusively that citizen participation
in Nashville had been adequate)" Although it mentioned the citizens'
objection to the proposal under consideration, the memorandum
indicated that the review would proceed, pending the receipt of more
3 12
specific complaints.
It was against this background that the formal RICC review was

307. Although the available memoranda do not deal extensively with the omission of the
relocation plan, the evaluation program, or the federal base statement, these omissions concerned
the Model Cities regional office. See RICC Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 14, 1970, at
10-11: RICC Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 15, 1970, at 1.
308. See, e.g., Memorandum from Floyd Nichols to Melvin Randolph, Mar. 27, 1970. The
improbability that Nashville would actually get grant-in-aid commitments from non-Model Cities
agencies was noted by Earl Metzger when he wrote that the Nashville strategy "suffers from one
glaring and improbable assumption, i.e., funds from other sources will materialize as scheduled."
Memorandum from Earl Metzger to Edward H. Baxter, Regional Administrator, May 14, 1970,
at 4.
309. E.g. Memorandum from Henry Bankston to Melvin Randolph, Apr. 1, 1970, at 3. The
regional office's Urban Planning Adviser expressed special concern over the failure to name
sponsors: "There are numerous projects with undesignated sponsors. As a general rule, funds
cannot be released for those projects until a satisfactory operating entity is designated. This may
prove to be more than administratively cumbersome in Nashville where there exist [sic] a strong
conflict between the CDA and CCC." Memorandum from Floyd Nichols to Melvin Randolph,
Mar. 27, 1970, at 6.
310. See Memorandum from Joseph Fischer to Melvin Randolph, Apr. 24, 1970. This lack
of a coordinating mechanism has continued to date.
311. "There exists little or no doubt but what there has been Citizen Participation in the
Model Cities Program in Nashville. To a great extent it is to this end that the planning of the
program has lasted almost two years." Memorandum from Henry Bankston to Melvin Randolph,
Apr. I, 1970, at I.
312. "The CCDP is being reviewed without the endorsement of the CCC (Citizens Coordinating Committee) also without the benefit of specific concerns of the CCC which led to its lack
of endorsement. It is relevant to note, however, that comments have been solicited and a telegram
dated March 16, 1970, from the Chairman of the CCC indicated that details would follow explaining why the Plan was not endorsed. To date, no further information has been received. The
telegram as well as two letters from other sources state that the Plan does not represent the desires
of the citizens of the community, nor afford them adequate involvement in its operation.
"Without the benefit of information from the CCC on specifics, the plan is being reviewed
on the basis of its content." Id.
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held on April 14, 1970. 3' 3 From the very outset of the meeting, it was

clear that the discussion was to proceed on two totally different levels.3t 4 On one hand, the RICC apparently intended the meeting as an

evaluation session in which the city could be informed of the steps
necessary to render the CCDP "approveable." To this end, the RICC
Chairman had already urged members of the committee to maintain a
hands-off attitude toward any debate between the city and the citizens'

group.3 15 Furthermore, an agenda had been prepared especially for the
purpose of directing the discussion toward a component-by-component
evaluation of the CCDP as submitted, rather than addressing the general question of citizen participation.3 6 The representatives of the citizens' group, on the other hand, obviously expected some reaction from
the regional Model Cities officials to the CCC objections to the whole
program. 317 Although the CCC's representatives raised the question of
their complaint, the issue was sidestepped 31 8 and the component-bycomponent agenda adhered to.

One very significant comment about citizen participation was offered, however, during the course of the programmatic evaluation. Dur-

ing the analysis of the housing component, the issue of sponsorships of
313. In addition to the normal RICC membership the meeting was attended by 2 members
of the Washington Model Cities Central Office: Allen Polsby, the Atlanta Region's desk officer,
and Anna Payne. The City of Nashville was represented by the CDA Director Buford Drake, 5
members of the CDA staff, Don O'Donniley of the Metropolitan Planning Commission, staff
attorney Joe Ragland of the Metropolitan Legal Department, and an administrative assistant to
the Mayor. The CCC was represented by its Chairman, Edwin Mitchell, and 2 other members of
its Executive Committee, Mrs. C.E. McGruder and Mrs. JoAnn Bennett. It might be noted that
the CCC's request for funds to send more members to the meeting was denied. Letter from Buford
Drake to Edwin Mitchell, Apr. 6, 1970; see RICC Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 14, 1970,
at 3.
314. Information concerning the meeting is drawn primarily from minutes taken by the
RICC secretary, a report of the meeting prepared by the CCC's secretary, JoAnn Bennett, and
from a tape recording of a substantial portion of the meeting.
315. See text accompanying note 302 supra.
316. RICC Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 14, 1970, at 2.
317. JoAnn Bennett, Report of the Regional Interagency Coordinating Committee, Atlanta,
Georgia, Apr. 14, 1970, appended to CCC, Minutes of Regular Meeting, Apr. 24, 1970; RICC
Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 14, 1970, at 2; Tape Recording, supra note 314.
318. The Chairman of the CCC "requested an indication of the HUD response as to the
letter from the CCC which informed us that they planned to file an administrative complaint. ...
He asked Mr. Polsby to comment on the complaint. Mr. Polsby said that the complaint had been
received in Washington. However, he said there was nothing in it to provide for taking any action
on it but that they stand ready to take any complaints that the CCC may have." RICC Secretariat,
Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 14, 1970, at 2. The tape recording of this exchange makes it clear that
the complaint received in Washington was a telegram or letter notifying HUD of the CCC's
intention to file a complaint. Tape recording, supra note 314. The administrative complaint was
not filed until 2 months after the RICC review. For a discussion of the administrative complaint
see notes 344 & 345 infra and accompanying text.
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projects was raised. In discussing this question the Chairman of the
CCC stated that the CCC now understood that the group could not
sponsor projects; he continued, however, to assert the CCC's concern
over who the sponsors would be.3 t9 There could have been no doubt in
the minds of the HUD officials that the CCC's objections were not
limited to its desires to run the program.
At the conclusion of the meeting the RICC Chairman summarized
the programmatic review by informing the CDA that it must prepare
and submit the three missing elements of the CCDP. He further urged
the CDA to begin combining, reducing, and modifying projects in order
to correct the problems revealed in the component-by-component evaluation. Finally, in response to questions from representatives of both
the city and the citizens' group, the RICC Chairman stated that he did
not know when the RICC would approve or disapprove the Nashville
proposal. He did say that there was "a lot of information which [the
RICC] must assimilate,"' ' " and that another meeting of the RICC
would have to be held to determine the Committee's recommendations 2 0 What the RICC Chairman failed to inform the city and the
citizens' group representatives was that the RICC meeting to discuss
approval of the Nashville program was already scheduled for the
following day.
On April 15, 1970, the RICC met to determine its recommendation
for the Nashville program.32 2 The Chairman opened the meeting by
stating that Washington had requested the RICC "not to require additional paper from cities except on critical issues. 3' 23 The Chairman
said that the three missing elements of the CCDP would have to be
supplied by Nashville, but he suggested that the RICC recommend
approval of the program to Washington pending receipt of the necessary
documents. Correction of the remaining deficiencies in specific projects
and components was to be achieved through approval of the Nashville
program for the full supplemental grant reserved for the city, 324 subject
319. "At this time another discussion regarding content of the document was initiated by
the CCC. Mr. Drake said that only 4 out of 93 projects were changed. The CCC had wanted to
co-sponsor all projects and this was not possible so they were changed. Dr. Mitchell said that the
CCC is now aware that they cannot sponsor projects, but that they want to know who is going to
sponsor them." RICC Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 14, 1970, at 7. This portion of the
discussion is not included in the tape recording mentioned in note 314 supra.
320. RICC, Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 14, 1970, at 10.
321. Id. at 1I. This comment was also reported in the CCC's report on the meeting. JoAnn
Bennett, supra note 317, at 5.
322. Discussion of the meeting is drawn largely from the RICC minutes. RICC Secretariat,
Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 15, 1970.
323. Id. at 1.
324. In the event HUD approved the program Nashville would receive $5,451,000. Guar-
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to "holds" placed on the expenditure of funds for troublesome projects. 25 The RICC concurred in these suggestions and voted to approve

the Nashville Model Cities program subject to programmatic holds on
funds.

After this meeting, the Model Cities technical advisors in the regional office prepared background memoranda listing the holds that
should be placed on the Nashville program. 326 As the formal RICC
recommendation was being prepared, a strong internal debate arose

within the Model Cities regional office over the wisdom of approving
the Nashville program at all. 3 7 Although the debate was not directly
disclosed by the memorandum prepared by the Model Cities Regional
Office as the RICC recommendation, it was clearly reflected by the fact

that every project in the program was subjected to some form of funding
hold. 328 On May32922, 1970, the RICC recommendations were forwarded

to Washington.
B.

Aftermath of the Initial Review-Opposition and Ambivalence

When the representatives of the city and the CCC returned from
the April 14 RICC review, both sides were still clearly committed to
their opposing views. The meeting in Atlanta had not bridged the gap
separating the two sides. The representatives of the citizens' group returned determined to complete preparation of their administrative com-

plaint and thereby gain the opportunity for the full hearing they thought
anteeing a set amount had been intended by HUD to avoid the problems of planning that had been
encountered in the traditional grant-in-aid applications, which tended to request exaggerated
amounts in aniticipation of a reduction by the funding agency. The subsequent funding would then
cause a reshuffling of the plans to adjust the project to the reduced amount actually granted. See
note 25 supra and accompanying text.
325. RICC Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 15, 1970, at 1.
326. Although only one of the memoranda is available, it is likely that there was at least
one additional memo. The one available was addressed only to the social services aspects of the
program proposal. Memorandum from Joseph Fischer to Melvin Randolph, Apr. 24, 1970.
327. Interviews with 5 of the Model Cities members of the RICC indicated that the debate
was quite strong. In off-the-record comments, 2 officials stated that the written RICC recommendations favoring approval of the program may have been accompanied by oral comments suggesting that Nashville should be turned down for funding as a Model City.
328. Memorandum from Earl Metzger to Edward Baxter, May 14, 1970 (signed May 22,
1970).
329. The RICC had voted to approve the CCDP at the April 15 meeting. The final written
approval was formulated by the RICC chairman, Earl Metzger, and circulated to the other RICC
members for comments. The members were given 3 days to comment on the draft memorandum.
Apparently, no objections were received and the memorandum was signed by the HUD Regional
Administrator on May 22, 1970. See id; RICC Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 15, 1970, at
2.
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HUD was offering them. The representatives of the city, on the other
hand, had completed the first step toward approval of the CCDP. The

strategy of both sides necessarily demanded a significant further effort
to achieve success.

The first task facing the CCC was the preparation of the administrative complaint and its submission to HUD as quickly as possible. The
process of drafting the complaint encountered lengthy delay, however,

because the CCC's attorney was at that time committed to preparing
the defense in a controverisal murder trial. The CCC's second task was
simply the maintenance of an active membership despite the group's
withdrawal from program participation. Although the group continued

to hold meetings regularly, "30 poor attendance was becoming a serious
problem. 33 ' In some cases, members of the group had ceased to attend

meetings regularly because of opposition to or frustration with the
CCC's course of action. In other instances members had ceased regular
attendance in order to avoid the high emotions and controversy that
frequently were displayed at the meetings. Finally, many CCC members
had become ineligible either due to employment in the CDA, 332 or
because they had moved from the district they represented.33 3 The
attendance problem was particularly acute because there were no provi-

sions in the CCC bylaws for the replacement of inactive or ineligible
33
elected members. 4

330. Although the CCC frequently has held called meetings, it has been the group's general
practice to hold executive committee meetings on the second Thursday of each month, and regular
meetings of the entire group on the third Thursday of each month.
331. As one might expect, attendance at the CCC meetings had tended to be quite good
during the period in which the program was submitted. Starting in the late spring, however,
attendance declined noticeably. The available minutes indicate that a quorum-25 members-was
not present at any of the CCC meetings from early May until mid-September. See CCC, Minutes
of Meetings, May 21, June 4, June 25, July 16, and Aug. 20, 1970.
332. At least 3 members of the CCC have been employed by the Model Cities program. One
elected member was hired to work on the CDA citizen participation staff. The other 2 members
were hired by the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP). Although the effect of hiring CCC
members on the total membership was not large, it was resented by many CCC members as an
effort to co-opt the group's leadership. The CCC requested that the 2 recently hired CEP employees
involved resign their CCC memberships. CCC, Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 2, 1970. In a memorandum. the CDA Director informed 2 CCC members who were employed by CEP that the Labor
Department had "made it very clear that persons on the citizens participation structure may, in
fact, be employed in the CEP program providing that the citizens particpation structure does not
have the authority to hire and fire." He continued that there was "no reason for you to relinquish
your membership on the CCC." Memorandum from Buford Drake to Delores Gordon and Herb
Collier, Apr. 3, 1970.
333. It is not possible to measure accurately the number of elected members that had become
inactive or ineligible. An examination of the minutes for the period reveals, however, that attendance by more than half of the elected members was rare.
334. The replacement of elected members later became a source of major concern. See notes
398-401 infra and accompanying text.
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The first task confronting the CDA after the RICC review was the
preparation of the three documents that the RICC had identified as
essential to the approval of the CCDP. After these documents were
completed, there remained the entire process of combining and modifying projects as recommended by HUD. Furthermore, the city had not
yet commenced soliciting support from federal agencies for the various
in the CCDP that depended on non-Model Cities federal fundprojects
.

ing 3

Despite the evident rift separating the CCC and the city, there were
some factors that tended to mitigate the hostility between the two sides.
First, the leadership of the CCC had become convinced that no urban
renewal activity was planned for the first action year.3 Secondly,
much of the initial concern over the city's deletion of the CCC from
sponsorship of particular projects had subsided. 7 Thirdly, many CCC
members and CDA staff members continued to enjoy cordial personal
33
relationships, despite their apparently opposing points of view. 1
Fourthly, the CCC had a strong interest in participation in the preparation of the relocation plan and the evaluation program. Finally, the
CDA was in perilous financial straits and was most anxious to expedite
funding of the CCDP. During the weeks immediately following the
RICC review the combination of these factors injected an element of
ambivalence into the formal opposition separating the CCC and the
CDA. The most interesting example of this ambivalence centered upon
the preparation of the relocation plan.
Following its return from the RICC review in Atlanta, the CDA
had requested the Relocation Director of the Nashville Housing Authority to draft a relocation plan. A plan was prepared and submitted
to the Metropolitan Council for approval on May 19, but city officials
recognized that this plan contained several technical deficiencies.3 9
335. Interview with Charles Straub, in Atlanta, Mar. 2, 1972. The First Quarterly Report
of the Nashville CDA indicates that applications for non-Model Cities funds for projects in the
CCDP were not made until after the proposal was approved. See CDA, Quarterly Report for
Period Ending March 31, 1971, attachment 1.
336. Throughout the period following the submission of the CCDP city officials stressed the
fact that no urban renewal was planned for the first action year of the program. See, e.g., Nashville
CDA, Comprehensive City Demonstration Plan iv (Mar. I1, 1970) (memorandum from Buford
Drake to the Citizens Coordinating Committee and the Assistant Regional Administrator for
Model Cities).
337. See note 319 supra and accompanying text.
338. Interview with Norman Moore, in Nashville, Feb. 21, 1972.
339. Interview with Robert Little, former Urban Development Coordinator for Mayor Beverly Briley, in Nashville, Jan. 14, 1972. The plan did not even mention the replacement housing
payment which was required by CDA Letter No. 5. Furthermore, the five-year and one-year
forecasts for relocation required by CDA Letter No. 5 were missing.
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More importantly, the CCC was concerned over the designation of the
Nashville Housing Authority to serve as the sponsor. Despite its announced policy of withdrawal, the CCC appeared in opposition to the
proposal when it came before the Metropolitan Council Model Cities
Committee. The Model Cities Committee voted to defer action on the
proposed plan indefinitely and appointed a special committee to formulate a new plan. The membership of the committee consisted of the
CDA Director, the Chairman and Attorney of the CCC, the Relocation
Director of the Nashville Housing Authority, and the committee was
chaired by a member of the Model Cities Committee. Ostensibly, the
CCC representatives on the committee limited their involvement to
detached observation. The lack of involvement was more apparent than
real, however, since the actual drafting of the new relocation plan was
accomplished by two attorneys who had worked with Legal Services of
Nashville and had been contacted for the job by the CCCY4 0 The new
plan was more protective of the citizen's rights, replaced the NHA with
the Metropolitan Welfare Commission as sponsor, and received full
CCC approval. On June 10, 1970, the Metropolitan Council voted unanplan, and it was submitted to Atlanta
imously to pass the substitute
4
without modification. 1
Despite the ambivalence that characterized the CCC-CDA relationship, which was exemplified by the preparation of the relocation
plan, the rigid roles of opposition were never fundamentally altered.
With both sides frozen into positions of opposition, it was inevitable that
the factors tending to ameliorate the conflict would retain only minimal
importance. Thus, for example, the cooperative preparation of the relocation plan indicated moderation of the parties' attitudes, but its completion and submission apparently was not followed by an effort to
consolidate the progress that had been made. The parties simply receded
into their long-accustomed roles of conflict. By late May a wave of petty
quarreling had erupted, which culminated in a futile demand by the
CCC that the CDA Director be removed. 4 Shortly thereafter the
CDA staff was drastically reduced, ostensibly on the grounds of financial necessity. There were strong indications, however, that the termina340. Interviews with Jerry Black and Grayfred Gray, drafters of the revised relocation plan,
in Nashville, Jan. II, 1972.
341. Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County Council, Substitute Res. No. 70-979
(passed June 10, 1970).
342. The CCC resolution demanding Drake's ouster cited lack of concern for the MNA and

its residents, deliberate misconstruction of communications, denial of meaningful participation for
citizens, refusal to recognize the CCC's right to direct access to HUD, and Drake's alleged
attempts to disrupt the CCC. See CCC, Minutes of Called Meeting, June 4, 1970.
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tions were largely due to the staff members' "disloyalty" to the
CDA.3 4 3 Finally, on June 12, 1970, only two days after the relocation

plan had been passed by the Council, the CCC filed its administrative
complaint, thereby institutionalizing the roles of opposition.
The administrative complaint filed by the Citizens Coordinating
Committee was a lengthy document that outlined in detail the citizens'
group's grievances against the proposed program.3 44 The complaint
alleged generally that the CCDP failed to satisfy the statutory goals of

citizen participation and innovation, and that the plan would have no
significant impact on the living conditions in the MNA. The complaint
further charged that the Nashville Model Cities program violated the

Act because it contemplated the replacement of a residential neighborhood with extensive commercial and industrial development. The complaint also alleged that the CCDP violated statutory and constitutional
protections of the MNA residents' civil rights. The relief requested in
the complaint was rejection of the CCDP, recognition of the citizens

group in its corporate status as the citizen participation structure, and
provision for an opportunity to replan the Nashville Model Cities program. The complaint also requested a prompt hearing and an opportun-

ity to submit documentary evidence in support of the allegations made.
Although the expectations of the citizens' group regarding the complaint are not altogether clear, at least two observations are possible.
First, it is unlikely that the citizens actually expected HUD to reject the

CCDP and order another year for planning.3 5 It is more likely that the
citizens hoped to establish a strong role for the CCC in the future
343. Two former staff members of the CDA indicated in interviews that the CDA Director,
Buford Drake, was extremely upset over the fact that copies of CDA correspondence "frequently
found their way over to Hubbard Hospital," the business address of the CCC chairman. He felt
that "spying for the CCC" was intolerable. Interview with Norman Moore, in Nashville, Feb. 21,
1972. Interview with Robert Meadows, in Nashville, Feb. 26, 1972. The co-chairman of the Metro
Council Model Cities Committee at the time felt the firings were unfair and termed a later
investigation of the dismissals by the Committee a "whitewash." Interview with Councilman Tom
Sharp, in Nashville, Feb. 14, 1972.
344. This administrative complaint was a 21-page sworn document addressed to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. HUD had been advised by the CCC Chairman over 2
months earlier that such a formal complaint was being prepared for filing. Letter from Edwin
Mitchell to George Romney, Apr. 3, 1970.
345. In a letter to the chairman of the CCC, the HUD Deputy Assistant Secretary for Model
Cities, Robert Baida, stated that "[t]he city of Nashville has been in planning for two years. While
no decision has been reached as to whether to approve Nashville's program, we doubt that further
planning would be beneficial. In this connection, the Model Cities program strongly emphasizes
continued planning and evaluation in the development of approved local programs, and you should
recognize that if it is approved, the signing of a grant agreement between HUD and a city does
not freeze the development of the city's program." Letter from Robert Baida to Edwin Mitchell,
Apr. 24, 1970.
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operation of the program and to modify some of the more objectionable
elements of the first year CCDP before it was accorded HUD approval.
Secondly, the citizens' group expected a formal determination of the
merits of their complaint. The complaint had been drawn in the stylized
format of trial pleadings and evidently contemplated advocacy proceedings.

As noted, the filing of the administrative complaint marked a stage
at which the opposing stances of the city and CCC had become ex-

tremely uncompromising. 34 6 This inflexibility was compounded by the

fact that by early June the future plans of the CDA and the citizens'
group depended substantially on the decisions to be made by HUD. On

one hand, the CCC had withdrawn its participation and filed an administrative complaint. The course of further action by the citizens' group

depended largely on HUD's handling of the complaint. The CDA, on
the other hand, had completed all of the major paperwork required by
the RICC to make the CCDP approvable. Although extensive work
remained to be done to ready the projects for implementation, the CDA

decided to postpone substantial work on the projects until the program
was officially funded. Thus, during the summer months of 1970, the
CDA made no significant effort to solicit the non-Model Cities federal
funds requested in the CCDP. 3 7 Furthermore, no substantial attempt
was undertaken to combine and modify projects within the CCDP as
had been suggested in the April 14 RICC review. 38 The staff of the
CDA had been reduced to the bare minimum, and the city appeared
34 9
content to wait for HUD's decision on funding of the program.
346. See notes 343 & 344 supra and accompanying text.
347. One example of this lack of interest in pressing the applications for non-Model Cities
funds occurred in mid-July when the leadman for Nashville, Melvin Randolph, visited the city to
promote funding of projects by the Department of Transportation. Although DOT had suggested
the trip and had sent 3 representatives to accompany Randolph, city officials were unreceptive. In
his Field Trip Report, Randolph stated that the Transportation officials were "exposed to Nashville's problems in a straight-forward manner and had clearly impressed upon them by Director
Drake that transportation T[echnical] A[ssistance] has low priority relative to solving the CCC
mayor problem and getting a grant out of HUD." Memorandum from Melvin Randolph to H.D.
Harrison and Earl Metzger, July 16, 1970.
348. Apparently the only effort to combine and modify projects before the Letter of Readiness was received in the fall was made by the Metropolitan Planning Commission. Don
O'Donniley. a staff member of the Commission, presented a tentative draft of the combinations
and modifications to the Model Cities Regional Office in July. At this meeting, however, the
regional officials suggested that further work was necessary.
349. Following the dismissals in early June 1970, the CDA staff apparently was limited to 5
or 6 employees, including clerical staff. Interview with Norman Moore, in Nashville, Feb. 21, 1972.
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C. HUD Action on the Nashville Proposal
The dependence of both parties at this point on action by HUD
magnified the importance of the Department's decisions. During the
summer and early fall of 1970 there were three separate issues in the

Nashville Model Cities program with which HUD had to deal: the
relocation plan, the administrative complaint, and the approval of the
CCDP. In its approach to each of these issues, HUD failed to provide

the kind of leadership that was essential to move the Nashville Model
Cities program off dead center.
1. Relocation Plan.-The question of the relocation plan was perhaps the simplest of the three issues with which HUD was faced. This
document was the only portion of the Nashville proposal that has ever
been submitted with the full approval of both the city officials and the

CCC. The problem confronting the Model Cities Regional Office was
that there were still basic technical deficiencies in the plan. 50 Despite

the fact that no displacement had been projected for the first action
year,35 1 the Regional Office, quite inexplicably, decided to reject the
relocation plan as submitted.3 5 2 Not only did HUD reject the plan, but

it also required the substitution of the Nashville Housing Authority for
the citizen-designated sponsor, the Metropolitan Welfare Commission.3 53 Thus, HUD not only showed remarkable insensitivity-or ignorance of local conditions-by its rejection of the relocation plan, 3"
350. Interview with Henry Bankston, in Atlanta, Mar. 3, 1972. The deficiencies were largely
documentary in nature, such as the absence of descriptions of the available rehousing and overall
vacancy rates.
351. The CCDP made it clear that no clearance or displacement was included in the Model
Cities projects for the first action year. See, e.g., Nashville CDA, Comprehensive City Demonstration Plan iv (Mar. 11, 1970). Nevertheless, a relocation plan was required by HUD to cover
displacement in non-Model Cities programs that might occur in the MNA. HUD, CDA Letter
No. 5, Revised HUD Handbook MC 3165.1 (Feb. 1970).
352. With certain modifications the relocation plan was accepted on an interim basis only.
Memorandum from Relocation Division, June 24, 1970. At least one of the grounds relied upon
by the Relocation Division in rejecting the relocation plan was factually incorrect. The memorandum states that the Nashville plan does not indicate the quality of housing required as temporary
relocation housing. Id. at 2. The Council-passed plan, however, specifically indicates that "any
dwelling used for temporary relocation must be standard housing." Substitute Res. No. 70-979,
at 16 (passed June 12, 1970). The plan also specifically defines "standard housing." A subsequent
offer almost a year later by the city to make the interim plan acceptable by amendment was
rejected by HUD. Letter from Buford Drake to Earl Metzger, Apr. 5, 1971; Letter from Earl
Metzger to Buford Drake, Apr. 23, 1971.
353. Letter from Earl Metzger to Buford Drake, Aug. 26, 1970.
354. An alternative explanation of HUD's rejection is that HUD previously had agreed with
Nashville city officials in private to demand certain changes in the relocation plan. This would have
freed the city to feign cooperation with the CCC, while HUD would take the blame for altering
the end product. An arrangement of this sort had been offered to the city at least once before by
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but it also returned the issue to Nashville without the sort of clear
definition of the requirements that would make any future dispute unlikely.
2. Administrative Complaint.-The second issue that confronted
HUD during the summer of 1970 was the CCC administrative complaint. Once again the Department's apparent insensitivity tended to
compound the problem. In the period immediately following the submission of Nashville's CCDP, HUD had avoided answering the CCC's
objections to the proposal by stating, both orally and in writing, that
the citizens should more fully document their complaints."' To the
citizens' group this response suggested, or possibly even required, the
submission of a formal administrative complaint and perhaps some
form of adversary hearing. Although HUD apparently never intended
to dignify the complaint with any formal determination of its merits, 36
this was never conveyed to the citizens' group. Apparently the Model
Cities officials had hoped to avoid the issue by requesting "documentation," which hopefully would never be forthcoming, or, at worst, to hold
an informal meeting in Atlanta, at which the citizens could air their
grievances in person.3 5 7 The CCC did persist, however, in "documenting" its objections and in demanding some form of hearing. Finally, the
to
CCC was invited to attend a meeting in Atlanta on July 23, 1970
"clarify and explain certain aspects of the complaint to HUD. 13 18
The July 23 meeting was opened by the HUD Assistant Regional
Administrator for Model Cities with a statement emphasizing that the
meeting was to be informal and not an adversary hearing.359 The discusHUD with respect to the changes made in the CCC-approved CCDP. Interview with Earl Metzger,
in Atlanta, Mar. 3, 1972. At least one of the drafters of the relocation plan believes that such an
arrangement was behind the relocation decisions made by HUD. Interview with Grayfred Gray,
in Nashville, Jan. I1,1972. Such an explanation of the relocation plan rejection does not seem
likely, however, in light of internal HUD correspondence. See, e.g., Letter from Joe Behrens to
Earl Metzger, Aug. 1970.
355. See, e.g., Letter from Robert Baida to Edwin Mitchell, Apr. 24, 1970; RICC Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 14, 1970, at 2.
356. Interview with Allen Polsby, in Washington, Mar. 17, 1972. The question of responding
to the complaint became a source of embarrassment for HUD when approval of the Nashville
CCDP was announced before HUD revealed the status of the complaint. See note 396 infra and
accompanying text.
357. When questioned about the procedure employed to process the administrative complaint, Earl Metzger, former Assistant Regional Administrator for Model Cities, indicated that it
was not uncommon for meetings to be held between citizens' groups and city officials. Metzger
stressed the therapeutic effects of such meetings, as well as the benefit of serious exchanges of
views. Interview with Earl Metzger, Mar. 3, 1972, in Atlanta.
358. Letter from Allen Polsby to Edwin Mitchell, July 16, 1970.
359. Information concerning the meeting is drawn from minutes taken by the RICC secretary and the secretary of the CCC.
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sion that followed never directly addressed the allegations of the CCC's

administrative complaint. Although citizen participation and the citizens' fears about urban renewal were mentioned in general terms, the

issue of the CCC's incorporation was the only topic dealt with in detail.
Given the nature of the discussion, it is not surprising that no issues were
resolved at this meeting 60 Once again, the more interesting meeting
was held by HUD on the following day.

On the day following the meeting with representatives of the city
and the CCC, HUD held a private meeting attended only by representa-

tives of the city.3' A portion of the meeting was devoted to the question
of CDA staffing and the progress that had been made in combining and

modifying projects in tbe CCDP.362 The question of citizen participation was then raised. More specifically, the regional officials questioned
the CDA Director, a staff attorney of the Metropolitan Legal Depart-

ment, and an Administrative Assistant to the Mayor about the city's
refusal to recognize the CCC in its corporate status. In response to these

questions, two basic arguments were offered to justify the city's refusal
to recognize the group's corporate status. First, the city officials argued
that the North Nashville Citizens Coordinating Committee, Inc., tended
to emphasize the role of Model Neighborhood residents, while the
Mayor insisted that the CCC should represent the entire Nashville
community. This argument was largely specious because the two groups

had identical membership, membership selection, bylaws, and officers. 3 3 The second argument propounded was that corporate status
would facilitate easier access to the courts for the organization in the
event of litigation. Because of well established precedent, however, this
argument was also unpersuasive.3 64 It is clear that the Model Cities
360. One method of resolving the CCC's objections had already been suggested by the
RICC. This procedure was for the CCC to submit a list of the individual projects to which the
group had specific objections. The RICC could then act to resolve the difficulties. RICC Secretariat, Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 15, 1970, at I. This procedure, however, apparently was never
attempted.
361. The only available records of the meeting are the minutes prepared by HUD and a 3page internal HUD memorandum summarizing the July 23 and the July 24 meetings. HUD,
Minutes of Meeting of HUD Model Cities Personnel and City Officials of Nashville, Tennessee
on July 24, 1970; Memorandum from Jennifer Lantrip, Program Assistant to Henry Bankston,
Aug. 5, 1970.
362. For a discussion of this portion of the meeting see notes 386-87 infra and accompanying
text. See also material cited note 361 supra; Memorandum from Allen Polsby to Earl Metzger,
July 22, 1970 (outlining the staffing and programmatic problems to be discussed July 24 with
Nashville officials).
363. Although there are some minor disparities between the original bylaws and the bylaws
of the corporation, there has never been any functional difference between the 2 groups.
364. The standing of a citizen participation structure to obtain judicial review of a Model
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officials were unconvinced by the city's arguments, and the meeting
recommendation that the city recognize the CCC in
concluded with the 365

its corporate status.

The July 23 and 24 meetings were hardly satisfactory to either the
citizens' group or the city. None of the CCC's basic objections to the

program had been resolved, and very few of them were even discussed.
The city was unable to gain any better indication of the prospects for
approval of the CCDP, and had been pressed firmly by HUD to recognize the incorporation of the citizens' group.

After returning to Nashville, city officials did, in fact, offer to
accept the incorporation of the CCC. In an exchange of letters with the

CCC chairman, 36 the CDA Director offered to recognize the NNCCC,
Inc., if five conditions were met: (1) scheduling annual elections of the
30 unaffiliated members; (2) appointment by the Mayor and the universities of I I members each; (3) appointment of 23 members by organized
groups; (4) status as director for each CCC member; and (5) deletion

of the North Nashville part of the title to "reflect its community wide
structure. ' 37 These conditions amounted basically to a demand that
the membership selection process of the CCC remain unchanged. The
CDA Director emphasized that open-ended participation was desired.
The CCC, however, did not respond positively to this offer within the
time limit specified by the CDA Director. The only response elicited
from the CCC to the offer amounted to petty criticism, suggesting that
the CDA Director lacked the authority to demand a change in the

citizen participation structure.3 6 A more likely explanation of this inCities program had been a subject of no small amount of litigation from 1968 through 1970.
Although the issue was not faced by a federal appellate court until the summer of 1970, no cases
have been reported in which incorporation of the citizens' group affected the outcome. Only 10
days prior to the July 24, 1970 meeting, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals specifically held that
a citizens' group does have standing to contest the adequacy of citizen participation in a Model
Cities program. North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v. Romney, 428 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1970).
Although the citizen participation structure was incorporated, this factor did not affect the court's
decision. Id. at 757. Indeed, incorporation of the CCC conceivably could have made access to the
courts more difficult, since the court might have to be shown that the group's corporate status had
not affected its official status as the recognized citizen participation structure.
365. See HUD, Minutes of Meeting Between HUD Model Cities Personnel and City Officials of Nashville, Tennessee on July 24, 1970, at 2-3; Letter from Earl Metzger to Beverly Briley,
July 30, 1970, at 2. It should be noted that HUD never took an official position demanding that
the city recognize the incorporation of the citizens' group. The HUD recommendation was more
in the nature of an insistent but friendly suggestion.
366. Letter from Buford Drake to Edwin Mitchell, July 31, 1970; Letter from Edwin Mitchell to Buford Drake, Aug. 4, 1970; Letter from Buford Drake to Edwin Mitchell, Aug. 5, 1970;
Letter from Buford Drake to Edwin Mitchell, Aug. 18, 1970.
367. Letter from Buford Drake to Edwin Mitchell, July 31, 1970.
368. Letter from Edwin Mitchell to Buford Drake, Aug. 4, 1970.
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transigent response is the suspicion and inflexibility that had characterized each side's attitude since early June. 3 9 Ironically, the result of this

exchange was the prolongation of the only dispute that HUD had sought
to resolve during the two July meetings.

3. Approval of the CCDP.-The third major issue with which
HUD was confronted during the summer of 1970 was the question of

approving the Nashville CCDP. Although the RICC's recommendation
to approve the program subject to various holds had been sent to Washington in late May 1970,370 the progress toward official approval of the
Nashville program was painfully slow. After the RICC recommenda-

tion was received in Washington, it was circulated among various Model
Cities Central Office officials for review.371 Although the mechanical
procedure employed in the review of the Nashville proposal is unclear,
the RICC recommendation evidently did not resolve all of the Central

Office's doubts. Indeed the only major issue that the RICC memorandum laid to rest was whether the past involvement of citizens in develop-

ing the plan had been sufficient to justify approval.372 Even the adequacy of past involvement, however, did not guarantee acceptable citizen participation in the future.
The decision confronting the Model Cities Central Office was not
an easy one. The CCDP, as it stood, was of very questionable quality.
A massive effort on the part of Nashville was necessary to get the
program underway, and there were grave doubts about the city's
capacity to provide that effort.37 3 The administrative effort was com369. In reading this exchange it must be remembered that the CDA Director's letters subsequently were used to document the city's argument for refusing to recognize the NNCCC, Inc.
There may have been some confusion over the deadline by which a response was expected from
the CCC. In any event, there apparently was no effort to convene a called meeting of the CCC to
consider the offer of recognition, and the next regularly scheduled meeting of the CCC was held
August 20, 3 days after the deadline for responding.
370. See note 329 supra and accompanying text.
371. The Regional Interagency Coordinating Committee (RICC) structure originally was
paralleled by the Washington Interagency Coordinating Committee (WICC), which reviewed
Model Cities proposals in light of RICC recommendations. The WICC structure, however, apparently has been deemphasized, and it is not clear exactly what format was used in reviewing the
Nashville proposal. Interview with Donald Dodge, Director of Evaluation, HUD-Community
Development, in Washington, Mar. 17, 1972.
372. See footnotes 307 & 327-29 supra and accompanying text.
373. The RICC memorandum recommending approval of the Nashville program clearly
indicated concern about the city's commitment. Despite the fact that the memorandum tended to
minimize the RICC's doubts, see note 327 supra and accompanying text, its approval of the
commitment of city officials was lukewarm at best: "[W]hen examined closely the commitment
of high ranking city officials ranges between passive indifferences [sic] to mild interests [sic]. The
mild interest level is exceeded only when a major crisis develops or the very formidable citizens
organization is pushing'for action." Memorandum from Earl Metzger to Edward Baxter, HUD
Regional Administrator, May 14, 1971, at 4-5.
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plicated by the necessity of planning around the massive funding defaults that were expected to occur in the non-Model Cities federal programs. 374 The nature of HUD's role in the Model Cities program exacerbated these difficulties. The emphasis in the program on local planning and responsibility made it unlikely that the Department could
supervise the Nashville program closely once the proposal was approved.75 Furthermore, this stage of the program represented a point
of no return for HUD. Until then, the only funds expended had been
for planning, but any future funding would be primarily for project
implementation. Thus, while HUD technically could refuse to fund
Nashville Model Cities in future action years if the program did not
improve, that course of action would necessarily require the termination
of ongoing projects, many of which, taken individually, might be quite
good.
On the other hand, many factors militated strongly in favor of
funding Nashville's program. To a certain extent, many of the problems
of quality evident in the CCDP were attributable to honest efforts 3by6
Nashville to comply with HUD's complex planning requirements. 1
Furthermore, HUD had already invested over 200,000 dollars in the
Nashville program, and it was hoped that this investment might still be
salvaged.3 71 The program was, after all, a five-year program, and the
Department had had experience with other cities pulling themselves
together after initial "growing pains. ' 3 78 North Nashville itself was also
an eloquent argument for approval. The area was in desperate need of
significant improvement, and it had strong potential for a successful
program because of the presence of the three universities in addition to
a favorable economic mix. Finally, there were political factors to be
considered. Only two Model Cities programs had been terminated by
HUD, the largest of which was approximately one-tenth Nashville's
374. In discussing the Nashville program, the RICC praised the city's reliance on non-Model
Cities funds but was forced to conclude that the strategy "suffers from one glaring and improbable
assumption, i.e., funds from other sources will materialize as scheduled. No further comment is
required." Memorandum from Earl Metzger to Edward Baxter, HUD Regional Administrator,
May 14, 1970, at 4.
375. Interview with Earl Metzger, in Atlanta, Mar. 3, 1972. In discussing the Model Cities
program, HUD officials at all levels emphasized that Model Cities is "the city's program" and
that the HUD staff is simply inadequate to monitor closely the quality of any city's efforts.
376. "Looking back at the staggering number of projects, the conclusion is inescapable that
there was a conscious attempt at the comprehensiveness required of all first round cities." Memo-

randum from Earl Metzger to Edward Baxter, May 14, 1970, at 2.
377. As of December 30, 1970 the total Model Cities funds expended on the Nashville
program was $232,951. Nashville City Demonstration Agency, Monthly Model Cities Financial
Management Report for the Month of January 1972 (submitted Feb. 15, 1972).
378. Interview with Earl Metzger, in Atlanta, Mar. 3, 1972.
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size. " ' Termination of a program in a city Nashville's size would al-

most invariably focus massive political pressure on the Department.38

The circumstances were complicated further by the fact that the Mayor

acquaintance of the Assistant Secreof Nashville was a close personal
3 81
tary of HUD for Model Cities.
By mid-July, HUD officials in Washington had concluded tentatively to follow the RICC recommendation and approve the Nashville

program subject to holds on specific projects. Immediately prior to the
meetings in Atlanta on July 23 and 24, the Model Cities Central Office
sent a memorandum to the Regional Office outlining the status of the

Nashville program.382 The memorandum adopted the basic position
that the RICC had recommended, and it set forth a strict timetable for
Nashville to follow in implementing the program.3 83 Failure to meet
the timetable was designated as "cause for suspension or termination

of the grant on grounds that the carrying out of the grant agreement is
improbable or infeasible."384
Although the representatives of the city at the July meetings appar379. The 2 programs terminated were North Little Rock, Arkansas and Danville, Kentucky.
In North Little Rock, the city requested termination of the project. In Danville, there apparently
was a substantial failure to comply with the basic structure of the Model Cities legislation and
regulations. Interview with Steve Vilvens, in Knoxville, Feb. 1, 1972. One more program has
terminated since the date of the approval of the Nashville program. The termination was of a
relatively small city, Atlantic City, New Jersey. Letter from David Grossman, Acting Assistant
Regional Administrator for Model Cities, Region II, to Allan Gates, Special Projects Editor,
Vanderbilt Law Review, July 15, 1971.
380. Even under normal conditions, one would expect termination of a Model Cities program to have political consequences. In the case of Nashville, however, more was at stake than
the mere continuance of the program. The Nashville program had been funded from June 1969
through September 1970 by means of a "Letter to Proceed." Under this arrangement,the City of
Nashville paid all of the costs incurred with a refund of 80% only if HUD approved the Nashville
CCDP. The remaining 20% of the costs represented Nashville's one-fifth matching share of the
funds. The funds that were made available by the M'Ltropolitan Council to finance the Nashville
program under the Letter to Proceed arrangement were appropriated as loans only. Thus, rejection
of the Nashville CCDP by HUD would have placed Nashville's Mayor Briley in an extremely
embarrassing position only months away from the date he was to start his campaign for reelection.
381. Nashville's Mayor, Beverly Briley, and Floyd Hyde became acquainted through their
work together in the National League of Cities. During Briley's tenure as president of the
organization, Hyde served as vice-president.
382. Memorandum from Allen Polsby to Earl Metzger, July 22, 1970.
383. Id. The memorandum stated that an acceptable interim relocation plan had to be
submitted before execution of the grant agreement. The city would be required to set up a planning
work program within 60 days after contract execution. Within 90 days of the agreement, a final
relocation plan had to be formulated and a competent CDA staff hired. Citizen participation was
also to be addressed in this 90-day period. Projects were to be combined and eliminated within
the first 120 days so that the final program would have less than 50 projects.
384. Id.
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ently were informed of the Central Office's position, 315 the memorandum was not a final approval of Nashville's proposal. Instead, the city
was informed of three additional requirements to be met."' First, the
city was instructed to begin enlarging the CDA staff in order to be ready
to implement the program when the grant was approved. The staffing
problem in the CDA was especially important for Nashville because the
massive gearing-up process would have to be accomplished without the
benefit of most of the experienced staff that had been dismissed at the
beginning of the summer. The second requirement imposed by HUD
was the reduction of the number of projects in the program by at least
one-half. The reduction requirement did not imply the elimination of
particular projects. Instead, HUD suggested that projects be combined
in order to organize the same overall project effort into a more manageable number of separate operations. The final requirement mandated a
statement from the Mayor concerning the method by which he planned
to assure adequate citizen participation in the event of HUD approval
of the program. The final requirement was accompanied by a strong
indication that recognition of the CCC's incorporation would satisfy
38 7
much of HUD's concern for citizen involvement in the future.
Although the three requirements were expressed as preconditions
to approval of the Nashville program, it was readily apparent that little
real progress would be made toward resolving any of the problem areas.
In response to the citizen participation requirement, the Mayor sent a
letter August 21 to the regional office outlining the conditional offer
extended by the CDA to recognize the incorporation of the citizens'
group. 38 As previously noted, 389 the offer of recognition had been
rebuffed by the CCC. Because of that refusal, the Mayor informed
HUD that he would not recognize the incorporation of the citizens'
group and stated that the original citizen participation structure would
remain unchanged. The letter did not specify, however, how the Mayor
385. The memorandum began by stating that "[tihe following concerns along with any the
Region may have should be communicated to the city in writing." Id.
386. The requirements were outlined in a letter to Mayor Briley, and apparently were
discussed in the meeting July 24. Letter from Earl Metzger to Beverly Briley, July 30, 1970. But
see HUD, Minutes from Meeting of HUD Model Cities Personnel and City Officials of Nashville,
Tennessee on July 24, 1970.
387. Although the letter from Metzger carefully avoided requiring the City of Nashville to
recognize the incorporated citizens' group, it did state that "[slince the incorporation seems to be
the critical issue, it is inevitable that the city will have to sit down with the citizen structure,
acknowledge leadership, and cope with it." Letter from Earl Metzger to Beverly Briley, July 30,
1970.
388. Letter from Beverly Briley to Earl Metzger, Aug. 21, 1970.
389. See notes 366-69 supra and accompanying text.
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would assure effective participation in the original structure. The

Mayor's response to the questions of staffing and project combination
was contained in a letter sent six days later.9 0 In this letter, the Mayor
noted that two new CDA staff members had been hired since the July
24 meeting. The Mayor stated that recruiting other staff members had
begun, but he stressed that it would be financially impossible to hire
additional staff members until the program was funded. Concerning the
requirement of reducing and combining projects, the Mayor pointed out
that a tentative plan for consolidating projects had been prepared by the

Metropolitan Planning Commission and given to the regional office at
the July 24 meeting. The Mayor expressed the hope that this plan would

satisfy HUD's requirements. The Mayor closed the second letter by
emphasizing the critical financial conditions of the Nashville CDA, and
current review had been underway for five and
by noting that HUD's
391
one-half months.
Immediately upon receipt of the Mayor's second letter, the regional

office reported that Nashville had complied satisfactorily with all three
of the supplementary requirements, and approval of the Nashville program was recommended. 3 2 The Washington Central Office delayed its
decision to recommend approval for two weeks.393 On September 15,
1970, approval of the Nashville program was issued by the Assistant
Secretary for Model Cities.3 1 Once again, however, delay ensued. Finally, Secretary Romney approved the program and on October 7,

a grant to begin the first action
1970, the City of Nashville was tendered
3 5
year of its Model Cities program.
390. Letter from Beverly Briley to Earl Metzger, Aug. 27, 1970.
391. After stating that all available funds for the CDA would be exhausted by September
30, 1970, Mayor Briley closed his letter with some fairly sharp language about the lengthy delay
which had been experienced during the review of the CCDP by HUD: "I am sure you also read
that our CCDP was submitted to y6ur office on March 12, 1970. Since that time all requests by
HUD for revisions have been met. I therefore see no reason why an early answer to our funding is
not forthcoming." Letter from Beverly Briley to Earl Metzger, Aug. 27, 1970.
392. Memorandum from Earl Metzger to Floyd Hyde, Sept. 1, 1970.
393. In interviews with various HUD officials, it was revealed that part of the delay in the
review process resulted from a time-consuming effort to release more of the holds on specific
projects before approving the program. Although the effort may have been partially responsible
for the delay from September 1 to September 15, if the effort was made, it was unsuccessful. As
the program progressed through the review process, it tended to collect more holds instead of
having holds released.
394. Memorandum from Floyd Hyde to George Romney, Sept. 15, 1970; Memorandum
from Allen Polsby to Floyd Hyde, Sept. 15, 1970.
395. HUD Press Release, No. 70-739 (Oct. 7, 1970); Memorandum from Allen Polsby to
Earl Metzger, Oct. 7, 1970 (Authorization to Execute a Grant Agreement with Nashville-Davidson
County, Tennessee).
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VIII.

FIRST ACTION YEAR

A. Impact of Funding on the Citizens' Group
The decision by HUD to fund the Nashville Model Cities program
for its first action year altered neither the basic position nor problems
of the CCC. The citizens' group had long since voted to withhold formal
participation from the program in order to avoid lending legitimacy to
the CCDP that had been submitted by the city over vigorous citizen
group objections. The policy of withdrawal was continued after the
funding for precisely the same reason. By this point, however, the citizens had realized that pressing their administrative complaint upon
HUD would not produce satisfactory resolution of their grievances.
Indeed, HUD's tender of a grant to Nashville for the first action year
was followed, belatedly, by a letter from the HUD Assistant Secretary
for Model Cities explaining that the relief requested in the administrative complaint would not be granted.3 96 Because of the apparent futility
of appealing to HUD, the citizens voted to direct their attorney to file
suit against both the city and the Department in order to obtain redress
of the CCC's grievances. 397 Thus, in the month following the decision
by HUD to fund the Nashville program, the CCC had reaffirmed its
policy of withholding participation and of seeking some sort of judicial
resolution of its objections to the program.
The CCC also was still plagued by a problem that had appeared
shortly after the CCDP had been submitted, that of dwindling membership and attendance. In the months following the April 1970 vote to
withdraw participation, the CCC had rarely been able to convene a
quorum-one third of the membership-at its meetings. Even before the
public announcement that the Nashville program had been funded, the
CCC Executive Committee had begun preparations for an election to
replace the inactive and ineligible elected members. 38 Although the
election would directly affect only 30 "grass roots" membership posi396.

The timing of the letter from Assistant Secretary Hyde was more revealing than its

substantive content. Although HUD had consistently professed strong interest in the CCC's objections to the Nashville CCDP, the letter informing the CCC's attorney of the Department's rejection
of the administrative complaint was not written until a week after the decision to fund the Nashville
program had been made public. Indeed, this letter was not mailed until 5 days after it had been
prepared. Letter from Floyd Hyde to Avon Williams, Oct. 19, 1970 (letter dated Oct. 14, 1970
and dated again Oct. 19, 1970); see Letter from Avon Williams to George Romney, Oct. 19, 1970
(requesting statement on the status of the administrative complaint); Letter from Floyd Hyde to
Avon Williams, Nov. 19, 1970 (responding for Secretary Romney to Williams' letter of Oct. 19,
1970).
397. CCC, Minutes of Regular Meeting, Nov. 20, 1970.
398. See, e.g., CCC, Minutes of Regular Meeting, Aug. 20, 1970 at 2.
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tions, it was apparently hoped that this step would have the indirect
effect of reviving interest among the inactive appointed members. Almost immediately, however, implementation of the election plans encountered delay.
The original bylaws of the CCC were rather indefinite and included
no provision for replacement or reelection of members. As the citizens'
group began to formulate specific plans for the election, the CDA
Director questioned the propriety of the election and balked at assisting
the group in its efforts. 99 To avoid challenges to the legitimacy of
the planned election, the CCC requested that the HUD Regional Citizen
Participation Adviser visit Nashville and assist the group in making its
election plans."' Although the Regional Office responded favorably to
the CCC's request for a visit by the Citizen Participation Adviser, the
group was also informed that the bylaws would have to be amended
before an election would be held.4"'
On October 14, 1970, the HUD Regional Citizen Participation
Adviser visited Nashville and conferred with the citizens' group and the
CDA Director about the revision of the CCC bylaws. During these
meetings the CCC agreed to revise its bylaws to establish a procedure
for replacement of members prior to the election. Initially it appeared
that the revision could be accomplished easily. Instead, however, the
CCC launched into a lengthy process of entirely rewriting its bylaws
that continued for fifteen months. It is not entirely clear why the revision required more than a year to accomplish, but it is probable that a
major factor contributing to the delay was the inability of the group to
infuse its membership with renewed vigor during a period when the
official organization position was that of deliberate inactivity. Another
factor that tended to undermine any sense of urgency about reviving
membership spirit was that the CDA generally refrained from identifying the group's inactivity as a basis for criticism. Finally, the CCC
Executive Committee probably was confident that if an important question should arise, a sufficient number of members could be roused from
their apathy. The end result of the extensive delay was that the CCC
regular meetings repeatedly failed to attract a quorum, and, as a consequence, the conduct of the CCC's business was handled increasingly by
the Executive Committee.
399. See Letter from Buford Drake to Edwin Mitchell, Sept. 8, 1970, at 2; Letter from
Edwin Mitchell to Henry Bankston, Sept. 18, 1970.
400. Letter from Edwin Mitchell to Henry Bankston, Sept. 18, 1970.
401. Letter from Earl Metzger to Edwin Mitchell, Sept. 25, 1970.
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B.

Impact of Funding on the CDA

While it had only limited impact on the CCC's position, the decision to fund the first action year of the Nashville program required
fundamental restructuring of the CDA role. Prior to funding, the CDA
had been a relatively small agency that coordinated program planning
and negotiated differences that arose over various plans. After funding,
however, the CDA became responsible for the total administrative effort necessary to effect implementation of the projects by the various
sponsoring agencies.
The most immediate and visible change in the CDA was its increase
in staff. From an initial complement of six, the size of the CDA staff
grew almost immediately to 25 and ultimately as high as 40 employees.
Quite naturally, the agency experienced some confusion during the initial gearing up process. The difficulties encountered were further complicated by marked variation in the qualifications of the newly hired
staff members. Although many of those hired were very capable, other
positions were filled on the basis of political considerations or without
adequate scrutiny of the applicant's qualifications. The effectiveness of
the staff was also hampered by vacancies in several key administrative
positions and by the high job turnover rate that apparently resulted
from the program's controversial nature. Finally, the agency's administration difficulties were compounded by the CCC's decision to file suit,
after which the delegation of normally simple tasks became a matter
that required unusual caution.
The procedure that the CDA was to follow for implementing the
projects in the CCDP was outlined in detail by HUD in a nine-page
letter commonly known as the Letter of Readiness." 2 Each of the 93
projects was discussed in this letter, but only eleven were approved for
immediate funding. Holds were placed on the expenditure of funds for
the remaining projects until certain designated conditions were met. The
most important hold provided that none of the projects involving nonModel Cities funds could be implemented until the city had received a
definite commitment from the outside funding sources. There were also
general requirements such as the combination and reduction of the
number of projects and the submission of a permanent relocation plan
within 90 days of the execution of the grant agreement. These requirements were to be satisfied according to a timetable that amounted to a
watered down version of the very strict schedule prepared in July by the
Model Cities Central Office.103
402.
403.

Letter from Earl Metzger to Beverly Briley, Oct. 28, 1970.
See notes 382-84 supra and accompanying text.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

The mechanical procedure of implementing a project, once all the
holds on it had been released, was fairly simple. The project description
was merely rewritten into the prescribed contract format. Once the
project's contract was drawn, it was submitted to the Nashville Metropolitan Council in the form of a resolution for approval. 4 After the
resolution was passed by the Council and signed by the Mayor, the
contract was executed between HUD, the CDA, and the sponsoring
agency.
Although the process of implementing projects was relatively mechanical, progress toward actual implementation was painfully slow for
several reasons. First, although the Letter of Readiness required modifications in almost all of the projects, the CDA was hesitant about making any changes in the previous plans. The CDA Director argued that
the projects, as submitted in the CCDP, had received full citizen participation during the replanning process. Given the CCC's policy of withdrawal, the CDA Director feared that any further project changes necessarily would have to be unilateral, and therefore would be vulnerable to
attack by the citizens' group on the ground that the alterations were
made without involving the citizens in the decision-making process. The
second reason for delay in implementation was the city's inability to
secure the non-Model Cities funding on which many projects relied.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the CDA Director frequently
encountered problems in motivating project sponsors to act. Many projects had been planned without specific sponsors in mind, and the process of obtaining sponsors for these projects often proved to be very
difficult. Even when sponsors had been designated, the proposed sponsors frequently manifested reluctance t, associate themselves with the
program after it became the subject of so much controversy. Furthermore, many of the original sponsors had experienced changes in circumstances during the hiatus between the original project planning and the
first action year funding"' that made implementation of the project
without alterations undesirable. 0 6
The pattern that emerged from this background of administrative
difficulty and project delay contrasted sharply with the intensive
404.
405.

See HUD, CDA Letter No. 8, HUD Handbook MCGR 3100.8, at 13 (June 1969).
The delay between the original planning and the effort at implementation in most cases

was in excess of 18 months.
406. The most extreme example of changed circumstances for sponsoring agencies occurred
in the education component. Almost all of the education projects were based on working with the
students in the MNA schools. During the summer of 1971, however, the student bodies of these
schools were radically altered by a school desegregation order that involved a large amount of interdistrict busing.
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administrative effort that the Letter of Readiness timetable seemed
to demand. By the end of June 1971, the half-way point of the first
action year, only six of the 93 projects in the CCDP were fully operational. 107 Although the pace at which the various projects were brought
before the Council accelerated somewhat during the summer of 1971,
the degree of success in implementing an individual project tended to
vary directly with the interest and persistence of the sponsor. It should
be noted that the delays in implementing projects, at least in the first
six months of the action year, were not the product of opposition from
either the Council or the CCC. The CCC had adopted an informal
policy of not opposing a project unless it would cause displacement or
serve as the basis for a housing program that the citizens had not approved.4"' The Council's attitude, at least until August, tended to be one
of general disinterest. As long as the proposed project involved no local
funds and generated no opposition from the CCC, approval tended to
be automatic.
A second major concern of the CDA-in addition to project implementation-was the problem of citizen participation. Although the
CDA Director had been able to ally himself with a few members of the
CCC, the constant opposition of the group as a whole and, more specifically, of the Executive Committee had convinced him that the group was
an obstacle that had to be circumvented if the program was to succeed.
Shortly after the first action year funding was announced, the Director
began formulating plans for an alternative citizen participation structure. 0'
Although the Director's tentative plans did not elicit strenuous
opposition from HUD, 10 two factors made a full scale ouster of the
CCC strategically undesirable. First, an election for Metropolitan offices was to be held in August 1971, in which the Mayor would be seeking reelection. Although North Nashville had not been a traditional
source of electoral strength for the Mayor, the early appearance of a
strong anti-busing candidate increased the possibility that the vote of
407. Nashville CDA, Quarterly Report for Period Ending June 30, 1971.
408. Interview with Edwin Mitchell, April 13, 1972, in Nashville. This policy was never
formally articulated or passed upon by the group.
409. An unsigned and undated plan for a structure to replace the CCC was delivered to the
HUD office as early as February according to HUD regional officials. Different plans for the
replacement of the CCC were frequently discussed by the CDA Director with the HUD Regional
Office throughout 1971. E.g., Memorandum from Ernest Marsolan to Wallace Cheatwood and
Earl Metzger, March 24, 1971.
410. Interview with Earl Metzger, March 3, 1972 in Atlanta. The position stated by regional
officials on the replacement of the CCC was simply that the citizen participation must be adequate
in the present and future operations of the program.
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the North Nashville residents might be crucial to the Mayor's reelection.411 The CCC's leadership, of course, already had been alienated by

the Mayor's conduct of the Model Cities program, but the group's
opposition had rarely taken the form of public appeals for mass support
from the North Nashville community. If an overt effort to oust the
CCC had been undertaken prior to the election, it could have turned
the CCC's low-key opposition into a major attack capable of jeopardizing the election.
The second factor that made the ouster of the CCC strategically
undesirable was the group's decision to file suit against the city over the
program. Although the city was confident that its legal position was
strong, the complicated factual background of the program would not
have been easy for the court to understand fully. Since citizen participation was a major issue in the case, there was a clear danger that an
ouster of the CCC might diminish the city's effectiveness in presenting
its defense. Furthermore, if the city ousted the CCC prior to the termination of the suit, the court could easily order the group's reinstatement
pending a decision on the merits. Indeed, even if the suit were won by
the city on the adequacy of citizen participation in the past, an ouster
might still result in an order prohibiting the replacement of the CCC in
the future.
Given the strategic limitations of the election and the lawsuit, the
CDA Director decided against a direct replacement of the CCC and
instead began what appears to have been a process of indirectly undermining the CCC's influence. While attendance at CCC meetings had
declined for reasons intrinsic to the group itself, notices of meetings-mailed by the CDA-began to reach members only shortly before, or even after, the meetings had been scheduled.412 Telephone reminders of CCC meetings and offers to provide transportation increasingly were limited to those members who were sympathetic to the CDA.
Private meetings between the CDA Director and sympathetic members
411. The North Nashville vote for Mayor Briley did prove to be extremely important in his
successful reelection campaign.
412. Through the courtesy of the CDA, the participants of this study were placed on the
regular CCC mailing list in mid-May of 1971. During the year in which this study was conducted,
the problem of short notice or late notice frequently was apparent. The late receipt was especially
suspect because the only postmark date available was the date that had been set on the CDA's
postage meter. Frequently, the date of receipt and the postage meter date indicated a delay of a
week or more in the delivery of the materials. It is possible that clerical inefficiency caused some
of the delay, but it is unlikely that the CDA Director would have allowed any unintentional
alienation of the CCC to continue for'any extended period of time. The CCC, of course, objected
to the late receipt of notices and claimed that they were a major factor in the low level of attendance
at the group's meetings. It should be noted, however, that the group did not make any organized

effort of its own to solicit member attendance.
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of the CCC frequently preceded CCC meetings. While the full effect of
these efforts cannot be measured, the CCC continued to experience
remarkably poor attendance at its meetings.
The most important aspect of the CDA's efforts to undermine the
CCC was the introduction of a series of block clubs. The clubs were
organized on a geographic basis, each club representing a very small
fraction of the total area of the MNA.41 3 In organizing these clubsthe CDA staff first contacted one or more "recognized community
leaders" who were invited to coordinate the club meetings. 4 The leaders were asked for a list of names of persons in the immediate neighborhood who might be interested in participating in the meetings. The
people recommended by the leaders, along with the others contacted on
a door-to-door basis, were then invited to club meetings. CDA staff
members helped to organize the meetings and to solicit new participants
until the groups became self-sustaining. At that point, the CDA tended
to let the group operate as independently as it wished. The programs at
these block club meetings were usually low-key and informal. Moreover, the dispute between the CCC and the CDA was not normally
discussed. Instead, the members of the clubs were given presentations
concerning Model Cities projects and plans in a relaxed social atmosphere. Participants were urged to offer their own ideas about the proper
scope and focus of the Model Cities program. To the extent that it was
possible, high ranking officials from the CDA, the Mayor's office, and
other agencies appeared and made general presentations to the active
clubs.
Although the importance of any single individual block club meeting was probably minimal, the significance of the overall network of
block clubs was clearly reflected by the full-time assignment of roughly
one-third of the entire CDA staff to organizing the clubs115 The advantages of the block club structure from the city's viewpoint are not difficult to perceive. The creation of a broadly based network of clubs
generally sympathetic to the city's position would enable the CDA to
replace the CCC with a viable citizen participation structure as soon as
the election and the suit were no longer restraining factors. Because of
413. The MNA was divided into approximately 16 separate areas for the purposes of block
club organization.
414. Interview with Zelma B. Waller, CDA Citizen Participation Supervisor, March 9, 1972
in Nashville.
415. As of March, 1972 the CDA staff included 32 employees. Of this number, 10 were

assigned to the CDA Citizen Participation Unit. It should be noted that in addition to organizing
the block clubs, the Citizen Participation Unit did perform a small amount of clerical work for

the CCC.
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the large number of people participating in the clubs, the CDA could
argue that the CCC was no longer responsive to or representative of the
residents of the MNA who were truly interested and involved in Model
Cities. Furthermore, given the large number of separate clubs, it would
be difficult for the CCC to meet with each to discuss the CCC's point
of view on the program. Similarly, the relatively small size of each block
club and the informal and frequently social atmosphere of the meetings
made it unlikely that the membership of any particular club would
mount a serious challenge to the course of action proposed by the CDA.
The independent and isolated nature of each club also tended to preclude efforts by rebellious block clubs to mobilize community-wide opposition to the CDA. Finally, the nature of the organizing efforts afforded the CDA employees an excellent opportunity to urge block club
members to support the Mayor in his reelection campaign." 6
Given the intensive organizing effort by the CDA in forming the
block clubs and the clear threat that they posed to the CCC, it is
somewhat surprising that the citizens' group did not vigorously oppose
their creation. Several factors may explain the CCC's noncombative
attitude. The initial concept of the block club was an outgrowth of the
efforts by an elected CCC member to involve the area residents in the
program. When the CDA followed up on the concept, the full potential
of the clubs may not have been immediately apparent. It is also quite
likely that much of the organizational effort may have been viewed by
the CCC as merely campaign efforts on behalf of the Mayor. Furthermore, the CCC was not generally aware of the full intensity of the
CDA's organizational effort, and the group simply may have been ignorant of the scope of the threat. Furthermore, vigorous criticism of the
block clubs by the CCC might have led to disputes with the block clubs
over the representativeness of the inactive CCC. The CCC may have
preferred to forestall any controversy over the adequacy of representation until it had completed the bylaw revision and had revived the activity of its full membership.
416. It is an open secret that employees of many Metropolitan agencies have directly engaged in political campaign activities in support of Mayor Briley. Indeed, the predictable newspaper criticism commonly tends to focus less on the practice itself than on discharge of municipal
employees allegedly for refusal to work in the Mayor's behalf. Interviews with 3 CDA staff
members indicated that the CDA's campaign efforts were vigorous, and there was apparently at
least one termination in the CDA staff for refusal to campaign. See Nashville Tennessean, Aug.
26, 1971, at 5, col. I & 2. It is also interesting to note that one successful councilmanic candidate
who has since proven very sympathetic to the Mayor was employed by the CDA for the 2 months
immediately preceding the election.
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C. Nature of the Continuing Controversy

By the end of June 1971, the Nashville CDA had evolved into what
appeared to be a stereotypical political machine; that is to say, the
Agency had become an operation that sought to achieve its goals primarily through the distribution of material rewards rather than through
appeals to political ideas. The CCC, on the other hand, had developed
into a relatively small group of articulate spokesmen whose strength
depended on their ability to rally support through public appeals to a
variety of ideologically sympathetic constitutencies in the community.
The continuing struggle between the CCC and CDA can be fully understood only when the fundamentally different character of these sources
of strength is appreciated.
The strength of the CDA rests firmly on the efficacy of its distribution of material rewards. The most obvious of these benefits is money
to subsidize projects. The measure of flexibility that is allowed in the
allocation of Model Cities funds makes the program an ideal vehicle for
conferring benefits in the form of projects. Not only may Model Cities
funds be spent for virtually any type of legitimate endeavor, but the
Model Cities regulations also require that the cities plan new projects
to absorb any Model Cities funds that were originally allocated to programs that never become operative.4 17 In the case of Nashville's Model
Cities program, this requirement meant that the CDA had more than
two million dollars available with no specific restrictions limiting the
scope of possible uses. A related source of strength for the Nashville
CDA was its capacity to provide employment opportunities. Since most
of the projects that were implemented by the CDA contemplated the
delivery of social services, most of the funds were budgeted for salaries 41 and the Model Cities regulations required that MNA residents
be given employment preference in all Model Cities-funded projects.4 19
In addition to the direct recipients of Model Cities project funds or
salaries, the CDA is further supported by the large group of project
service recipients. This constitutency is parallelled by the block club
organizations whose members, while they do not receive direct material
benefits, enjoy a sense of satisfiaction through the interest expressed by
CDA officials in their ideas and suggestions.
417. HUD, CDA Letter No. 6, HUD Handbook MC 3140.7 10-12 (May 1970).
418. In a statement before the Metropolitan Council Model Cities Committee, the CDA
Director stated that 393 people were currently employed by projects of the Nashville Model Cities
program. Statement of Buford Drake before the Metropolitan Model Cities Committee, March

1, 1972 (tape recording).
419.

HUD, CDA Letter No. I1, HUD Handbook MC 3160.1 (Nov. 1970).
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The constituencies from which the CCC derives its strength are
much less well defined than those supporting the CDA. First, the CCC
draws substantial support from a pervasive fear in the MNA of displacement by government projects. Secondly, the group is ideologically allied
with a variety of groups throughout the city that share an intense hostility to urban renewal and high-density public housing. Thirdly, the plight
of the CCC has proved to be a strong magnet for public support from
both liberals and blacks who automatically tend to be suspicious of what
is viewed as an insensitive white city bureaucracy. Finally, the CCC
receives some sympathy from a broad spectrum of individuals who
suspect that federal poverty programs generally, or the Model Cities
projects specifically, are wasting tax dollars through mismanagement or
impropriety. The strength of the CCC is not represented, however, by
a constant or direct manifestation of support from these ideological
allies. Instead, the CCC's strength rests in its ability to arouse intense
public opposition among these loosely allied constitutencies at strategic
points, thereby forcing the city on occasion to postpone proposed action.
The most surprising aspect of the struggle between the CDA and
the CCC has been the CDA's inability to s'licit interested sponsors for
Model Cities projects. As noted, the CCO had adopted an informal
policy of limiting its opposition to projects that involved major displacement or proposed large scale housing efforts not approved by the group.
Indeed, it seems clear that the CCC could 'not oppose some social
services projects without risking the alienation of many of its potential
constitutents. 41° Despite the lack of CCC opposition to social services
projects, the CDA continued to experience difficulty in the implementation of projects of any type. Although HUD granted a six-month extension to Nashville for the first action year, the CDA has been unable to
utilize the full five and one-half million dollar grant. The spending
problem is of particular concern to the CDA since all funds that are not
spent by the end of any action year are to be carried over and credited
as a portion of the next action year grant.4"'
Whatever the causes of this lack of project support, the result has
420. Thus, for example, if the CCC opposed a day care project or a supplemental food
program it would risk alienating the potential beneficiaries of those programs. If the CCC later
raised criticism of proposals that involved displacement or urban renewal, the credibility of its
opposition would thereby be diminished, even though the program beneficiaries might fear displacement.
421. This concern was clearly expressed by CDA Director Buford Drake in an apparent
Freudian slip when he stated to the Metropolitan Council Model Cities Committee that there was
a large uncommitted portion of the Model Cities grant that the CDA had to "get rid of" before
the end of the first action year.
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been an ad hoc assortment of unrelated projects. Planning and evaluation of the best methods for utilizing the Model Cities grant has been
almost completely overshadowed by efforts merely to obtain project
sponsors. As the CDA Director explained to HUD officials, "His admitted strategy for the first action year is to spend funds (all funds) on
the projects which are either already approved or can easily get approval, quality notwithstanding."4 22 The purpose of this strategy, the
CDA Director added, "was to spend [the first action year] funds as
quickly as possible to avoid a loss or reduction of funding [in the second
action year]." 4 3
The attitudes of interested parties who were not directly involved
in the CCC-CDA struggle understandably have been ambivalent. The
August election introduced three new councilmen to the cast of characters involved in the program. The new councilmen were extremely interested in the patronage potential that the Model Cities program represented, but they were also wary of alienating the CCC leadership, which
had contributed indirectly to their successful election campaigns.4 4 Although these councilmen did attempt to utilize the Council's power to
investigate and to approve projects in order to coerce the CDA into
cooperation, they were quickly confronted with hostile reactions from
project sponsors and beneficiaries, Model Cities employees, and block
club members. Potential project sponsors also encountered this sort of
resistance when they proposed to resolve disputes over physical development and housing. Thus, for example, a proposal by the presidents of
the three MNA universities to sponsor the major portion of the housing
component was quickly abandoned, at least for the moment, in the face
of icy reception by the CCC. Similarly, recent informal presentations
by the Nashville Housing Authority at block club meetings have begun
to raise fears among citizens of the MNA that the CCC's early warnings
about residential displacement were not unwarranted.
The failure of HUD to take an active role in the guidance and
regulation of local Model Cities programs facilitated the unfortunate
deterioration of the Nashville Model Cities program to an essentially
political contest that pitted the ideological support for the CCC position
against the capacity of the CDA to distribute material benefits. During
422. Memorandum from Earl Metzger to Floyd Hyde, June 16, 1971, at I (report on second
quarterly review of Nashville program).
423. Id. at 2.
424. The CCC took no formal position and played no direct role in the election. The
chairman of the group, Edwin Mitchell, however, also served as chairman of the Davidson County
Independent Political Council, a black nonpartisan political organization. This group opposed 2
of the incumbent MNA councilmen, and urged a boycott of the Mayor's race.
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the planning stages of Model Cities, HUD frequently exerted influence
on the formulation of local programs. The close monitoring function at
this stage was implemented through a review by the regional offices of
the detailed material that HUD required each city to submit and
through frequent visits by regional officials, known as leadmen, who
were to provide a liaison between HUD and the local programs. Since
1969, however, several factors have combined to impair the monitoring
process. First, the difficulty that the cities experienced in complying
with the detailed submission requirements forced their virtual elimination. Secondly, the organization of HUD was shifted from a design built
around an individual program approach to a broader categorical structure. Thus, officials who had been responsible solely for Model Cities
were now expected to administer a broad spectrum of HUD programs
under the administrative rubric of Community Development. Thirdly,
the bureaucratic structure of HUD underwent major modifications in
the direction of greater decentralization, thereby reducing drastically
the personnel complement of each regional office. The rearrangement
of staff and function placed the primary program responsibility in Area
Offices created for each state. The decentralization, by reducing regional office manpower, effectively eliminated the capacity of regional
offices to conduct detailed reviews of Model Cities programs and confused the formerly established lines of authority. Finally, as the program
progressed, the HUD Model Cities staff inevitably lost its enthusiasm.
When the bright hopes of the early planners encountered the harsh
realities of the inner cities, bureaucratic frustration was the natural
consequence. Furthermore, the change of national administrations
brought the entire program perilously close to termination in 1969. Only
after several influential mayors rallied behind it did the program survive.
In the end, the Department's function consisted of little more than
self-justification and self-perpetuation. To satisfy demands that something be done to improve the quality of life in the cities, the Department
answered that substantial funding had been directed toward improvement of the inner city. Particularly successful local projects were publicized as examples of the beneficial effects of the program expenditures.
Unsuccessful programs were either ignored or dismissed as exceptional.
The fixed amount of the Model Cities grant for each action year and
the practical impossibility of terminating a program meant that HUD
was virtually powerless to impose its policy determinations on the ci-
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ties.41 Furthermore,the interagency coordinating role of HUD that was
designed to ensure a comprehensive array of federal funding for each
Model Cities program quickly disintegrated in the face of interdepartmental jealousies. Thus, the local Model Cities programs tended
to rely on the Model Cities grant as the primary source of funding rather
than as supplementary funding to ensure comprehensiveness, coordination, and innovation.
The future of the Model Cities program in Nashville is difficult to
predict. As of this writing, the program is approaching the end of the
first of five action years. The suit filed by the CCC in April 1971, is,
more than a year later, still pending. It is, of course, possible that the
program may eventually prove successful, but such a result is unlikely.
Even if the CCC is replaced as the official citizen participation structure
for the program, the ideological constituency from which the group
derives its strength will remain. Furthermore, as the CDA continues to
build an ad hoc constitutency of social service project sponsors and
beneficiaries dependent on sustained Model Cities funding, the amount
of uncommitted Model Cities funds available for coordination and
planned development diminishes. Most importantly, however, the questions of land use and residential development in North Nashville remain
unanswered.
IX.

POSTSCRIPT

At the completion of a study of this type there is a strong temptation to close with a series of broad conclusions and several proposals
for sweeping reform. Unfortunately, a case study rarely offers the
breadth of perspective needed for such conclusions or supplies the requisite wisdom for solutions with any certainty of success. The most that
can be hoped for in this study is some understanding of the complexity
of the problems involved. Having stated these limitations perhaps the
indulgence of a few general observations is permissible.
Perhaps the, most noticeable aspect of the Nashville Model Cities
experience is the inherently negative function of the citizen participation
structure. This is not to say that the citizens' impact on the program
was necessarily wrong or bad, but rather to say that the only independent power that the citizen participation structure had at its disposal was
425. An interesting exception to this general rule is apparently found in the very small
communities that have Model Cities programs. In interviews with regional Model Cities officials,
frequent reference was made to the successes that had been enjoyed where the Model Cities grant
represented a large percentage of the city's total budget.
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that of opposition. In this light it must be noted that unless a citizens'
group is given some form of veto power or proportionate voting control
in the decision-making process, its strength will nearly always rest on
its capacity to rally public sentiment. Thus, while the nature of the
constitutencies that a citizens' group represents may be criticized, a
truly effective citizen participation structure is almost by definition
never "unrepresentative." Criticism that a citizens' group is not representative in some sort of electoral sense is, of course, almost always true
and is almost always a mask for some other sort of attack on the
legitimacy of the group.
A second general observation that can be drawn from the Nashville
experience is that federal urban programs appear to ignore the fundamental differences between policies and programs. The presumption
seems to be that if something is being done, especially if it is being done
fairly expensively, then the result is bound to be beneficial. Unfortunately, the mere expenditure of funds to solve urban ills, while essential,
is not by itself enough. Both federal and local governments have displayed an apparently limitless capacity to absorb funds while very little
change is effected. Programs without clearly defined policies seem inevitably to result in massive bureaucratic staffing, coordination, reporting,
duplication, and evaluation, but only incidentally-and perhaps accidentally-in tangible results. The creation of a program, even a well
designed program, does not ensure that the program will be administered well. While the existence of a clearly defined policy cannot ensure
good administration, it can serve as a standard against which a program's administration constantly can be evaluated.
The final observation is perhaps more a reflection on the portents
that Model Cities holds for the current vogue of the New Federalism.
Put in somewhat oversimplified terms, the New Federalism assumes
that the cities are becoming ungovernable because they do not have the
resources with which to govern themselves. The solution proposed is
that funds be supplied to the cities with no strings attached so that the
viability of city governments can be restored. With adequate resources,
it is argued, the city governments will prove their value as the level of
government most responsive to the desires of the governed. In its final
development the Model Cities program has closely parallelled the New
Federalism concept. Given this fact, two problems seem worthy of note.
First, in allocating their resources city governments apparently have
developed something of a dual standard. The apportionment of local
funds is treated almost invariably as a matter for serious consideration.
The use of federal categorical grant-in-aid funds, however, seems frequently to have induced a conditioned reflex of approval simply because
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the money traditionally requires only a minimal local match and the
uses to which the funds may be put have been predetermined by the
federal government. This has tended to focus the consideration of the
local governments on maximum federal dollar return, rather than on
analysis of the city's problems and allocation of resources to meet these
problems. It is quite possible that the availability of federal funds with
no allocative restrictions attached will cause city governments to give
more serious consideration to the most effective method of utilizing
these funds. The removal of these strings from federal funds, however,
raises the second problem. In attempting to eliminate the bureaucratic
red tape and complexity of regulation, the Model Cities program was
generally successful. The elimination of the red tape and regulations,
however, was accomplished at the cost of surrendering the authority of
the federal government to intervene when the funds delivered to the
cities were being squandered. There is, of course, no necessary correlation between the relinquishment of control and the impropriety of expenditure, but the gravity of the decision to relinquish that control is
clear.
RICHARD W. CRESWELL
ALLAN GATES
PAUL M. KURTZ
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APPENDIX I
The Nashville Model Cities program has produced a remarkable
amount of studies, plans, and proposals relating to North Nashville.
Much of this material has been generated by the CDA in the normal
course of fulfilling the HUD planning and reporting requirements.
Other research and planning has been conducted in coordination with
the CDA by consultants and governmental agencies. Finally, the Nashville Model Cities program's performance itself has been the subject of
several studies. This appendix attempts to organize this material in a
manner that will be helpful to future students of North Nashville or the
Model Cities program. The materials listed in this appendix are available in the Vanderbilt Urban and Regional Development Center library.
I.

NASHVILLE CITY DEMONSTRATION AGENCY

All of the materials noted in this section, with the exception of the
Model Cities Responder, are documents that HUD required the local
CDA's in each city to prepare. The HUD regulations requiring these
documents are noted along with the description of each document
because the form and information used are frequently the result of the
detailed HUD requirements.
1. Planning Grant Application. Metropolitan Nashville City

Council Res. No. 67-209 (passed Apr. 27, 1967). Pp 205, appendices,
tables. This document is Nashville's request for a Model Cities planning
grant. The format follows the very detailed requirements set out by
HUD. HUD, Improving the Quality of Urban Life, A Program Guide
to Model Neighborhoods in Demonstration Cities, HUD PG-47 (Dec.
1966); see HUD, CDA Letter No. 1 (Oct. 30, 1967); HUD, CDA Letter
No. 4, HUD Handbook MCGR 3100.4 (July 1968).
2. Problem Analysis. Undated. Pp. 268, appendices. The Problem Analysis is Part I of the 3-part documentary planning process
required by HUD. HUD, CDA Letter No. 1 (Oct. 30, 1967); HUD,
CDA Letter No. 4, HUD Handbook MCGR 3100.4 (July 1968). The
document presents an analysis of the problems of the MNA in each of
the ten program component categories. Each component section was
prepared independently by a Technical Task Force of city agency personnel or consultants. The Problem Analysis also contains an Appendix
that includes eight of the studies listed elsewhere in this bibliography.
The studies that were included are so noted in their individual
discussions.
3.

Comprehensive City DemonstrationPlan. The Comprehensive
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City Demonstration Plan is basically a compilation of the specific project proposals planned for the execution phase of the Model Cities
program. Originally HUD required two distinct parts in a CCDP: a
detailed set of goals and objectives for the entire five year execution
program, and a specific set of project proposals for the first action year.
HUD, CDA Letter No. 1 (Oct. 30, 1967); HUD, CDA Letter No. 4,
HUD Handbook MCGR 3100.4 (July 1968). The requirement of goals
and objectives was eliminated for second round Model Cities programs,
however. Although the CCDP of any Model Cities program is in a
constant state of evolution, there are four distinctly identifiable stages
in the development of Nashville's plan. First, an initial draft CCDP was
completed by the city by the summer of 1969. Although this draft was
informally transmitted to HUD, it lacked adequate citizen participation
in its preparation and was eventually declared to be "Working Papers"
only. The second stage of Nashville's CCDP was a "Revised Issue"
dated February 12, 1970. This draft was apparently never intended for
submission, but was reproduced in order to have relatively current copies of a draft for the replanning process that was underway at that time.
The third stage is that of official submission. This document was presented and passed by the Metropolitan Council and served as the basis
for the first action year. The fourth and, to date, final stage of the
CCDP is a drastically simplifed version which reflects the massive number of projects that have been deleted or combined. Thus, while the first
three drafts all exceeded 700 pages in length, the current CCDP is a
relatively scant 200 pages.
4. Synopsis of Nashville CCDP. Mar. 11, 1970. Pp. 78. This
document, prepared by the Nashville CDA, summarizes the basic elements of the CCDP submitted to HUD on March 11, 1970. The Synopsis aroused a certain amount of hostility because it included a modified
version of the goals and objectives prepared for the initial draft of the
CCDP. The citizens were not consulted about the inclusion of these
goals and objectives and they feared that their submission violated the
working agreement with the Mayor and presaged a return to the discarded plans for an urban renewal project in the MNA.
5. Periodic Reports. Through the Model Cities Program HUD
has required cities to complete periodic reports on the progress of their
local Model Cities program. During the planning year, at least for the
first round Model Cities, there were two separate reports required: a BiMonthly Planning Progress Report and a Work Program Status Report. The regulatory authority requiring these reports is no longer clear
and, in the case of Nashville,the reports were submitted only sporadically. During the execution phase of a Model Cities program different
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reporting requirements are involved. HUD, CDA Letter No. 9, HUD
Handbook MCGR 3100.9 (Apr. 1969). The most important of these
execution phase reporting requirements is the Quarterly Program Status
Report. Each Quarterly Report includes not only a narrative of major
events, but also a set of tables indicating project and budget status.
Although the preparation of these reports has occasionally been behind
schedule, a report for each quarter of Nashville's program has thus far
been submitted to HUD.
6. Project Contracts. Each project of a Model Cities program
must be approved by a resolution of the local government body. HUD,
CDA Letter No. 8, HUD Handbook MCGR 3100.8 91 13 (June 1969).
Thus, the contract under which each Model Cities project is implemented is enacted as a resolution and is filed with the city clerk as a
matter of public record.
7. Model Cities Responder. The Responder is a newspaper dealing with Model Cities that is published monthly by the Nashville CDA.
The Responder has been the subject of occasional criticism due to the
amount of funds ($20,000 annually) budgeted for its publication, and
because of the criticism that the paper has frequently directed at the
CCC and, somewhat less frequently, at uncooperative MNA councilmen. The Responder began publication in December 1970.
II.

CONSULTANT REPORTS

A. Funnye Associates, Brooklyn, New York. This consulting
firm was engaged by the CCC to assist that group in its replanning of
the CCDP in the winter of 1969-70. The firm was selected by the citizens
group and was responsible directly to the citizens, but for the purpose
of compensation the contract was between the Nashville CDA and the
National Committee against Discrimination in Housing, Inc., New
York, New York (NCDH). Funnye Associates served as the planning
consultants for the NCDH Department of Field Services.
Although the Funnye Associates work consisted primarily of fifteen days of personal consultation with CCC standing committees, three
reports were issued.
1. Highway Planning and Urban Opportunity in Nashville,
Tennessee. June 20, 1970. Pp. 15. This report is an analysis of plans for
connector and Interstate highway frontage roads in North Nashville.
The report criticizes the highway planners' prediction of local traffic
volume that would be generated by 1-40 as too high and recommends
that the planned construction be delayed indefinitely.
2. Model Cities Planning and Urban Opportunity in Nashville,
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Tennessee. June 22, 1970. Pp. 13. This is the final report of Funnye
Associates on the services rendered in consultation with the CCC. The
report describes in very helpful detail the activities of the consultants
during their involvement in the Nashville Model Cities program. Because the report discusses the activities of the consultants, substantive
planning commentary is discussed only indirectly.
3.

Model Cities Planning and Urban Opportunity in Nashville,

Tennessee. July 10, 1970. Pp. 5. This addendum to Funnye Associates'
final report discusses the criteria utilized in reviewing the CCDP with
the CCC standing committee.
B. Marcou, O'Leary & Associates, Washington, D.C. This planning firm was engaged by the Nashville CDA in the late summer of 1968
to prepare a detailed physical development plan for the Nashville Model
Cities program. The task of planning the proposed air rights deck over
1-40 was added to the consultants' tasks in the wake of the 1-40 controversy in late 1968.
1. Nashville Model Neighborhood Area: Alternatives for Housing and Industrial Development. April 1969. Pp. 114. This study is the

basic report of Marcou, O'Leary & Associates on the physical planning
alternatives possible under the Nashville Model Cities program. After
briefly reviewing the economy of Nashville and the physical and socioeconomic conditions in the MNA, the study proposes three planning
alternatives for physical development in the MNA. The proposals presented in this study represent virtually all of the initial physical planning
conducted in the first year of the Nashville program and became a focal
point for the controversy over physical development in North Nashville.
An early draft of this study was included in the Problem Analysis
submitted to HUD by the Nashville CDA.
2.

Interstate Highway 40 Air Rights Project, Nashville,

Tennessee January 1970. Pp. 64. This study was prepared for the Nashville CDA, the Tennessee Department of Highways and the United
States Bureau of Public Roads to study the economic and design feasibility of an Air Rights Project or deck over a section of Interstate 40
that had been depressed below ground level for this purpose. This deck
was proposed as a development that could ameliorate the disruptive
impact of Interstate 40 in the MNA.
C. Simmons, Ussery, Streets & Associates, Berkeley, California.
This consulting firm was selected by the CCC to assist the group's
standing committees in reviewing the proposed projects that were being
prepared by the CDA. The firm's contract called for 30 days of personal
consultation starting April 3, 1969. The role of the CCC in the planning
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process, however, was unclear at this point in time. As a consequence,
much of the consultants' time was spent in advising the citizens on role
definition rather than in evaluating project plans. Thus, while the reports submitted are generally brief and superficial, they constitute the
bulk of the planning recommendations made by the firm.
1. Recommendations on the Nashville Model Cities Proposed
Physical Environment and Housing Components. NMC-PEH Paper
No. 1. May 1, 1969. Pp. 10. This report reviews very superficially the
Model Cities projects proposed for the physical development of the
MNA and recommends that a Community Development Corporation
be formed to sponsor the projects finally selected. This corporation is
stressed as an essential element in assuring MNA residents both continued involvement in the planning and economic benefit from the implementation of projects.
2. Housing and Economic Development: Suggestionsfor a Planning Approach Applicable to the Nashville Model Cities Area. NMCHED Paper No. 2. May 12, 1969. Pp. 31. This report presents a more
detailed set of goals, proposed structure, and suggested first year program for the Community Development Corporation proposed in the
firm's initial report.
D. Alan M. Voorhees & Associates, McLean, Virginia. This firm
was engaged by the Nashville CDA in the late summer of 1968 to
prepare a problem analysis and project proposals for the Transportation
Component of the Nashville Model Cities program.
1. TransportationAccessibility from the Model Cities Area.
March, 1969. Pp. xvi, 66, figures. This study was prepared under a
contract with the Nashville CDA as the primary planning for the Model
Cities program's Transportation Component. The study emphasizes the
heavy dependence of MNA residents on public transportation and the
insufficiency of mass transit routes and scheduling to service these
needs. The study recommends three basic projects to solve these problems: a circumferential bus route to connect the existing radial routes;
a radio-dispatched Mini Bus service similar to taxi service; and a public
relations campaign to increase public awareness of the transit services
available.
E. Western Management Consultants, Inc., Phoenix, Arizona.
Unlike the other four consulting firms discussed in this section, Western
Management Consultants was not involved in the planning for Model
Cities. Instead, this consulting firm was the contractor for implementation of a first action year project. The report discussed below is the
result of that project.
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I. Public Opinion Survey in Nashville-Davidson County About
Metro Center. January 1972. Pp. xiii, 30, appendices. This study is a
marketing survey of public attitudes throughout Nashville toward a
large private residential and commercial real estate development
planned for the North Nashville area. The information in the report is
of only limited interest because it is a fairly standard market survey. The
real significance in this study is the fact that it was paid for by the Model
Cities program. The project had initially been planned to study the
engineering and economic feasibility of using the vacant 700-acre floodplain of the Cumberland River, which is located in the MNA, for the
construction of housing for MNA residents. Metropolitan Nashville
City Council Res. No. 71-1193 (passed May 4, 1971). Shortly after the
passage of this project it was announced that the floodplain had been
acquired for a private planned community development. Nashville Tennessean, May 16, 1971, at 1, cols. 7-8. When this study was published,
it provoked a minor controversy over the use of the 40,000 dollar project
to benefit so directly a private real estate venture.
III. Governmental Agency Studies
A. Metropolitan Planning Commission of Nashville-Davidson
County, Tennessee. The MPC has been intimately involved in Model
Cities planning from its earliest stages. The studies listed below represent only the studies that are clearly identifiable as projects prepared
entirely by the MPC Staff.
1. Model City Area: Community FacilitiesInventory. December
1968. Pp. vii, 65. This staff memorandum describes the physical characteristics of each park, public school, public health facilitity, library and
university building, and community center in the MNA. The memorandum was included as an appendix to the Problem Analysis submitted
to HUD by the Nashville CDA.
2. Model City Area: Evaluation of Neighborhood Livability.
December 1968. Pp. vi. 58. This staff memorandum begins with a general overview of the sewage, fire protection, educational, and recreational facilities in the Model Neighborhood Areas. The second and
largest part of the memorandum evaluates the housing quantity and
quality, the land use conflicts, the traffic patterns, the services and
facilities, and the aesthetic characteristics in each of the six planning
areas in the MNA. The memorandum concludes with a set of suggested
goals for resolving the problems identified. This memorandum was included as an appendix to the Problem Analysis submitted to HUD by
the Nashville CDA.
3. Model City Area: Socio-Economic and Residential
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Development. December 1968. Pp. v, 30. After a brief discussion of the
general characteristics of the population taken from the 1940, 1950, and
1960 censuses, this staff memorandum discusses the quality and quantity of housing in the MNA and the characteristics of tenancy. This
memorandum was included as an appendix to the Problem Analysis
submitted to HUD by the Nashville CDA.
4. Model City Survey Research EvaluationandPreliminaryData
System Design. March 1970. Pp. 227. (HUD § 701 Project: Tenn. P67). This is a three part study designed to survey the existing literature
on conditions in the MNA and to describe a computer data system into
which these studies and other data might be organized. The first part
of this report is a 190-page annotated bibliography of some 32 studies
that deal entirely or in part with conditions in North Nashville. The
remaining two parts of the report briefly describe a computer data
system design into which this material could be incorporated and suggests potential uses of the described system.
5. Model Cities in Perspective: An Analysis of Model City Area
Plans and their Consistency with the Policies of the MetropolitanGovernment of Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee. April 1970. Pp. x,
252. (HUD § 701 Project: Tenn. P-67). This study briefly reviews land
use patterns in the MNA, discusses in detail the three alternative approaches proposed by the consulting firm of Marcou, O'Leary, and
relates these planning approaches to the countywide planning process
as well as the inner city urban renewal effort.
B. Mid-Cumberland Comprehensive Health Planning Council,
Nashville, Tennessee.
1. Policy Implications of Health and Hospital ProgramsRelating to Model Cities Studies and Planning. July 1970. Pp. xi, 123.
(HUD § 701 Project: Tenn. P-67). This staff report was conducted
under a contract with the Metropolitan Planning Commission of
Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee to examine the health care services and policies, including the Model Cities Health Component, as they
relate to North Nashville.
IV.

MISCELLANEOUS STUDIES

1. A Case Study of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson
County, Tennessee's Application for a Model Cities Grant: The
Decision-Making Process in Selecting a Model Cities Neighborhood.
By Ronald Don O'Donniley. Knoxville, Tenn., 1969. Pp. iv, 151. This
study is a thesis presented to the University of Tennessee in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in
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Planning. The first part of the study is devoted to examining decisionmaking theory in urban planning. The second part of the study described in detail the narrative of events involved in the selection of
Nashville's MNA. The final section of the study applies the decisionmaking theories to the events in Nashville and concludes that the selection process was best described by nonrational decision theory due
largely to the political constraints involved.
2. Employment, Housing & Transportation Problems in the
MNA of Nashville. By Flournoy A. Coles, Jr. Nashville, 1969. This
survey, prepared for the Nashville Concentrated Employment Program,
is a compilation of data on employment and housing in North Nashville.
The study was included as an appendix to the Problem Analysis submitted by the Nashville CDA to HUD.
3. Nashville's Model Cities Program: An Unborn Partnership.
By Jack E. White, Jr. Nashville, 1971. (Race Relations Information
Center Special Report, RRIC-14). This study is a strongly pro-citizens
group narrative of the citizen participation controversy in the Nashville
Model Cities program.
4. Project Operation Northtown. By Middle Tennessee Business
Association. Nashville, 1969. Pp. 144. This study was conducted under
a grant from the Small Business Administration to the Middle Tennessee Business Association, a private non-profit organization of black
businessmen in the Nashville area. The grant was received in the wake
of the serious disruption of a major black business district caused by the
construction of Interstate Highway 40 through North Nashville. The
study was intended as a compilation and presentation of factual information relative to the Negro and small businesses in North Nashville,
their market and trade areas and was included as an appendix to the
Problem Analysis submitted by Nashville to HUD. The report is comprised of seven independent studies and two general commentaries:
-A Survey of Negro-Owned and Operated Business Enterprises in
Nashville, Tennessee. By R. Gran Lloyd. Pp. 52.
-Market and Trade Analysis of Afro-American Communities in
Metropolitan Nashville. By MTBA staff. Pp. 11.
-Land Use and Urban Analysis of Afro-American Communities
in Metropolitan Nashville. By Yale Rabin. Pp. 23.
-Architectural Analysis of Eleven Selected Negro Businesses in
Metropolitan Nashville. By L. Quincy Jackson. Pp. 13.
-Record and Bookkeeping Analysis of Eleven Selected Negro
Businesses in Metropolitan Nashville. By Ernst & Ernst, Public
Accountants. Pp. 15.
-Analysis of Resources and Economic Feasibilities for Black-
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Owned Business and Industry in Metropolitan Nashville and Middle
Tennessee. By Robert N. Moore. Pp. 28.
-State of Major Problems of Black Businesses. By Inman E. Otey
and R. Gran Lloyd. Pp. 6.
-Notes and Suggestions for Concern and Consideration in Economic Development of the Ghetto. By Vivian Henderson. Pp. 6.
V.

OTHER MATERIALS

1. HUD Memoranda.Written correspondence frequently is a valuable tool in unraveling the complex history of the Nashville Model
Cities program. Unfortunately, most of the correspondence between the
local participants was written "to build a record" and cannot always be
entirely trusted. The internal memoranda written by HUD officials,
however, seem to be very helpful in balancing the other documentary
evidence. Although other biases are exhibited by HUD officials, the
frequent memoranda on field trips and minutes of meetings offer
valuable insights into both the Nashville Program locally and HUD's
treatment of the problems it raised.
2.

Minutes of CCC Meetings. Although the Minutes of the CCC

meetings are neither detailed nor uniform in their accuracy, they are
helpful in at least three respects. First, an attendance list of each meeting is usually appended to the Minutes. Secondly, the Minutes are
frequently the only source in which an official position of the CCC is
precisely stated. Finally, the Minutes are usually detailed enough to
indicate the types of topics that were discussed at any particular meeting.
3. Trial Record. The Model Cities program in Nashville has been
involved in a lengthy court battle over the adequacy of both the citizen
participation and the substantive projects planned for implementation.
North Nashville Citizens Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Romney,
Civ. No. 6121 (pending in M.D. Tenn.). The pleadings and documentary
evidence introduced in the trial have been extensive and the transcript
of the oral testimony is thirteen volumes in length. Needless to say, this
record is a fruitful, if not overwhelming, source of data on the history
of the Nashville Model Cities Program.
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APPENDIX II
The Model Cities program was created by Title I of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, as amended,
42 U.S.C. §§ 3301-14 (1970). The statutory language was vague, however, and the task of establishing the detailed structure of the program
was delegated to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.
This Appendix attempts to serve as a bibliographical guide to the administrative regulations by which HUD has defined the scope and structure of Model Cities.
Four basic types of administrative material have been used by
HUD in defining the nature of the Model Cities program: CDA Letters,
Circulars, Technical Assistance Bulletins (TABS), and Model Cities
Management Series Bulletins. In the material that follows an effort has
been made to compile as complete a bibliography as possible of the
materials published by HUD in each of these four categories.
Several points should be noted about this bibliography. First, in an
effort to be historically complete many materials have been included
that have been revised or supplemented by subsequent issuances. Secondly, the date of issuance of an administrative regulation may not
reflect the precise date on which the policy or requirement was implemented by HUD. Frequently policies are implemented informally by
HUD before any written statement is promulgated. Furthermore, an
unofficial written statement of impending policy changes often is circulated to CDA directors and HUD Model Cities officials well in advance
of its official issuance. Thirdly, changing policies in the Model Cities
program may have different impacts on individual local Model Cities
programs. Thus, a revision of the planning requirements made in 1969
had its primary impact on the second round Model Cities programs and
did not affect the first round programs that had already completed their
planning year. Finally, it should be noted that this list may not be
complete. Each issuance is distributed informally by HUD and is not
reproduced in the FederalRegister or the Code of FederalRegulations.
Furthermore, the extent of distribution of an issuance will vary depending upon its subject matter. For example, regulations governing the
HUD Regional Office policies are normally distributed only to the
Regional Offices affected. Persons interested in obtaining these materials should correspond directly with the Department of Housing and
Urban Development.
CDA LETTERS
The basic procedures for the Model Cities program have been
outlined by the Department of Housing and Urban Development in
I.
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eleven CDA Letters, issued between October 1967 and November 1970.
These documents detail the required procedure for the local CDA office
for all phases of the program, from planning grant application to execution. The CDA Letters were issued under the authority of 42 U.S.C
§ 3303(a)(5) (1970).
CDA Letter No. 1 (October 30, 1967): Model Cities Planning Requirements.
CDA Letter No. 2 (May 1969): Administrative Policies and Procedures (this is the 3rd version of this letter).
CDA Letter No. 3 (November 1967): Citizen Participation.
CDA Letter No. 4 (July 1968): Comprehensive Program Submission
Requirements.
CDA Letter No. 5 (February 1970): Policies and Requirements for
Model Cities Relocation (this is the 2nd version
of this letter).
CDA Letter No. 6 (May (1970): Budget Submission Requirements (this
is the 3rd version of this letter).
CDA Letter No. 7 (November 1968): Computation of the Base for the
Supplemental Grant.
CDA Letter No. 8, Part I (June 1969): Administrative and Legal
Policies and Procedures for the Execution Phase.
CDA Letter No. 8, Part II (June 1969): Accounting and Financial
Management Procedures for the Execution Phase
of the Model Cities Program.
CDA Letter No. 9 (April 1969): Model Cities Program Execution
Phase Program Reporting.
CDA Letter No. 10A (December 1969): Administrative Performance
and Capability.
CDA Letter No. 10B (March 1970): Joint HUD-OEO Policy for
Citizen Participation in Model Cities.
CDA Letter No. lOC (November 1970): Policy Statement on Economic
Development for Model Cities.
CDA Letter No. lOD (November 1970): Separation of Responsibilities.
CDA Letter No. 11 (November 1970): Model Cities Resident Employment and Training Requirements.

II.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULLETINS

There are four Technical Assistance Bulletins (TABS) which have
been issued by HUD. Unlike the required policies and procedures out-
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lined in the CDA letters, the TABS are merely advisory and attempt to
give assistance to the local CDA office in troublesome areas.
Technical Assistance Bulletin #1 (October 1967): Use of Planning
Grant Money and Staffing.
Technical Assistance Bulletin #2 (July 1968): Measures of Living
Quality in Model Neighborhoods.
Technical Assistance Bulletin #3 (December 1968): Citizen Participation in Model Cities.
Technical Assistance Bulletin #4 (March 1971): Guidelines for Relocation Grievance Mechanism.
III.

MODEL CITIES MANAGEMENT SERIES BULLETINS

The Model Cities Management Series Bulletins were prepared by
consultants for issuance by HUD. These Bulletins describe successful
procedures observed in a study of several local City Demonstration
Agencies and suggest methods by which a CDA could implement these
procedures.
Bulletin
Bulletin
Bulletin
Bulletin
Bulletin
Bulletin
Bulletin
Bulletin
Bulletin
Bulletin
Bulletin

#1-Organization 70 pp. [1971].
#2-Personnel 86 pp. [1971].
#3-Financial Management 118 pp. [1971].
#4-Project Implementation & Coordination 72 pp. [1971].
#5-Policies and Procedures 136 pp. [1971].
#6-Citizens Organizations 83 pp. [1971].
#7-[Not Issued to Date].
#8-Information Systems 130 pp. [1971].
#9-[Not Issued to Date].
#10-Citizens Training 66 pp. [1971].
#11-Using Consultants 58 pp. [1971].
IV.

CIRCULARS

The Circulars issued by HUD are of two types. Some are required
policy and represent modifications and/or explanations of the CDA
letters. Others are purely informational and provide an opportunity for
local CDA offices to learn of available programs for inclusion in the
Model Cities effort. The Circulars are organized in topical categories
which are indicated by the first four digits of the issuance number.
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Title

Classification
A. General
MC 3130.0, Chg. 2 & 3 ......

Comprehensive Subject Index and
Numerical Index to the Model Cities Manual

MC 3130.1 .................

Summary of Comprehensive Pro-

M C 3130.2 .................

grams
Utilization of GSA Supply Sources
by CDA's

B. Submission Requirements

M C 3140.1 .................
MC 3140.3, Chg. 1 ..........
M C 3140.4 .................
MC 3140.5, Chg. 1 & 2 ......

Description of Projects in One-Year
Action Program-Modification of
CDA Letter No. 4.
Submission Requirements for First
Year Comprehensive Plans
Establishing the Beginning of the
First Action Year
Submission Requirements for Second Year

C. Action Plans
MC 3140.8 .................
D.
MC
MC
MC
MC

3145.1
3145.2
3145.3
3145.4

Public Service Careers Financial
Procedures

CDA Structure, Function and Administration
.................
.................
.................
.................

M C 3145.5 .................

M C 3145.6 .................

M C 3145.7 .................
M C 3145.8 .................

Conflicts of Interest
Contracting Procedures
Contracting Procedures
Letter to Proceed for Third Party
Contracts
Audits of Model Cities Operating
.Agencies and Citizen Participation
Organizations
Principles and Standards for Costs
Applicable to Model Cities Grants
& Contracts with Local Governments
Restrictions on Political Activities
Funding of Continuing Activities
Between Action Years
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E. CDA Relationships and Coordination
MC 3150.1 .................
MC 3150.2 .............

....

MC 3150.3 .................

Local Government Participation in
CAMPS
Local Approval of Interim Submissions
Letters to Proceed for Administrative Costs Incurred after Submission of Comprehensive City Demonstration Program

F.- Relocation
MC 3165.2
MC 3165.3

.................
.................
G.

Program Components

M C 3170.1 .................
M C 3170.2 .................
M C 3170.3 .................

M C 3170.4 .................
M C 3170.5 .................
M C 3170.6 .................
M C 3170.7 .................
M C 3170.8 .................
M C 3170.9 .................
M C 3170.10 ................

M C 3170.11

Model Cities Relocation Plans
Relocation Grievance Procedure

.................

M C 3170.12 ................
M C 3170.13 ................

Minority Construction Contractor
Assistance Program
Appalachian Housing Assistance
Financial Assistance for Sponsors
of Low and Moderate Income
Housing
Resources for Day Care Program
Group Practice Facilities-NonProfit Hospitals
Involvement of U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers in the Model Cities
Program
Food and Nutrition in Model Cities
Community Coordinated Child
Care (4-C) Program
Income Maintenance in Model
Cities
Transportation Grants, Technical
Assistance, and Coordination with
Highways
Legal Services for Public Welfare
Clients
Urban Investment Program of the
Life Insurance Business
Utilization of the National Corporation for Housing Partnerships
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Planning,Monitoring and Evaluation

CDA Evaluation Requirements
Responding to CDA Letter No. 9
Reporting Requirements
701 Planning Assistance
Interim Reporting Requirements

M C 3180.2 .................
M C 3180.3 .................
MC 3180.4, Supp ..........
M C 3180.5 .................
L

HUD Organization

MC 3185.0 ........ .........

MC 3185.1

.........

MC 3185.2

.........

MC 3185.3

.........

MC 3185.4
MC 3185.5

.........
.........

MC 3185.7
MC 3185.8

.........
.........

MC 3185.9 ........ .........
MC 3185.10

.........

MC 3185.11

....... .........

MC 3185.12 ....... .........
MC 3185.13 ....... .........

MC 3185.14 ....... .........

Comprehensive Subject Index and
Numerical Index to the Model Cities manual (Federal and State
Agencies Section)
Distribution of MC Materials to
Citizen Organizations
Data on Executed Contracts and
Amendments, Model Cities Planning Grants
Reporting on Obligation of Model
Cities Planning Funds
Report Compliance
Procedure for City Council Vote on
Comprehensive Plans
Model Cities Audit Procedures
Distribution, Processing and Control of Reports Required by CDA
Letter No. 9
701 Program Funding for Model
Cities (State Participation)
Assuring City Government Responsibility During the Planning Process
Instructions to Leadmen Regarding
Model Cities Relocation Plans
Workable Programs for Community Improvement (WPFCI) in
Model Cities
Relation of Technical Assistance
ContractQrs to Model Neighborhood Residents and Local Resource
Deliverers
Quarterly Progress Meetings
-Assistant Regional Administrator's Report
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M C 3185.15 ................
M C 3185.16 ................

M C 3185.17 ................
M C 3185.18 ................

M C 3185.19 ................

M C 3185.20 ................
M C 3185.21

................

M C 3185.22 ................
M C 3185.23 ................
M C 3185.24 ................
M C 3185.25 ................
M C 3185.26 ................
M C 3185.27 ................
M C 3185.28 ................
M C 3185.29 ................
M C 3185.30 ................
M C 3185.31

................

M C 3185.32 ................

M C 3185.33 ................

Review of Amendments to Comprehensive Programs
Procedure for Securing and Distributing Copies of Model Cities Comprehensive Programs
Regional Recommendations of City
Comprehensive Plans
Recording Approved Programs and
Amendments to Approved Programs
Regional Fiscal Monitoring Procedures (Supplemental Phase)
-Model Cities Program
Approval of Expansion of Model
Neighborhoods
Potential Voluntary Assistance
Available
Utilization of GSA Supply Sources
by CDA's
Execution Application Numbers
Relationship with Model Neighborhood Groups
Revocation of Letter of Credit
Evaluation Review Package for
Regional Staff
Certification of Base for Model Cities Supplementary Grants
Urban Technical Assistance Program
Distribution of Regional Issuances
to Citizens
Review Process for Second and
Succeeding Year Action Programs
Responsibilities and Procedures for
Moving into the Execution
Phase-the First Action Year
Procedures for Moving Into the
Execution Phase-Second Action
Year
Target Allocations for Supplementary Grants for Second and
Subsequent Action Years
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M C 3185.37 ................
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Regional Review of Program
Budget Submissions
Monthly Financial Management
Report
Modification of Second and Succeeding Year Review Process to
Reflect Opening of Area Offices
Area Office Review and Approval
of Amendments to Model Cities
CCDP's
Review and Approval Process for
Second and Succeeding Years
Model Cities Action Programs and
Amendments
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APPENDIX III
Through this study, many shorthand labels have been used to designate governmental agencies and programs. Also, many of the persons
connected with the Nashville Model Cities program are referred to by
name without any further identification. This appendix identifies the
labels used most often and the major actors in the Nashville Model
Cities drama.
I.

AGENCIES AND PROGRAMS

CAA-Community Action Agency. This is the operating agency
of a CAP.
CAMPS-Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System. The
CAMPS is a device for coordination and the exchange of information
on manpower programs on an area-wide basis.
CAP-Community Action Program. The CAP is the local antipoverty program undertaken b OEO.
CCC (also NNCCC, Inc.)-Citizens Coordinating Committee.
The CCC is the official citizens participation structure of the Nashville
Model Cities program.
CCDP-Comprehensive City Demonstration Program. This required submission by the CDA to HUD is a complete compilation of
projects proposed for funding under the city's Model City grant.
CDA (also MCA)-City DemonstrationAgency. The CDA is the
coordinating agency on the local level that oversees the planning and
operation of Model Cities-funded projects.
CEP-ConcentratedEmployment Program. This Department of
Labor program is a coordinating mechanism at the local level for employment development.
MCA (see CDA)-Model City Agency. A synonym for City Demonstration Agency.
MNA -Model Neighborhood Area. The MNA is the target area

that the local Model Cities program attempts to improve.
NNCCC, Inc. (see CCC)-North Nashville Citizens Coordinating
Committee, Inc. This is the corporate form of the CCC.
RICC-Regional Interagency Coordinating Committee. This regional committee, made up of representatives from several federal agencies, was charged with the responsibility of reviewing and approving a
city's CCDP before the proposal could be approved.
WICC- Washington Interagency Coordinating Committee. The
Washington counterpart of the RICC. This committee's approval was
originally a pre-requisite for funding of a local CCDP.
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INDIVIDUALS

Henry Bankston-Regional Citizen Participation Adviser for the
Atlanta region.
JoAnn Bennett-Secretary of the CCC.
Beverly Briley-Mayor of Nashville.
Buford Drake-Nashville CDA Director (technically, the Administrative Assistant to the Mayor in charge of the Model Cities Program).
Floyd Hyde-Assistant Secretary of HUD for Model Cities.
Ernest Marsolan-ThirdHUD leadman assigned to the Nashville
Model Cities program.
Robert Meadows-Former Assistant to the CDA Director.
Earl Metzger-Assistant Regional Administrator of HUD for
Model Cities for the Atlanta region.
Edwin Mitchell-Chairman of the CCC.
Norman Moore-Formersocio-economic analyst in the Nashville
CDA.
Allen Polsby-Former desk officer in Washington HUD for the
Atlanta region.
Melvin Randolph-Second HUD leadman assigned to the Nashville Model Cities program.
William Reinhart-FormerNashville CDA Director.
George Romney-Secretary of HUD.
Charles Straub-RegionalInteragency Liaison Officer for the Atlanta region.
H. Ralph Taylor-Former Assistant Secretary of HUD for Model
Cities.
Dean Tucker-First HUD leadman assigned to the Nashville
Model Cities program.
Steve Vilvens-Fourth and current HUD leadman assigned to the
Nashville Model Cities program.
Robert Weaver-Former Secretary of HUD.

